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INTRODUCTION
Within academia, paradigm shifts occur regularly, some more im-
portant than others. As the takeover wave of the 1980s ebbs,' a signifi-
cant shift now appears to be in progress in the way the public
corporation is understood. Above all, the new thinking emphasizes
that political forces shaped the modern corporation. While the old par-
adigm saw the structure of the corporation as the product of a Darwin-
ian competition in which the most efficient design emerged victorious, 2
1. The rate of takeovers and other acquisitions has declined significantly and con-
tinues to decline. During the first quarter of 1991, merger and acquisition activity de-
clined 18% over the corresponding quarter in the preceding year and hit an eleven year
low. See Mergers at an 11-year Low, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1991, at D10. The reasons
for this decline are various: The drying up of the junk bond market; restrictive state
antitakeover legislation, see infra note 5 and accompanying text; and judicial decisions
that have accepted preemptive defensive tactics by target management. See, e.g.,
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). This decline
in takeover activity, particularly as a result of restrictive state legislation, has supplied
the impetus, in my judgment, for scholars to consider the thesis that politics, more than
economics, shaped the modem American corporation.
2. What I am terming the "old paradigm" of the public corporation rests on two
basic structural pillars: (1) the view of the public corporation as a private and largely
contractual undertaking and thus devoid of much "public law" significance, see, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1416 (1989), and (2) the view that the separation of ownership and control is both inevi-
table and efficient. The separation of ownership and control was first identified by Adolf
A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means in their path-breaking book, The Modem Corporation
and Private Property (1932). Recent theorists have argued that this separation is effi-
cient because it allows entrepreneurs to obtain capital from risk-neutral shareholders
who, because they are diversified, can accept business risks that would deter undiversi-
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this new perspective sees political forces as constraining that evolution-
ary process and possibly foreclosing the adoption of a superior organi-
zational form. Thus, my colleague Professor Mark Roe has argued that
the Berle/Means corporation, in which ownership and control are sepa-
rated, was not "an inevitably natural consequence" of the economic
and technological forces that shaped modem capitalism, but rather was
an adaptation to political forces that limited the scale, scope, and power
of financial institutions.3 Absent these politically imposed constraints,
he suggests, the evolution of the modem corporation might have re-
sulted in the emergence of a very different dominant organizational
form, one more nearly resembling the Japanese or German industrial
system in which financial institutions are the major shareholders of, and
closely monitor, industrial corporations.4
Perhaps it should not be surprising that this new focus on political
constraints has surfaced just as the combination of state antitakeover
statutes and adverse judicial decisions has largely succeeded in eclips-
ing the hostile takeover as a mechanism of corporate accountability. 5
During the late 1980s, political constraints seemed puny in comparison
to the power of the market to drive corporate control transactions, but
today the political vulnerability of the takeover movement is obvious.
Still, there is an irony to the assertion that political forces crippled the
potential monitoring capacity of financial institutions. Academics are
raising the claim at the same time that (1) Congress is proposing to
repeal or substantially relax the Glass-Steagall Act, which separates
commercial from investment banking, and to amend related legislation
that restricts interstate branching,6 and (2) the SEC is proposing to re-
fled shareholder/managers. The new focus on the political forces shaping the modern
corporation chiefly challenges this second pillar of the current orthodoxy, but in time, a
public choice perspective, applied rigorously, could challenge the first pillar as well.
3. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 10 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Theory]; see MarkJ. Roe, Political and Legal
Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 7 (1990).
Even before Professor Roe, the thesis that financial institutions had been regulated into
passivity in their role as shareholders had been advanced (at least in an abbreviated
fashion) by Michael Jensen. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 65-66.
4. Roe, Political Theory, supra note 3, at 59-62. Professor Roe is careful not to
argue that control of corporations by financial institutions is necessarily desirable, but
he does conclude that the "[floreign experience provides strong evidence that" such a
pattern would have developed, absent regulation. Id. at 60. This Article disagrees.
5. The 1980s saw 34 states pass over 65 statutes restricting corporate takeovers.
These are examined and categorized in Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The
Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 291
(1989). See also Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and
Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457 (1988) (arguing that such legislation chiefly
benefitted the managements of target corporations).
6. What legislative modifications, if any, of the Glass-Steagall Act will ultimately
pass Congress remains uncertain, but as of mid-1991, each of the Administration,
House, and Senate bills would eliminate most of the barriers to commercial banks own-
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lax its proxy rules to facilitate shareholder collective action, particularly
by institutional shareholders. 7 If the public at large has a concern about
financial institutions today, it is not their strength, but their weakness,
that worries them. To the extent that the public perceives banks as
reckless, unstable, or infirm, it may still favor their paternalistic regula-
tion, but the populist image of a domineering J.P. Morgan seems to
have been forever erased from the public's mind by the recent wave of
insolvencies.
Without challenging the historical accuracy of the thesis that polit-
ical and ideological forces inhibited the growth of financial monitoring
in the United States, this Article doubts that this thesis takes us very far.
In particular, its contemporary relevance is undercut by the fact that
most of the barriers that confined commercial banks to limited sectors
of the economy appear to be facing a demolition that is as sudden and
complete as the collapse of the Berlin Wall. More importantly, even if
the new theorists are correct in their view that, but for political con-
straints, U.S. financial institutions could have developed into efficient
corporate monitors-much as they believe that they have in Japan, Ger-
many and elsewhere 8-that this scenario raises two major questions
that their political history of institutional development alone cannot ad-
equately answer: (1) Is a similar system of corporate monitoring
ing securities affiliates and to interstate branching. See Stephen Labaton, Riegle Offers
a Third Bill on Banking, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1991, at D6. In June, 1991, the House
Banking Committee approved legislation that would permit the expansion of banks into
both the securities and insurance fields. See Stephen Labaton, House Panel Approves
Sweeping New Bank Rules, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1991, at A35. To the extent that re-
strictions on commercial banks' ability to engage in interstate banking or investment
banking was the primary evidence relied upon to prove that political forces constrained
the development of financial monitoring in the United States, see supra note 3 and ac-
companying text, this political theory seems to have limited predictive power.
7. In June, 1991, the SEC proposed to amend its proxy rules under § 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to facilitate inter-shareholder communications and to
reduce the costs of compliance for persons engaged in a proxy solicitation. See Regula-
tion of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 29,315, 56 Fed. Reg.
28,987 (June 25, 1991). This proposed relaxation of the proxy rules was in response to
a request made by the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) that
their impact on institutional investors be reexamined. See infra note 46 and accompany-
ing text. In light of the SEC's apparent willingness to relax at least some regulations
that burden institutional investors, the overregulation thesis again loses some of its con-
temporary force.
8. In addition to Professor Roe, I would list Professors Bernard Black of Columbia,
Ronald Gilson and Joseph Grundfest of Stanford, and Reinier Kraakman of Harvard as
among those academics who have most notably advanced the overregulation thesis that
the monitoring capacity of institutional investors has been inhibited by excessive regula-
tion. See sources cited infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. I should indicate that
I do not disagree with them that there has been some overregulation which should be
relaxed, but I believe other factors-most notably conflicts of interest, a preference for
liquidity, and collective action problems--deserve greater weight in any theory of insti-
tutional investor behavior. As a result, deregulation alone is not an adequate policy
response.
1280 [Vol. 91:1277
LIQUIDITY VERSUS CONTROL
through institutional investors necessarily efficient or desirable? and (2)
In the absence of political constraints, would other causes have im-
peded the development of a system of institutional monitoring within
the United States?
These questions will be the focus of this Article. Although those
dissatisfied with the current state of shareholder power in American
corporate governance may find foreign models of corporate govern-
ance more attractive, the danger in such comparisons is the "grass-is-
always-greener" fallacy: one can easily idealize foreign systems and see
only their benefits and not their costs. Monitoring by financial institu-
tions does not necessarily mean net gains for other shareholders, but
may improve only the position of the monitoring financial institution.
Similarly, assigning primary causal significance to political constraints
may lead to overlooking deeper and more fundamental reasons why
financial monitoring has not developed in the United States. Put sim-
ply, the agents controlling institutional investors have considerable rea-
son to remain "rationally apathetic" about corporate governance and
little reason to become active participants. Why? Various reasons will
be advanced, but one stands out that will be the centerpiece of this
Article: a trade-off exists and must be recognized between liquidity and
control. Investors that want liquidity may hesitate to accept control.
This assertion-that a preference for liquidity chills the willingness
of institutional investors to participate in the control of major corpora-
tions-may sound heretical. With only a few exceptions, 9 both practi-
tioners and academics have shared the assumption that institutions are
on the verge of becoming active monitors. On the one hand, propo-
nents of the overregulation thesis have argued that SEC and banking
regulation has hobbled institutional investors, resulting in high agency
costs, weak capital market discipline, and managerial entrenchment.
Former SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest aptly synthesized the
views of these critics in a striking paragraph in a recent article:
America seems not to trust her capitalists. For more than half
a century, state and federal governments have limited inves-
tors' influence over the governance of publicly traded corpo-
rations. Investors' ability to monitor corporate performance,
and to control assets that they ultimately own, has been
subordinated to the interests of other constituencies, most no-
tably corporate management. 10
9. The leading exception to this generalization is an incisive recent article by Pro-
fessor Edward Rock. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L. J. 445 (1991).
10. Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 89,
89-90 (1990).
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In a similar vein, John Pound1 1 and Bernard Black 12 have separately
examined the legal rules and regulatory policies governing shareholder
voting and have reported that this body of law, which was long thought
to protect the shareholder's franchise, often operates to frustrate its
effective exercise. Other scholars have taken a more activist stance and
proposed specific courses of action by which institutional investors can
directly influence substandard corporate managements. 13 All these
new critics tend to favor deregulation of financial institutions so that
they can serve as more effective corporate monitors. For many of these
critics, the relationship between financial institutions and corporate
managements in the German and Japanese economies provides the rel-
evant model. 14
On the other hand, defenders of corporate management seem
equally convinced that, unless their power is checked, institutional in-
vestors will soon dominate corporate managements.' 5 As a result, they
have advanced a very different set of policy proposals, which seek to
subject institutional investors to greater oversight. Typically, these
proposals have portrayed institutional investors not as highly con-
strained and overly regulated entities, but as financial adolescents,
recklessly preoccupied with short-term profit maximization. One ex-
ample is the 1989 Report of the New York State Task Force on Pension
Fund Investment, which recommended that public pension funds be
subjected to greater legislative control and guidance.' 6 Others have
11. John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC: Democratic Ideals Versus Market Effi-
ciency (paper presented at the Structure and Governance of Enterprise Conference,
March 29-31, 1990, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review). Similarly, Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan have argued that the state law rules on expense reimburse-
ment unduly favor incumbents over challengers. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Marcel
Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 Cal. L. Rev.
1071 (1990).
12. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520
(1990).
13. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991).
14. This is particularly true in the case of Professor Roe. See Roe, Political Theory,
supra note 3, at 59-62. See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 876; David P.
Hale, Learning from Germany andJapan, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at A10 (suggesting
that until early in this century, American banks, such as the Morgan Bank, played such a
monitoring role). Actually, both sides in the current debate cite the Japanese and Ger-
man models to support their contentions. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A
New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 187, 218-22 (1991).
15. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
16. New York State Task Force on Pension Fund Investments, Our Money's Worth:
The Report of the Governor's Task Force on Pension Fund Investment (1989). Another
even more ominous signal for institutional investors was the passage in 1990 of a
Pennsylvania statute under which institutional investors could be forced to disgorge
their profits on the sale of a Pennsylvania-chartered corporation's stock, if they partici-
pated in a control group. See infra notes 187-189 and accompanying text. For the
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made similar suggestions that (1) pension funds "pass through" their
votes to their constituents,1 7 (2) corporate managements reassert con-
trol over their pension fund investment and voting policies,' 8 and (3)
institutions invest in stocks principally through vehicles that are allied
with corporate management.' 9 Alarmed by the power and what they
perceive as the short-term mentality of institutional investors, Martin
Lipton and Steven Rosenblum have suggested an even more sweeping
change: abolition of the annual election of directors in favor of a quin-
quennial election.20 In short, two polar views of the institutional inves-
tor compete for supremacy today: (1) the academic view of financial
institutions as Prometheus chained to the rock by outmoded regula-
tions that serve only to entrench and insulate incumbent managements,
and (2) corporate management's image of these same institutions as
frenzied gamblers in a financial casino, each competing to outdo the
other in short-term performance. Both sides in this debate share the
common assumption that, for better or worse, institutional investors
would soon dominate corporate managements in the absence of polit-
ical constraints.
This Article disagrees with that assumption. It will argue that the
primary explanation for institutional passivity is not overregulation, but
the insufficiency of existing incentives to motivate institutional money
managers to monitor. Although proponents of institutional activism
have analyzed at length the potential ability of institutional investors to
hold corporate managers accountable, they have largely ignored the
question of who holds institutional money managers accountable. The
problem of who will guard the guardian is a timeless one, but it is par-
ticularly complicated when the proposed guardian is the institutional
investor. Not only do the same problems of agency cost arise at the
institutional investor level, but there are persuasive reasons for believ-
ing that some institutional investors are less accountable to their "own-
ers" than are corporate managements to their shareholders. Put
simply, the usual mechanisms of corporate accountability are either un-
available or largely compromised at the institutional level.2 ' This con-
fullest statement of the view that Wall Street's influence forces corporate managers to
focus on the short-term, see Louis Lowenstein, What's Wrong with Wall Street: Short-
term Gain and the Absentee Shareholder 1, 5-6, 9, 56-63, 76 (1988); Robert H. Hayes
& William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 68-70.
17. George H. Cain, Corporate Participation, Nat'l L. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 13.
18. A recent trend toward such reassertion of voting control has been reported.
See Pension Fund Sponsors Urged to Retain Control of Proxy Voting, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 979 (June 29, 1990).
19. See Ira M. Millstein, On the Making of Pension Funds as "Patient Capitalists,"
Directors & Boards, Winter 1990, at 11, 14 (recommending that institutional investors
take guidance from corporate management because of their greater knowledge of corpo-
rate governance and greater commitment to corporate performance).
20. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 224 & n.53.
21. The point is obvious but fundamental: while corporate managements are sub-
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clusion does not deny that there has been overregulation of
institutional investors, but it suggests its impact may have been over-
stated by the new critics. More importantly, this perspective implies
that deregulation alone is an inadequate policy response.' If the diagno-
sis that rational apathy will continue to prevail at the institutional level
is accurate, then the law must intervene to correct the market's failure
by creating adequate incentives for institutional managers to monitor.
This Article will therefore explore possible strategies by which
agency costs can be reduced at this second level in order that institu-
tional investors will more effectively monitor corporate managements.
But the larger problem of the institutional investor's role in corporate
governance cannot be telescoped simply into one of reducing agency
costs at the fund manager level. Rather, the nature of that role is itself
problematic. In one key respect, American institutional investors are
unlike both individual shareholders in the United States and the finan-
cial monitors in Japan and Germany. Potentially, American institu-
tional investors have the capacity to unite liquidity and control.
Although institutional investors do not appear to have achieved such a
ject to the disciplinary threat of hostile takeovers, proxy fights, and other corporate con-
trol transactions, the managements of most institutional investors are not. Only in the
case of the closed-end mutual fund is a takeover even conceivable, and actual instances
of such takeovers are virtually unknown. Other forms of capital market discipline are
also lacking: while banks and other creditors can pressure corporate managements that
are underperforming, pension funds are immune from similar capital market pressures
because they are creditors, not debtors. In the case of defined benefit pension plans
(but not defined contribution plans), the corporate sponsor does have an incentive to
remove a substandard investment manager (in order to reduce the future contribution it
must make), but management of the corporate sponsor is itself subject to a conflict of
interest on the issue of whether it wishes its pension managers to engage in active share-
holder monitoring of corporate managements. To the extent that corporate managers
prefer to forego the benefits to their corporation resulting from more active monitoring
by pension fund managers in return for an implicit system that ensures the job security
of corporation managers, pension managers today have little reason to resist them. In-
deed, an investment manager who acquires a reputation as an active monitor may cease
to be given pension fund accounts. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
On a more abstract level, two other problems suggest that agency costs will be
higher at the institutional investor level than at the corporate management level. First,
the problem of collective action is potentially more severe at the institutional investor
level than at the corporate level. Not only are the beneficiaries of a pension fund (to use
the example of the largest, most important institutional investor) as dispersed as the
shareholders in a large corporation, but there is no analogue in the pension fund con-
text to the large shareholder in the public corporation who may be willing to undertake
monitoring and similar expenditures that benefit other shareholders. See infra note 23.
Second, one of the basic techniques in corporate governance for aligning managerial
and shareholder preferences is the use of executive compensation devices, such as the
stock option, that give managers an incentive to maximize value for shareholders. See
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, Harv. Bus. Rev. May-June 1990, at 138, 139-40. For reasons discussed later,
such executive compensation formulas are less used and more difficult to design for
institutional investors. See infra notes 336-347 and accompanying text.
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union in any modem industrial economy to date, it ,is within reach in
the United States in the near future-if institutional investors are
"unleashed."
Thus, we return to a major concern of this Article: is such a union
of liquidity and control desirable? Do we want the institutional monitor
to have the same ability to exit the firm costlessly as does the individual
shareholder? Would the institutional monitor who possessed such li-
quidity undertake the often costly burden of monitoring? These are
difficult questions, but the choices are not limited to a simple yes or no.
Rather, public policy could choose any of a number of possible posi-
tions along a continuum that runs from allowing investors to combine
liquidity and control to requiring an election between them. This Arti-
cle will seek to evaluate some of the risks and related considerations
that should be weighed in making any choice.
To point to the dangers in uniting liquidity and control is not to
reject, however, the claim that overregulation of institutional investors
is both possible and undesirable. In fact, three distinct hypotheses can
explain the passivity of institutional investors: (1) an "interest group"
story that views regulation chilling institutional investor participation in
corporate governance as the product of low-visibility political coalitions
between management and other groups;22 (2) a collective action story
that views the costs of organizing dispersed investors to be sufficiently
high as to make them rationally apathetic about participation in corpo-
rate govemance;23 and (3) a public interest story suggesting that pub-
22. Essentially, commentators such as Jensen, Pound, Roe, Black, and Grundfest,
tell such a story (although they do not deny that collective action problems also exist).
See supra notes 3, 8-13. State antitakeover legislation seems easily explained on this
basis. See Romano, supra note 5, at 458-65.
23. This form of explanation begins with the work of Mancur Olson and focuses on
the problems of dispersed shareholders in organizing to take action that is in their col-
lective interest. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups 55-56 (2d ed. 1971). See also Russell Hardin, Collective Action
(1982). Professor Rock relies on essentially such an argument to explain institutional
passivity. See Rock, supra note 9, at 453-63. To define the collective action problem, it
is useful to distinguish it from the problem of agency costs. Agency costs arise because
the interests of shareholders and managers can conflict (over salary, corporate policy or
whatever); thus, both shareholders and managers must undertake some costs to mini-
mize these conflicts of interest through monitoring and bonding expenditures, and
some losses will in any event remain because their prevention is too costly. The sum of
these costs and the residual loss is called "agency costs." See Michael C. Jensen & Wil-
liam H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308-10 (1976). In contrast, the collective action
problem arises as soon as there is more than one owner. Corporate monitoring is an
example of what economists call a collective good; that is, it benefits all shareholders
whether or not they pay for it. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law § 9.5, at 389-400
(1986). Rationally, shareholders would prefer to "free ride" on the efforts of others
than to subscribe to their pro rata share of the costs of corporate monitoring. Large
shareholders will, however, subscribe to these costs to the extent that their share of the
expected payoff exceeds the costs they must incur, thus permitting smaller shareholders
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lic-regarding legislation and administrative rules have long and wisely
resisted the union of liquidity and control. Although recent critics have
focused on the first explanation, this Article will stress the second and
third. None of these explanations is necessarily inconsistent with the
others, but the latter two have received less attention, as economic the-
orists, always suspicious of regulation, have tended to view the regula-
tion of financial institutions as intended to entrench corporate
managements.
Yet there are demonstrable problems with the simple overregula-
tion story. In fact, a close comparative analysis demonstrates that the
actual limitations placed by American law on financial institutions as
investors are not significantly more restrictive than, for example, the
applicable laws in Japan and certain other comparable economies. 24
Nor is it at all clear that in an unregulated legal environment, financial
institutions will necessarily develop into corporate monitors. 25 Thus,
the assumption that-but for regulatory and political constraints-
American financial institutions would have evolved into controlling
shareholders, as German and Japanese banks have arguably done,
seems shaky. 26
Equally important, the overregulation thesis simply overlooks the
liquidity/control trade-off. Only once the uniqueness of the American
context is understood can one assess intelligently this Article's claim
that the union of liquidity and control would be socially undesirable.
Both the German and Japanese economies (as do many others) depend
on internal capital markets, as opposed to the external capital markets
to free ride on their monitoring efforts. For example, if expenditures by shareholders of
$1,000,000 would yield benefits of $2,000,000, it would not be rational for a 25% share-
holder to expend $1,000,000, because it would benefit only to the extent of $500,000.
But if the gains to shareholders exceed $4,000,000, then the 25% shareholder will ra-
tionally expend $1,000,000 (and thereby confer a benefit on the dispersed, but "free
riding," small shareholders). The key implication of a collective action analysis is that
shareholder resistance to managerial actions that are adverse to their welfare will often
be underfunded, because of the difficulty in taxing the "free riders."
24. See infra notes 58-63, 129 and accompanying text.
25. Although unconstrained by legal restrictions, banks in the United Kingdom
have not developed into active corporate monitors, and institutional investors seldom
hold more than 1%-2%o of the stock of any individual corporation. See infra notes
143-147 and accompanying text. Even in Germany, where institutional investors are
little regulated, they do not own a higher percentage of equity securities in individual
corporations than current U.S. law would permit a bank holding company to own. See
infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
26. One qualification here is necessary: federalism did restrict the growth of finan-
cial institutions in the United States. Because each state could charter banks and pre-
vent the entry of out-of-state competition, the result was a highly fragmented financial
industry in which even leading institutions could not grow to the same scale as Japanese
and German banks. Federalism is not, however, a regulatory constraint that can be ex-
plained under an interest group theory that gives corporate management a central role,
because use of the corporate form arose well after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution.
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that characterize the United States and the United Kingdom.27 In such
internal capital markets, industrial firms obtain the bulk of their capital
from a very limited number of capital suppliers in direct negotiations.
In consequence, these capital suppliers have both greater leverage and
less liquidity than do institutional investors in the United States. To
some degree, this system of internal capital markets may be breaking
down with the growth of an international capital market that will give
all large firms access to public capital markets. But the critical point is
that institutional investors in the United States have a degree of liquid-
ity that their European andJapanese counterparts largely lack. At pres-
ent, any attempt by institutional investors in the United States to
exercise control over corporate managements will entail a probable
sacrifice of this liquidity, which may be an unacceptable cost to them.
Put more generally, when faced with the choice, U.S. institutional inves-
tors have traditionally preferred liquidity to control. This empirical ob-
servation leads in turn to a broader, normative contention: liquidity and
control are antithetical. American law has said clearly and consistently
since at least the 1930s that those who exercise control should not en-
joy liquidity and vice versa.28 Ultimately, this Article will defend the
proposition that the separation of liquidity and control is not only a
cause of institutional passivity, but to some degree should be. In short,
those institutions that most desire liquidity would make poor monitors.
Nor should this contention seem surprising: most other industrial
societies seem to have reached a similar resolution (either by legal rule
or by business adaptation). From a comparative perspective, advanced
industrial economies can be classified along a continuum ranging from
those, such as Japan and Germany, that permit financial institutions to
control corporate managements, but effectively deny them liquidity, to
those that inhibit institutional control, but maximize their liquidity. On
such a continuum, the dominant American organizational form-the
Berle/Means public corporation-represents the latter pole: investors
have only limited ability to control management, but near-perfect li-
27. One recent survey finds that in Germany there are only 497 German corpora-
tions listed on the eight German stock exchanges, and of these "not more than 100"
lacked a controlling shareholder. Similarly, in France, only "around 460" corporations
(out of nearly 135,000 stock corporations chartered in France) were listed on the Paris
Stock Exchange. This same pattern holds true also in Belgium, which has 35,000 stock
corporations, but only 190 listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. See Klaus J. Hopt,
Takeover and Other General Bids in European Law 4 (paper delivered at conference
sponsored by University of Ghent on May 30, 1991) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). In sharp contrast, there are some 2450 British corporations listed on the
London Stock Exchange, even though the British economy is much smaller than that of
either Germany or France. Id.
The point here is that because relatively few German or French corporations are
publicly traded (and even those firms typically have a controlling stockholder or stock-
holder group), financial institutions that hold a substantial equity stake in these firms
lack liquidity by definition.
28. See infra notes 221-223, 247-267 and accompanying text.
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quidity in deep and relatively stable financial markets. The oft-
repeated "Wall Street Rule" expressed the basic equilibrium that until
recently prevailed: dissatisfied investors could sell, but they could not
effectively challenge management. 29
The tension between liquidity and control can also explain why the
historic passivity of the institutional investor is declining. Today, the
press reports on an almost daily basis that institutional investors are
displaying a new activism.30 Clearly, some institutions-most typically,
public pension funds-sponsor shareholder proposals, lobby state leg-
islatures, and, in a few cases, support insurgents in proxy contests.3 1
What explains this new activism? On a theoretical level, the trade-off
between liquidity and control is simply a context-specific application of
Albert 0. Hirschman's famous generalization that the members of any
organization face a choice between "exit" and "voice." 3 2 If an easy,
low-cost "exit" is possible (such as that provided by securities markets),
the members will rationally have little interest in exercising a more
costly "voice." But if "exit" is blocked, the members will become more
interested in exercising a "voice" in governance decisions. From this
perspective, the new activism of American institutional investors can be
explained as the product of "voice" becoming less costly, because of
the growth in institutional ownership of securities and the resulting in-
creased capacity for collective action, while "exit" has become more
difficult, because institutional investors, who increasingly own large un-
marketable blocks, must accept substantial price discounts in order to
29. The basic notion underlying the "Wall Street Rule" was that institutions should
support and vote with management-or sell their shares. Some trace the origins of this
informal rule of behavior to guidelines developed in the 1940s by the American Bankers
Association. See Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of La-
bor, Proxy Project Report 1 (1989) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
30. See, e.g., Brett D. Fromson, The Big Owners Roar, Fortune, July 30, 1990, at
66; Debbie Galant, Putting New Muscle into Proxy Voting, Institutional Investor, Feb.
1990, at 161; Sanford L.Jacobs, Big Holders Resolve to Flex Their Muscles, Wall St.J.,
Feb. 28, 1989, at Cl; Roberta S. Karmel, CalPERS Versus the Business Roundtable,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 21, 1991, at 3; David Pauly, Wall Street's New Musclemen, Newsweek,
June 5, 1989, at 46; Anise C. Wallace, Institution's Proxy Power Grows, N.Y. Times, July
5, 1988, at DI.
31. The most activist institutions tend to be either state or municipal pension funds
(which I shall refer to as "public funds") that may be pursuing an agenda that enhances
the political reputations of the public officials controlling them or small private "pools"
of capital assembled from foreign investors. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
Such "private" investment companies appear to behave very differently from the much
larger mutual funds that are open to the ordinary investor, and they strive to maintain a
reputation as "friendly" long-term investors. See Diana B. Henriques, Fidelity's Secret
Agent Man, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1991, § 3 (Business), at 1. For a review of institutional
involvement in recent proxy contests, see Black, supra note 12, at 570-75. For data on
the relative size of private and public pension funds, see infra note 42.
32. Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States (1970).
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liquidate these blocks.33 These trends toward greater "voice" and
lesser "exit" seem likely to continue for institutional investors.3 4 As a
result, greater institutional activism is predictable, even in the face of a
static legal environment.
The trade-off between "exit" and "voice" also suggests a regula-
tory strategy: restrict "exit" to encourage "voice." Undoubtedly, such
a policy could be carried too far and might at some point induce institu-
tional investors to prefer alternative investments to equity securities.
Still, the new critics of regulation have not recognized the reverse side
of this coin: simplified "exit" may mean less "voice." At a minimum
then, a strategy for deregulation should accord a priority to relaxing
those rules that inhibit "voice," while exercising considerable caution
before making "exit" easier.35 In other words, rather than "un-
leashing" institutional investors en masse, the more sensible policy may
be a selective one: deregulate first those institutions most likely to ex-
ercise "voice" rather than seek "exit."
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I surveys the relation-
ship of financial institutions to corporate managements in several ad-
vanced industrial economies, particularly Germany and Japan. It finds
that (1) ownership and other legal restrictions similar to those now said
to hobble U.S. financial institutions also exist in many of these coun-
tries, but generally have had only a modest impact; (2) the relative con-
trol of financial institutions over industrial corporations appears to be
declining in both Japan and Germany as successful corporate manage-
ments exploit international capital markets or retain cash flow in order
to escape close monitoring and the conflicts posed by bank owner-
ship;3 6 and (3) in those economies where financial institutions do domi-
nate corporate managements, the industrial structure is organized
around internal capital markets,3 7 thus making the "exit" option un-
33. For the conclusion that pension funds "cannot dispose of large blocks of stock
easily" and face increasing illiquidity as their holdings grow, see Millstein, supra note
19, at 15. In addition, exit is less attractive because institutions have come to realize that
they cannot outperform the market (at least without accepting additional risk). This is
the central insight of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, and based on it many
institutions have turned to "indexed" investing, which implies a buy-and-hold policy.
See infra notes 236-239 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text.
35. There may also be other diseconomies associated with uniting liquidity and
control. An earlier era used the pejorative term "pools" to describe loose associations
among large investors, which were thought to be able to manipulate securities prices.
Prevention of such manipulation was a major focus of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 79-83, 108-116 and accompanying text.
37. The term "internal capital market" has been widely used to refer to the alloca-
tion of capital within a large conglomerate through bureaucratic decision-making cen-
tralized in the office of the chief executive. In theory, senior management redirects cash
flows received from its subsidiaries and divisions to those having the best future pros-
pects. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Impli-
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available. The contrast between internal capital markets in Japan and
Germany and the more developed external capital market in the United
States casts considerable doubt on whether foreign economies provide
relevant models for future regulatory reform within the United States.
Part II assesses the extra-legal factors that have retarded participation
by institutional investors in corporate governance in the United States
and concludes that a strategy of deregulation is likely to produce only
modest results. Part III considers the potential diseconomies that
might follow if deregulation were to permit investors to combine li-
quidity and control. Finally, Part IV asks how regulation might en-
courage the development of institutional monitoring, particularly in
light of the rise of "indexed" investing.38 Indexed investors, who may
hold securities in a thousand or more corporations, have largely aban-
doned "exit," but also find the exercise of "voice" infeasible because
their extensive holdings exceed their capacity to monitor. Part IV
therefore suggests that new mechanisms must be created to make mon-
itoring both feasible and mandatory. Although Part IV is not necessar-
ily optimistic about the prospect of active institutional monitoring
developing in the near future, it does outline the legal prerequisites
necessary before indexed or other widely diversified institutional inves-
tors are likely to play an active monitoring role: First, "excessive" di-
versification must be discouraged; second, investment management
services should be "unbundled" from monitoring services, so that a
true market in the latter can develop; and, finally, incentive compensa-
tion formulas that align the interests of the institutional money man-
ager, as agent, with those of its principal and thus encourage
monitoring should be authorized and implemented. This may sound
like a visionary, rather than realistic, scenario for reform. Perhaps it is,
but it is less idealized than the expectation that, in the absence of such
changes, institutional investors will naturally behave like individual
shareholders who hold large equity stakes.
I. A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
Part I briefly examines the position of institutional investors in the
United States and contrasts it with that of similar institutions in other
developed economies. Part I begins with the United States and then
cations 143-48 (1975). The term has also been used by others to apply to allocation
decisions made within a larger group or network of firms (such as the Japanese keiretsu,
see infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text) or between a firm and its principal share-
holder and creditor. See John Cable, Capital Market Information and Industrial Per-
formance: The Role of West German Banks, 95 Econ. J. 118 (1985). This Article uses
the term in that latter sense to distinguish an "internal capital market" from an "exter-
nal market" in which the firm has access to many active suppliers of capital.
38. "Indexed" investing refers to a passive investment strategy whereby an investor
holds a portfolio of securities that serves as a proxy for the market as a whole (such as
the Standard & Poor's 500). Such investors seek not to beat the market, but to match it.
See infra notes 236-244 and accompanying text.
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moves from internal capital market economies, such as Japan and Ger-
many, to the purest example of an external market economy, Great
Britain. Midway along this continuum are Sweden and Canada. De-
spite active stock markets in these nations, the rise of institutional own-
ership has produced defensive responses by corporate managements
that effectively prevent the union of liquidity and control. Necessarily,
this Part's treatment of each country is incomplete and, in some re-
spects, cursory. The intent, however, is (1) to contrast the essentially
internal capital markets that characterize Germany and Japan with the
external capital market in the United States, and (2) to note the institu-
tions and practices that have developed in those other countries that
have external capital markets in order to mediate conflicts between in-
stitutional investors and corporate managements.
A. The United States
As a result of Columbia University's Institutional Investor Pro-
ject,3 9 reliable statistical data on institutional ownership is now avail-
able. This data demonstrates that the percentage of equity in United
States corporations held by institutional investors has skyrocketed, par-
ticularly during the last decade.40 In 1950, institutional investors
owned only 8% of the equity in United States corporations. By 1980,
this level had risen to 33%, and by 1988, it had reached 45%.41 Insti-
tutional ownership is disproportionately heavy at the upper end of cor-
porate America. Among the top one hundred American corporations
in terms of stock market value, the level of institutional ownership is
now at 53%.42 Among some of the largest and best-known corpora-
tions, the percentage of institutional ownership nearly swallows the
market, for example: General Motors Corp. (82%), Mobil Corp.
(74%o), Citicorp (70%), Amoco (86%), and Eli Lilly & Co. (71%). 4 s
39. The Institutional Investor Project is under the auspices of the Center for Law
and Economic Studies at the Columbia University School of Law.
40. See Carolyn Kay Brancato & Patrick A. Gaughan, The Growth of Institutional
Investors in U.S. Capital Markets (Nov. 1988). This study has been partially updated as
of 1990. See Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capi-
tal Markets, in Institutional Investing: The Challenges and Responsibilities of the 21st
Century 3, 17-19 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991) [hereinafter Brancato, Pivotal Role of
Institutional Investors]. As Professor Black has pointed out, the definition of institution
used in the Brancato study is incomplete, because it excludes investment banks, bank
holding companies, and certain trustees. See Black, supra note 12, at 567 n.168. Thus,
institutional ownership is probably even slightly higher than these numbers reveal.
41. See William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70 (citing Brancato data).
42. See Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Momentum of the Big Investor, Directors &
Boards, Winter 1990, at 38 [hereinafter Brancato, Big Investor]; Brancato, Pivotal Role
of Institutional Investors, supra note 40, at 21. Perhaps more importantly, 29.6% of the
companies in this top 1000 had institutional ownership levels above 60%. Id.
43. Brancato, Big Investor, supra note 42, at 39 (table listing percentage of institu-
tional ownership of top fifty U.S. corporations). An earlier study by Professor Conard
1991] 1291
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
The level of institutional ownership looks even greater from the
perspective of the institutions themselves. As my colleague Professor
Bernard Black has calculated, the thirteen largest institutions each held,
on average, over 1% of the United States stock market at the end of
1989 and together the top fifty institutions owned 27%. 44 Many insti-
tutions now own 2-3% of the stock of a single company, he reports,
and some hold over 5%. Calculating the data a different way, another
colleague, Professor Louis Lowenstein, has examined the Form 13F fil-
ings made by institutional investors with the SEC and found that for the
average corporation listed in the Standard & Poor's 500, "it takes just
twenty institutional holders to account for 34% of the outstanding
stock."' 45 On this basis, it is entirely possible that twenty or fewer insti-
tutions could hold de facto control of a major industrial corporation
without any individual institution acquiring so large a block as necessar-
ily to impair its liquidity. Viewed in these terms, it may appear that the
union of control and liquidity has already occurred.
Yet if one looks only at the size of institutional holdings, one may
commit the classic mistake of confusing an ox for a bull. Although pub-
lic pension funds are "bulls" who often engage in aggressive, outspo-
ken criticism of corporate management, they constitute only a modest
minority of institutional investors.46 Most other institutional investors
seem closer to "oxen," because they have shown little willingness to
oppose corporate managements or even to support dissidents in proxy
shows institutional ownership levels in publicly traded securities reaching up to 90%.
Thirty companies in a sample of 100 randomly chosen exchange-listed firms had institu-
tional ownership levels over 60%, and sixty had levels over 40%. See Alfred F. Conard,
Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 117, 132 (1989).
44. Professor Black's calculations match institutional ownership against the
Wilshire 5000 Index. See The Institutional, Investor 300: Ranking America's Top
Money Managers, Institutional Investor, July 1990, at 137, 173. The Wilshire 5000 In-
dex was at $3.42 trillion as of December 31, 1989. See Black, supra note 12, at 567-68
& n.170.
45. See Louis Lowenstein, Sense and Nonsense in Corporate Finance (forthcoming
1991) (manuscript at ch. 11, p. 3, on file with the Columbia Law Review). In truth, this
calculation might understate the level of institutional ownership because it considers
only institutional investors and only those required to file Form 13F. Thus excluded are
individual owners and smaller institutions. Under Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1
(1991), "institutional investment managers" having investment discretion over at least
$100 million in certain defined equity securities must file Form 13F quarterly.
46. By some estimates, pension funds now hold as much as 40% of all equities. See
Jay 0. Light, The Privatization of Equity, Harv. Bus. Rev. Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 62-63.
However, of the total assets controlled by pension funds, it is generally estimated that
corporate pension funds control one half; public pension funds, one third; and the bal-
ance is held by union pension funds and funds of non-profit entities. See Letter from
Richard Koppes, General Counsel, CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of
Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission 3 (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter, CalPERS Letter]. CaIPERS is an abbrevia-
tion for the California Public Employees' Retirement System. See also, America's Share-
holders Break into the Boardroom, The Economist, Apr. 29, 1989, at 75 (public pension
funds control $600 million of the $2 trillion in assets controlled by all pension funds).
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contests.47 Indeed, some evidence suggests that a high level of institu-
tional ownership correlates with greater managerial success in proxy
contests.48 Even the most enthusiastic proponents of institutional
shareholder activism recognize that institutional investors historically
have not opposed corporate management, but usually have supported
them against insurgents. 49 Despite recurrent press stories about the
activism of institutional investors, 50 most antitakeover amendments still
pass,5 1 and surveys show that institutions support management propos-
als between 59% and 74% of the time.5 2 What is clearest, however, is
that, within the United States, different institutions behave differently:
public pension funds and, to a lesser degree, mutual funds and endow-
ments appear "pressure resistant" and frequently vote against manage-
ment, but banks and insurance companies seldom are willing to oppose
management.53 The reasons for these differences are assessed later,54
but even those institutions that are described as the most "pressure
resistant" appear eager to project themselves as "friendly" long-term
investors. 55 The bottom line to date then is that while some institu-
tions have become more assertive in the limited context of takeover
defensive tactics, their activism has not spread beyond this special
arena nor led them to seek participation in corporate governance
generally.56
47. Recently, there has even been a decline in proxy fights for corporate control.
From 41 contests in 1989, the number fell to 35 in 1990, and only 12 were under way by
mid-March 1991. See Leslie Wayne, Behind the Drop in Proxy Fights, N.Y. Times, Mar.
19, 1991, at DI0. See also With M&A in the Doldrums, Proxy Fights Plummet, Corp.
Control Alert, May 1991, at 1 (noting 15 proxy contests under way at mid-year).
48. See John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,
20J. Fin. Econ. 237, 256-60 (1988). Pound's study relies on data from the early 1980s,
which may be out of date. See Black, supra note 12, at 606.
49. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 892-93 ("Not only have institutional
investors failed to oppose management's candidates for the board with their own nomi-
nees, but many institutions have even voted with management in proxy fights, including
the Texaco and Lockheed contests . .
50. See supra note 30.
51. See Jeffrey W. Biersach, Voting by Institutional Investors on Corporate Gov-
ernance Issues in the 1990 Proxy Season 13 (IRRC). Admittedly, the margin by which
they pass is slim, and managements do not propose amendments they think likely to fail.
52. See Karen Van Nuys, Managerial Incentives and Shareholder Approval: Evi-
dence from the 1988 Proxy Season 5-8 (U. Rochester Working Paper 1990) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
53. SeeJames A. Brickley, et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover
Amendments, 20J. Fin. Econ. 267, 276-79 (1988); Biersach, supra note 51, at 3, 10.
54. See infra notes 180-191 and accompanying text.
55. For such an evaluation of the Fidelity group of mutual funds, see Henriques,
supra note 31, at 10.
56. For example, only in extremely rare occasions have institutional investors
sought to elect representatives to corporate boards. See id. at 10 (discussing general
reluctance of Fidelity group to have representation on corporate boards). Indeed, in
one recent case in which an executive of a major institutional investor agreed to serve as
an insurgent group's nominee for election to the USX board, his employer appears to
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B. Japan
To understand the relationship between financial institutions and
industrial corporations in Japan, some history is necessary. During the
early decades of the twentieth century, the zaibatsu-family-owned,
bank-centered holding companies-expanded through both vertical in-
tegration and diversifying acquisitions. These institutions have been
described as "the world's first multinational conglomerates. ' 57 By the
eve of World War II, they held most corporate equity and debt in
Japan. During the occupation ofJapan, the American authorities liqui-
dated the zaibatsu, expecting that American-style public corporations
would evolve in their absence.58 As part of this effort to decentralize
economic power, a Japanese equivalent of the Glass-Steagall Act, which
separates commercial and investment banking in the United States, 59
was imposed on Japan. Under section 65 ofJapan's Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1948,60 a Japanese bank may not engage in investment
banking, and under section 11 ofJapan's Anti-Monopoly Act,6 1 a Japa-
nese bank may not own more than five percent of the stock of any do-
mestic corporation. 62 Ironically, these restrictions were even more
clearly intended to prevent the concentration of economic power than
have been angered. See Quirk's Role in Icahn Proxy Fight Lands them in Hot Water
With Prim Board, Vol. XV Money Mgmt. Letter (No. 25) Dec. 10, 1990 at 1.
CalPERS is probably the leading exception to this generalization. As of late 1989, it
reported that it had sponsored 28 shareholder proposals, and it has sought to reform
the proxy rules. See Letter from Dale M. Hanson, Chief Executive Officer of CalPERS
to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission 1 (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
CalPERS Letters]. Yet, even CalPERS has not sought to fund or sponsor proxy contests
for the election of directors.
57. Aron Viner, InsideJapanese Financial Markets 1 (1988). For a fuller discussion
of the zaibatsu, see Rodney Clark, The Japanese Company 41-44 (1979).
58. During the post-World War II occupation of Japan, the American authorities
required that the equity in the constituent members of the zaibatsu conglomerates be
sold toJapanese individuals. As a result, on the reopening of theJapanese stock markets
in the late 1940s, individuals held more than 6976 of the outstanding shares inJapanese
corporations. Viner, supra note 57, at 55.
59. The Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78,
377, 378 (1988), consists of four sections of the Banking Act of 1933 (§§ 16, 20, 21, and
32). Under § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378, individuals and organizations engaged in investment
banking may not receive deposits. Correspondingly, § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24, bars a bank
that is a member of the Federal Reserve System from dealing in or underwriting
securities.
60. Shoken torihikiho (Securities Exchange Act), § 65, Law No. 25 of 1948.
61. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru horitsu (An act re-
garding the prohibition of private monopolies and the maintenance of fair trade),
§ 11 (a), Law No. 54 of 1947 [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Act].
62. Originally, the Anti-Monopoly Act placed the maximum level at 10%o, but this
was reduced to 5% in 1977. Banks were given until December, 1987, to divest excess
holdings. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the
Shadow of Defection inJapan, 20J. Legal Stud. 91, 99 n.21 (1991). I am grateful for the
assistance of Professor Haruhiko Katagi of Hiroshima University for explaining theJapa-
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were the restrictions imposed on American banking institutions, which
today prevent an American bank holding company from owning more
than five percent of the voting stock of any nonbanking company. 63
Yet, in Japan, these restrictions failed. Because the American occu-
pational authorities underestimated the power and centrality of the
banks within the zaibatsu confederations, they did not insist on the liqui-
dation of these institutions, and this omission eventually resulted in the
reemergence of a looser regrouping of the former zaibatsu interests.64
These successor coalitions became known as "keiretsu. '' 65 The internal
structure of the keiretsu varies with the industry or the relationship upon
which the coalition is based, but typically each consists of a diversified
confederation of companies clustered around a "main bank" that pro-
vides loans to the members of the group as their chief source of financ-
ing. Although the main bank in the keiretsu is usually both a major
shareholder and the principal creditor of the members of its constella-
tion of companies, 66 its position is clearly distinguishable from that of
the parent company in a large American conglomerate, because the
main bank-the putative "parent" in the keiretsu-is in turn owned by
its subsidiaries and affiliates. It is probably more accurate to think of
the keiretsu as a miniature common market in which each member gen-
erally relies on the others as its principal trading partners, preferring
them to external sources as suppliers, customers, and creditors.
The legal force knitting together this structure is a system of inter-
nese law to me. Under § 11, an insurance company may own up to 10%o of a domestic
Japanese corporation.
63. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, §§ 4(c)(6)-(7), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988). Indeed, under this statute, bank holding companies have
been authorized to own up to 25% of the nonvoting stock of a nonbanking corporation.
See Pauline B. Heller, Federal Bank Holding Company Law § 4.03(2)(a), at 4-60.9
(1989).
64. Viner, supra note 57, at 55-56.
65. There are today six major keiretsu groups in Japan. Three of these (Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo) are descended from former zaibatsu, while the other three
are newer groups that have formed around major banks (Fuyo-Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kangyo,
and Sanwa). The number of firms within a group varies widely, from the Sumitomo
group's 16 to the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group's 57. See William G. Ouchi, The M-Form Soci-
ety, app. at 290-91 (1984). The word "keiretsu" is derived from the words "kei" mean-
ing "faction or group" and "retsu" meaning "arranged in order." See Viner, supra note
57, at 2. For a more detailed examination of the internal structure of a keiretsu, see
Hiroshi Okumura, Interfirm Relations in an Enterprise Group: The Case of Mitsubishi
in Kazuo Sato & Yasuo Hoshino, The Anatomy of Japanese Business, 166-75 (1984)
(describing relations among 120 "principal allied companies" and over 300 subsidiaries
of Mitsubishi group).
66. A recent study reports that, on average, a Japanese company's largest
debtholder owned 6.2% of the company's equity; that the five largest debtholders
owned 18.2% of the equity; and that out of 133 companies surveyed, the largest
debtholder was the largest shareholder in 57 cases or was a member of the same keiretsu
as the largest shareholder in an additional 67 cases. See Stephen D. Prowse, Institu-
tional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the United States and
Japan, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 43, 46-47 (1990).
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locking cross-ownership under which each constituent company owns
from 0.5 to 3% of the equity in each other member in the keiretsu,
thereby effectively locking control within the group.67 Originally, these
reciprocal stock acquisitions were financed through loans provided by
the main bank in the combine, and each member in the keiretsu under-
stands that it may not dispose of the shares it owns in other members of
the group.68 It is estimated that between 65% and 70% of the stock in
all listed companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange is now held in such
interlocked cross-ownership. 69 Indeed, because the stock held by the
members of the keiretsu is illiquid, the float on many Japanese stocks is
extremely thin and is held almost exclusively by individual investors. 70
Over the years, the percentage of individual share ownership of all
listed companies on Japanese stock exchanges has declined steadily,
from 70% during the early days of the occupation to 22% today.7 1
In terms of this Article's focus on the trade-off between liquidity
and control, the Japanese system seems based on an implicit under-
standing that liquidity is unavailable to those who participate in control.
That is, individual investors and certain other non-controlling institu-
tional investors do enjoy reasonable liquidity (albeit in a volatile mar-
ket), but they have no hope of acquiring control or exercising
significant influence over management.
Still, this explanation leaves the role of the main bank in the keiretsu
ambiguous. Clearly, its role is pivotal, but who is it allied with? Several
scenarios are plausible. First, the main bank could be providing con-
sulting and monitoring services that benefit the minority shareholders
and for which the latter reward the main bank by granting it preference
in servicing the corporations' financial needs (possibly at above market
interest rates or fees). Such a deal might well be in the minority share-
holders' interests, depending on how generous the above market terms
were, because it would reduce agency costs at the corporate manage-
67. Id. at 56. A 1983 study found that the average shareholding of any single
group member in other group members is down to 1.78%o of each company's outstand-
ing stock, with each company holding stock in an average of half of all the other compa-
nies in the group. See Ouchi, supra note 65, at 291.
68. Viner, supra note 57, at 56. Of course, explicit agreements not to resell are
unnecessary. A member of a keiretsu that sold stock in its fellow members could both
lose its principal trading partners and customers and alienate a group holding the ma-
jority of its stock. Thus, its management would become vulnerable to ouster.
69. Viner estimates that 65%o of the stock is held by other keiretsu members. Id. at
56. A more recent estimate is 70%. See Steven Barber, A Close Circle of Friends, Insti-
tutional Investor, Feb. 1991, at 35 (citing Robert Zielinski & Nigel Holloway, Unequal
Equities: Power and Risk in Japan's Stock Market (1990)).
70. Again, estimates vary. Viner estimates that "only an average 30 percent of the
total float of shares in listed companies is traded." Viner, supra note 57, at 328. A more
recent estimate is 22%o. See Barber, supra note 69, at 35. This may help explain the
high volatility that has long characterized the Japanese stock market.
71. See Barber, supra note 69, at 35. For an earlier estimate that it had fallen to
25%o as of 1985, see Viner, supra note 57, at 100-01.
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ment level. A second possibility is that the main bank could ally itself
less with minority shareholders than with the incumbent management
and receive above-market fees and interest for protecting them. A third
interpretation postulates still another quid pro quo: the main bank
lends to the corporate borrower at an attractive rate in return for the
latter's agreement to support the bank's share price by purchasing the
bank's securities in the secondary market.72 From this perspective, the
main bank is less a financial monitor than a co-conspirator in stock ma-
nipulation. Still, whatever the scenario offered, only an implicit con-
tract exists between the participants, and the main bank may on
occasion defect and switch sides. Thus, whatever coalitions exist may
to a degree be unstable.
Interestingly, although Japanese scholars have not framed the
question of the main bank's role in terms this blunt, they have recog-
nized the possibility that the main bank protects managerial interests
more than shareholder interests. For example, one of the most popular
explanations within Japan for the development of the keiretsu form of
organization was that it protected wage differentials under which em-
ployees of keiretsu member firms received substantially higher wages
than employees of smaller, independent firms.73 In a stockholder-
controlled firm, employees presumably would be less able to escape the
market's disciplinary effect on their wage rates. To the extent that this
explanation of above market wages is valid, the main bank seems less
an efficient monitor for its fellow shareholders than an ally of the in-
cumbent management. 74
Another well-known theory asserts that the main bank provides a
substitute for the bankruptcy and corporate reorganization procedures
that have developed in the United States to reduce bankruptcy losses. 75
72. See Marshall Auerback, Japan Inc.'s Days Are Numbered, Wall St. J., Sept. 3,
1991 at A18. By the of 1989, the free float in mostJapanese bank stocks had fallen to as
low as 8% of the total market capitalization, thus permitting price-earnings ratios to soar
to "stratospheric multiples of 70, 80 or even 160." Id. Because of special accounting
rules, a high stock price enabled Japanese banks to engage in riskier lending activities, in
which non-Japanese banks could not engage. With the 1989 stock market crash inJapan
(in which the Nikkei Stock Averages fell a total of 42%), Japanese corporate borrowers
found bank credit more difficult to obtain and in return, with less liquid funds, were less
able to support the price of their main banks. Auerback suggests that the gradual un-
winding of this reciprocal agreement "adds up to a death knell for Japan's cross-share-
holding structure." Id. At a minimum, it suggests that a large equity stakeholder need
not necessarily be an efficient financial monitor, but may have other incentives.
73. See Okumura, supra note 65, at 175-76. Another theory was that it permitted
the enterprise to engage in riskier activities. Id. at 176.
74. It can be argued that the keiretsu members pay above-market wages to induce
their employees to invest in firm-specific human capital. Yet this argument seems im-
plausible in the Japanese context, where full-time employees typically have life tenure.
That is, employers both inside and outside the keiretsu have the same incentive to induce
lifetime employees to invest in the acquisition of firm-specific human capital.
75. Okumura, supra note 65, at 177 ("Bankruptcy and the Corporation Reorganiza-
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Assume that the main bank in the keiretsu is committed to bailing out
any failing member, and, in return, is permitted to charge an above
market interest rate on its loans to member firms. Who benefits most
from such an arrangement? In economic terms, such a relationship is
best described as an "implicit insurance contract."' 76 In the words of
one expert, "The main-bank/corporate-borrower relation can be
viewed in terms of the firm paying insurance premiums to the bank in
normal times in the expectation of receiving assistance in times of cor-
porate downturn."77 Yet would rational shareholders wish to pay such
a premium to obtain this insurance? The answer is probably no, be-
cause shareholders can diversify to protect themselves from losses and
so would not want expensive insurance purchased from banks at the
price of above-market interest rates. 78 The logical answer, then, is that
this implicit insurance contract chiefly benefits the management of the
borrower and the main bank, at the other shareholders' expense.
For some, this managerialist theory is implausible. They instead
view the keiretsu as a continuation of a traditional Japanese form of or-
ganization, one that reflects Japan's social character with its much-
noted emphasis on cooperation and a desire for stability. But of all
possible theories about the keiretsu, this is the most tenuous. The sur-
prising fact-to Westerners-is that Japanese firms regularly switch
their main banks and smaller Japanese firms even switch their affilia-
tions between keiretsu groups.79 So much for the picture of unchanging
stability. As in the West, corporations quickly gravitate to the cheapest
supplier of capital and seek to limit their dependence on any one firm.
How effective is the keiretsu as a monitoring system? In general,
bank monitoring in Japan appears to be relatively slack and focused
largely on the danger of insolvency or sustained unprofitability. Such a
finding is consistent with the view that the keiretsu serves the interests of
management more than shareholders. Interestingly, contemporary ac-
counts stress that the stronger, more successful Japanese corporations
have largely escaped bank control.80 Professor Ramseyer notes that
once the Euromarket developed as an alternative source of credit, "Jap-
tion Law are, in fact, being used by big enterprises as weapons for enterprise
affiliation.").
76. See Ramseyer, supra note 62, at 111.
77. Id. at 111-12 (quoting Australian economist andJapanese scholar Paul Sheard,
Main Banks and Internal Capital Markets in Japan, 157 Shoken Keizai 255 (1986)).
78. This is Professor Ramseyer's conclusion also. See id. at 112 n.66.
79. Ramseyer notes that over a five year period, 15% of a sample of the firms listed
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange switched their main bank affiliation, and over a ten year
period, as many as 33% may have. Id. at 98 n.18. Moreover, in the electric machinery
industry, one-fifth of the subcontractors changed their affiliation with their general con-
tractor each year. Id.
80. SeeJames C. Abegglen & George Stalk,Jr., Kaisha, The Japanese Corporation
189 (1985) ("The conclusion is that dependence on a bank is no more to the liking of
Japanese management than management in other countries, and for leading Japanese
companies no longer a significant issue."). Strong firms can spread their borrowings
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anese firms deserted the banks in droves. 8 1 Absent a crisis, direct in-
volvement by the main bank in the management of a member of the
keiretsu is rare today. Only when a member firm in the keiretsu becomes
financially distressed or otherwise embarrasses its colleagues does the
main bank step in and reorganize the firm. In such a case, the main
bank typically will insert its own executives into positions of control and
even temporarily assume a direct management role in order to avert
bankruptcy.8 2
In sharp contrast to American institutional investors, the Japanese
main bank seems relatively unconcerned about maximizing the current
share value of the members of its keiretsu. Japanese corporations histor-
ically have paid dividends equal only to approximately ten percent of
the par value of their stock,83 and dividend yields as a percentage of the
market value of shares are much lower, usually between one and two
percent of market value.8 4 These figures would be extraordinarily low
for most U.S. corporations. More importantly, they may suggest that
Japanese firms are pursuing an inefficient empire-building policy that
hoards "free cash flow" that might be more efficiently paid out to
shareholders.8 5 Indeed, during the 1980s, asJapanese corporations es-
caped their dependence on their main banks, their debt/equity ratios
fell significantly. 86 Such a pattern in the United States might attract a
between several banks "to ensure that no one bank will exert undue influence on the
corporation." Id. at 166 (discussing Hitachi).
81. Ramseyer, supra note 62, at 98. Professor Ramseyer also finds that Japanese
firms have recently developed multiple banking relationships to reduce their former de-
pendence on their main bank. See id. at 107-08.
82. See Abegglen & Stalk, supra note 80, at 166-67. In a recent example, the
Sumitomo Bank Ltd. sent in its own managers to rescue Itoman & Co., "a heavily in-
debted trading company closely affiliated with the bank," which was on the brink of
bankruptcy. See Masayoshi Kanabayashi & Marcus W. Brauchli, Sumitomo to Send
Managers to Help Troubled Itoman, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1990, at Al1. Eventually,
Sumitomo, which held less than 5% of Itoman, forced the ouster of the latter's presi-
dent, a former Sumitomo employee whom the bank had lent to Itoman to oversee its
rehabilitation after a prior financial crisis. SeeJames Sterngold, Ouster of Realty Leader
Jolts Corporate Japan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, at 32.
83. See Abegglen & Stalk, supra note 80, at 169.
84. Id. at 184.
85. "Free cash flow" basically refers to income after debt service and the accept-
ance of investment projects having a positive net present value (using the firm's cost of
capital as the discount rate). See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash-Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323 (1986). When a firm under-
takes an investment project that has a negative net present value (that is, an expected
rate of return below its cost of capital), it will reduce the market price of its shares. In
short, proceeds for which the firm lacks an attractive investment use should be paid out
to shareholders as dividends, but a firm that seeks to maximize growth, rather than
shareholder value, will hoard such cash flow. ProfessorJensen argues that the excessive
retention of free cash flow was a major cause of the takeover and LBO waves in the
United States of the 1980s. See id. at 328-29.
86. See Ramseyer, supra note 62, at 97 n.16 (ratio of new capital borrowed from
financial intermediaries fell from 74.3% in 1960s to 60.47 in 1980s).
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hostile takeover (at least until recently), because unused borrowing ca-
pacity can fund shareholder distributions or can finance a takeover.
But hostile raids are virtually unknown in Japan, where, after all, the
majority of the stock is locked up in friendly hands. Nonetheless, dis-
satisfaction among Japanese institutional investors with low dividend
yields has recently become open and public, as Japanese insurance
companies in particular have criticized corporations with low dividend
payouts.8 7
In this light, the Japanese model of financial monitoring is less
clearly a more efficient organizational form and may represent a mecha-
nism for managerial entrenchment. The foregoing description sug-
gests an industrial structure in which agency costs are high, as above-
market wages are prevalent and substantial insurance payments are
made to protect against an insolvency risk that concerns managers
more than investors. Indeed, the very structure of the keiretsu seems
designed to ensure weak monitoring. Because the main bank holds an
ownership level that is below five percent by definition, it must secure
the consent of its fellow keiretsu members before it can take disciplinary
action or remove senior management. Yet these other members share
a common interest in restricting main bank interventions in the internal
affairs of each member to occasions in which the demonstrated delin-
quency of a member firm threatens the keiretsu as a whole.
The evidence on the keiretsu, however, is not clear-cut. Rational
economic motives can also explain why the main bank that dominates
the keiretsu tolerates managerial slack in its member firms. From an
efficiency-oriented perspective, one can hypothesize that the deliberate
use of minority public ownership permits some capital market disci-
pline. The advantage of minority ownership is that the members of the
keiretsu are not all lumped together on an aggregate basis. Instead, if
one firm has better prospects or a superior track record, the market can
price its publicly traded shares at a premium. Such market signaling
may affect the allocation of capital within the group or indicate the need
for outside intervention. Alternatively, Professor Masahiko Aoki, a
noted Japanese economist, has argued that the relatively weak control
exercised by banks over industrial corporations in Japan is efficient be-
cause it complements the internal organizational character of the Japa-
nese firm.88 One hard fact supports either theory: At least prior to
Japan's 1989 stock market decline, Japanese shareholders enjoyed a
87. See Chiharu Okajima & John Taylor, Tokyo Stock Slide Triggers Shareholder
Rebellion, IRRC Global Shareholder, Autumn 1990, at 5. The veiled threat made by
some of these insurance companies was that unless payouts increased they might sell
their holdings in the lowest paying firms. Such concentrated selling might collapse the
firm's stock price. Insurance companies appear to be the one institution in the Japanese
markets that parallels an American institutional investor.
88. See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J.
Econ. Lit. 1, 14-18 (1990).
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very high annual after-tax market rate of return.8 9 Nonetheless, one
may well ask whether the keiretsu system was responsible for this rate of
return or, rather, whether the rate of return was responsible for share-
holder tolerance for the keiretsu system. In any event, the irony is that if
the Japanese keiretsu system is efficient, it seems to work well only within
its special context and, according to Aoki, largely because it relies on a
relatively passive and deferential style of monitoring.
Still, even if accepted, these arguments do not necessarily imply
that the main bank is an efficient corporate monitor. Because the
bank's position as a debtholder may outweigh its position as an equity
holder, which cannot exceed five percent, it may be risk averse and
want cash hoarded within the firm paid out as dividends. Or, it may use
its controlling position to exact above-market interest rates on the
loans it makes to member firms in its keiretsu,90 and may tolerate a man-
agerial preference for empire-building in return. Clearly, this hypothe-
sis suggests not optimal monitoring but a conflict between the interests
of the main bank and the minority shareholders in the firm. For this
Article's purposes, the basic point is that a substantial investor's will-
ingness to incur significant monitoring expenses does not necessarily
imply that it will act in the interest of the minority shareholders.
Rather, it may behave opportunistically, such as by charging above-
market interest rates. In short, a system that relies on institutional in-
vestors as monitors could simply substitute a new set of agency cost
problems for the traditional problem of managerial opportunism.9 1
Some observers believe that the keiretsu mode of organization is
gradually disappearing injapan. They report that few of the most suc-
cessful Japanese multinational corporations over the last several de-
cades have been members of traditional keiretsu. 92 More importantly,
89. See id. at 15 (after-tax annual market rate of return from 1963 to 1986 was
11.7%). Recent developments, however, raise the possibility that this extraordinarily
high rate of return may have been partially the product of systematic stock market ma-
nipulation. Twenty-one Japanese securities firms have admitted paying at least $1.3 bil-
lion to cover trading losses of major clients. See James Sterngold, Regulation, Japan
Style, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1991, at D), D2. Such a de facto investor insurance system
could easily result in stock prices and price-earning ratios that are not sustainable over
the long term. For other evidence of manipulation, see Auerback, supra note 72.
90. Such a possibility has also been noted by Professor Aoki. See Masahiko Aoki,
Shareholders' Non-Unanimity on Investment Financing: Banks vs. Individual Investors,
in The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm 193 (Masahiko Aoki ed., 1984).
91. Put simply, while a large shareholder can perform effective monitoring that
benefits all shareholders, there is no logical reason for it to perform such a service gratu-
itously. If it can demand a side payment (such as above-market interest rates or an obli-
gation on the borrower's part to support the bank's stock price, see supra note 72 and
accompanying text) in which the minority does not share, in return for tolerating some
slack, it has little reason to decline such an exchange. The Japanese experience is at
least consistent with such a story.
92. See Abegglen & Stalk, supra note 80, at 189-90 (listing among others, Toyota,
Hino, and Suzuki in vehicles; Hitachi, Sharp, Sanyo, Matsushita, and Sony in electronics;
Fuji, Canon, Ricoh, and Seiko in cameras and films as among those recently emergent
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these observers note that the period of tightest control ofJapanese cor-
porations by financial institutions was during the 1950s and 1960s
when Japan was still recovering from World War II and capital was
scarce.93 By the mid-1980s, they note, the roles had reversed:
With greatly increased liquidity in the Japanese economy, and
with stronger company balance sheets, this system has
changed. Banks must now solicit attractive borrowers, and
find themselves providing funds to the weaker companies, in
which their powers remain considerable. The most successful
ofJapan's companies ... are hardly under bank control. The
leading companies have little debt, and they can choose their
bank sources.94
In short, the control of financial institutions is strong in times of capital
scarcity, but weak otherwise. As discussed later, the same characteriza-
tion can be applied to the relationship between Germany's "universal
banks" and its industrial corporations. The rise of an international cap-
ital market may spell the end for financial monitors in internal capital
markets. 95
C. Germany
Even more than in Japan, German corporations depend upon their
banking system for access to all forms of external finance.96 The Ger-
man stock markets are used by relatively few German corporations (402
as of 1988), and even these firms obtain only a small proportion of their
capital by issuing exchange-listed securities. 9 7 Of the German firms
that do trade in the public market, fewer than one hundred lack a con-
firms that were not group members or bank dependent). Some of these firms have,
however, begun to form their own groups that mimic the Aeiretsu. Id. For a similar view
that the keiretsu system is breaking down (but for different reasons), see Auerback, supra
note 72.
93. Abegglen & Stalk, supra note 80, at 188-89.
94. Id. at 189.
95. See infra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
96. See John Cable, Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The
Role of West German Banks, 95 Econ.J. 118, 119 (1985). Bank borrowing is the largest
single external source of capital (20% of total enterprise funds), and banks also handle
most new issues of marketable securities, placing substantial proportions of them with
their customers. See id.
97. A 1989 study conducted by Coopers & Lybrand for the British Department of
Trade and Industry provides the best comparative data on the size of the European
stock markets and the role of institutional investors in them. It found: "Germany's
stock markets have never been a significant factor in the equity raising process as compa-
nies have traditionally relied upon long term loans from their primary banks as the ma-
jor source of finance." See 2 Department of Trade and Industry, Barriers To Takeovers
in The European Community 16 (1989) [hereinafter, Coopers & Lybrand Report].
Whereas the U.K. had 1804 publicly traded domestic corporations listed on its stock
exchanges as of the end of 1988, Germany had only 402. 2 id. at 26. Another revealing
statistic is that the total capitalization of the London Stock Market in 1988 was 587.6
billion (in European Currency Units), as compared to 205.8 billion for Germany, 190.4
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trolling shareholder or shareholder group.98 In short, investors who
pursue liquidity have little chance at participating in control.
Unlike the Japanese banks, German banks are merchant banks that
handle both commercial banking and securities underwriting. Yet,
bank domination of German industrial corporations does not result
from outright ownership, because German banks in fact own under 5%
of the stock of the largest one hundred German corporations. 99
Rather, control is effectively held by the major German banks because
they provide the country's stockbrokerage services, and shares in Ger-
man corporations are generally deposited by their owners with the
banks, which can vote the shares on behalf of their owners.100 As a
practical matter, the German proxy voting system produces a functional
analogue to the Japanese keiretsu. Because of it, German banks exercise
nearly 34% of the total voting power in the top one hundred German
corporations and over 50% of the total voting power in the ten largest
companies. 101 Once again, we encounter a puzzle: despite the absence
of legal restrictions, German banks own no more stock on a percentage
basis than do Japanese banks-or than U.S. bank holding companies
billion for France, and 115.6 billion for Italy. I id. at 9. Thus, the U.K. market capitali-
zation exceeds the total of the next three largest markets.
Institutional investors other than banks appear to play a relatively insignificant role
in corporate finance in Germany, and fund managers are particularly unimportant. The
Coopers & Lybrand Report sets forth the following breakdown of funds under discre-
tionary management as of 1986: U.K. (580 billion pounds); France (148 billion pounds);
the Netherlands (147 billion pounds); West Germany (142 billion pounds). 1 id. at 11.
98. See Hopt, supra note 27, at 4. The Coopers & Lybrand Report estimates that
the combined holdings of the two largest classes of institutional investors in Germany
(banks and insurance companies) accounted for 21%o of the ownership of publicly held
German corporations as of the end of 1988. 2 Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note
97, at 26. No other class of institutional investor had significant holdings. Hence the
overall level of institutional ownership of German corporations is around half that in the
United States.
99. Cable, supra note 96, at 120. No legal restriction requires German banks to
hold ownership to this level. Recently, this percentage has fallen to around 3.2% in the
case of exchange listed firms. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, German banks do not appear to provide much new equity finance for
their corporate clients. The Coopers & Lybrand Report finds that in 1987 financial insti-
tutions across Europe provided new equity finance according to the following break-
down: France ($15 billion); Italy ($2.8 billion); the Netherlands ($0.7 billion); United
Kingdom ($21.6 billion); West Germany ($5.5 billion). 1 Coopers & Lybrand Report,
supra note 97, at 13. In short, British banks (at least in 1987) provided nearly four times
as much equity finance as did their much larger German rivals. Instead, German banks
appear to provide primarily debt finance to their clients. Possibly, this is a consequence
of the limited liquidity available to banks in the German economy or of the desire of
those holding control not to dilute their control position.
100. See 2 Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note 97, at 13-14.
101. See Cable, supra note 96, at 120. Based on this voting power, German banks
hold 9.8% (through their officers and agents) of the total seats on the supervisory
boards of the one hundred largest German companies. Id. at 119.
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are permitted to own. 0 2
Bank supervision of corporate managements in Germany has been
described as close and intensive. One observer reports that:
Through the exercise of voting rights the big banks greatly in-
fluence hirings and firings in West German corporations' ex-
ecutive bodies, the supervisory boards; as well as on
managing boards. They have a voice in all fundamental busi-
ness decisions.' 0 3
This greater interest in "voice" seems easily explainable in terms of this
Article's framework of analysis: because German banks lack liquidity,
as a result of the relatively undeveloped state of the German stock mar-
kets, they are compelled to exercise "voice." Commentators character-
ize the relationships between the three major German banks and their
corporate clientele as "very close and stable" and note that the prob-
lem of "[slhort-termism" does not arise. 1 4
How effective is the German system of monitoring? The available
empirical evidence indeed suggests that it does benefit minority share-
holders. One recent statistical study of the largest German corpora-
tions finds a "significant, positive relationship between the degree of
bank involvement in leading industrial companies and their financial
performance."' 0 5 Regression analysis suggests that these results are
not explainable simply in terms of the market power or credit advan-
tages that these corporations obtain from their banking associations.10 6
Rather, the explanation that works best to explain the German data is
that bank monitoring reduces agency and information costs applicable
to these corporations and results in their exhibiting "greater conform-
ity to cost-minimising, profit-oriented goals."' 0 7
Still, even if the German system works well, it may be rapidly
changing. The balance of power between German financial institutions
and German industrial corporations seems to be shifting in the latter's
favor. During the 1970s and 1980s, large German corporations (the
Aktiengesellschaften) appear to have escaped their former dependence on
the universal banks as a source of debt capital.' 08 Debt/equity ratios
shifted correspondingly, but, even more importantly, the development
102. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
103. Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corporation and The Institutional Inves-
tor: Are There Lessons From Abroad?, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 775, 783.
104. Id. at 790. See also 2 Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note 97, at 14
("banks' representatives [on the board] are not viewed suspicously... but are gladly
welcomed").
105. Cable, supra note 96, at 130 (study of 48 leading German corporations).
106. See id. at 129-30.
107. Id. at 121.
108. The share of bank credits and loans in the overall capital position of the
Aktiengesellschaften fell from 16.9% in 1974 to 6.6% in 1984. In the chemical sector, it fell
from 18.4% to 4.0%, and in the electronics sector from 16.3% to 2.8%. SeeJosef Esser,
Bank Power in West Germany Revised, 13 W. Eur. Pol. 17, 23 (1990).
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of international capital markets allowed German industrial corpora-
tions to select their creditors and hence escape their traditional
monitors.' 0 9 Between 1976 and 1986, the number of German corpora-
tions in which the universal banks jointly held a 10% or greater equity
stake fell from 129 to 86,110 and by the end of 1986, this aggregate
ownership amounted to only 0.7% of the capital of all German non-
banking firms (down from 1.3% ten years earlier). 11I Among German
firms having a stock exchange listing, the average equity stake held by
German banks similarly fell from 4.5% to 3.2%. 112 Furthermore, the
representation of German banks on the supervisory boards of the hun-
dred largest firms fell to 7% of the board members by 1989.113 At least
one close observer reports that management had succeeded "in usurp-
ing the controlling function of the supervisory boards."' 14
Even more striking has been the behavior of Germany's leading
universal bank, Deutsche Bank, which has voluntarily begun to relin-
quish its chairmanships on the supervisory boards of German corpora-
tions. 115 Why should it abandon the chairmanship of these boards,
when by all accounts the chairman wields the greatest influence and
performs the principal monitoring role on the supervisory board? A
partial answer is that the Deutsche Bank repeatedly found itself caught
in conflicts of interest. With the appearance of an incipient merger and
acquisition movement in Germany, some have speculated that
Deutsche Bank wanted to avoid entanglements with corporations that
might prevent it from financing, or engaging in, such takeovers. 16
Still, a more general explanation is possible that focuses on the declin-
ing profitability to Deutsche Bank from monitoring: Deutsche Bank's
109. See id. at 23-24.
110. Id. at 25.
111. Id.
112. Id. The Coopers & Lybrand Report finds that German bank ownership in all
public companies fell from 10% in 1987 to 9% in 1988, and attributes this decline partly
to public criticism of bank domination of German industry. See 2 Coopers & Lybrand
Report, supra note 97, at 13.
113. Esser, supra note 108, at 26. It is also noteworthy that employee representa-
tives and union leaders must constitute half the directors on the supervisory board of
German corporations with more than 2,000 employees. See Julian Franks & Colin
Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany and the
UK, 5 Econ. Pol'y 191, 205-06 (1990) (noting that such representation blocks frequent
control changes and takeovers). Hence, the German system of co-determination under
which labor and capital share control of the supervisory board may make the role of
financial institutions a desirable counter-weight to labor's powerful position in the
boardroom. At the least, co-determination implies that the German system is very dif-
ferent from that in the United States.
114. Esser, supra note 108, at 27. German corporations have two boards: an ex-
clusively outside or "supervisory" board (the Aufsichtsrat) and the managing or executive
board (the Vorstand). The domination of the Vorstand, which is chosen by the Aufsichtsrat,
means that insiders are running the corporation.
115. See New Dreams at Deutsche Bank, Economist, June 22, 1991 at 79, 80.
116. See id. at 80.
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disengagement from the supervisory boards it formerly chaired may be
a direct consequence of the greater reliance of German corporations on
international capital markets. Monitoring is often costly, including
both the direct costs of supervision and the indirect opportunity costs
of lost business which conflicts of interest required the Deutsche Bank
to forgo. In the past, the German universal banks may have been com-
pensated for their monitoring services by virtue of the near monopoly
position they held as the sole or primary provider of capital market
services to German corporations. As an international capital market
brought competition and a lower cost of capital to German corpora-
tions, however, it also made monitoring less profitable for the German
universal banks. In short, unless shareholders can compensate an insti-
tutional monitor (either through above-market interest rates or some
other means), the amount of monitoring provided may decline.
D. Intermediate Cases: Sweden and Canada
Sweden and Canada provide interesting case studies because each
reveals the adaptive responses to which corporations can resort when
they are exposed to direct monitoring by institutional investors in a de-
veloped external capital market. The Swedish economy has both a
well-developed stock market 1 7 and a high level of takeover activity." 8
As in the United States, there has been a dramatic recent increase in the
level of institutional ownership. Between the 1960s and 1988, individ-
ual ownership of stock in Sweden fell from roughly 70%o to 23%.119
The balance of the stock in Swedish corporations is held by a diverse
group of institutional investors, with investment companies and insur-
ance companies constituting the largest categories.'
20
Yet another trend is equally noticeable in Sweden: over the same
period that institutional ownership has risen, stock has become concen-
trated in the hands of small control groups assembled by management
or the firm's founders. In 1978, the largest single owner of a Swedish
117. In 1985, the Swedish Government authorized the Minister of Industry to ap-
point a parliamentary commission to study stock ownership and control. The Commis-
sion on Stock Ownership and Efficiency submitted its report in 1988. An English-
language summary of that report has been prepared. See Rolf Skog & Mats Isaksson,
Ownership and Control in the Swedish Business Sector (Institutional Investor Project,
Columbia University School of Law, 1989). It reports that, of the 200 "major" compa-
nies in the private sector in Sweden, approximately half were listed on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange. Id. at 3. These companies "accounted for about 90% of the total
number of employees in the 200 private sector companies." Id.
118. Of the 90 major companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1978,
40 were taken over by other companies by August, 1988, with three-fourths of these
transactions occurring after 1983. See id. at 16. Skog and Isaksson do not indicate
whether these takeovers were "friendly" or "hostile"; however, they do note that in 29
cases a change in company control occurred.
119. Id. at 5.
120. As of year-end 1985, Swedish stockholders fell into the following categories:
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"major" company accounted on average for 20% of the equity; by
1985, this figure had risen to 29%. The five largest shareholders to-
gether held 41% of the equity in 1978, but 56% by 1985.121
These figures actually understate the degree to which control of
Swedish corporations has been locked up in a very small group of con-
trolling shareholders. Under Swedish law, corporations may issue two
classes of common stock with different voting rights. 122 Thus, owner-
ship of equity does not imply equivalent voting rights. When one looks
instead at the concentration of the voting stock, one finds that in 1978
the largest single holder averaged 27% of the voting stock, but this
figure had risen to 39% by 1985.123 Similarly, the top five shareholders
combined averaged 48% of the voting power in 1978, but 66% by
1985.124 Once an additional adjustment is made for stock held by affili-
ated companies, the largest owner's share of the voting power rose
from 34% in 1978 to 47% in 1985, and the top five owners' voting
power together rose from 51% in 1978 to 69% in 1985.125
In short, the typical Swedish firm has either a single shareholder or
a closely affiliated group which clearly holds control. More impor-
tantly, this trend toward consolidation of control occurred concomi-
tantly with the rise of institutional ownership. Thus, at least viewed
from a distance, Swedish institutional investors may have liquidity, but
apparently not control.
A closer look at the transition in Sweden reveals that control has
been insulated from capital market discipline by a variety of less visible
measures as well. First, Sweden has developed a system of cross-
ownership and circular ownership of stock that closely resembles the
Percentage of Total
Category of Owner Stock Market Value
Individuals 25%
Mutual funds 1%
Payroll investment and national investment
funds 5%
Listed investment and holding companies 16%
Non-listed investment and holding companies 3%
Insurance companies 11%
Pension and employee investment funds 4%
Listed non-financial companies 9%0
Non-listed nonfinancial companies 2%.
Foundations 9%
National and local governments 2%
Other institutional owners 5%
Foreign owners 8%
1007
Id. at 12.
121. See id. at 13.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13-14.
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Japanese pattern. 126 Frequently, Company A owns stock in Company
B, which owns stock in Company C, which owns stock in CompanyA. A
Swedish Parliamentary Commission found the levels of such reciprocal
ownership varied from 2%o to almost 50%o and averaged 14%y.127 Sec-
ond, dual-class voting schemes have come into increasing use over the
last decade. By 1985, 75%o of major companies had adopted such a
scheme. 128 Obviously, both devices- cross-ownership and dual-class
voting stock-are means by which management or a controlling family
can entrench itself. Finally, Sweden restricts the voting power that in-
vestment funds, insurance companies, and pension funds may possess
in any single company.' 29
In terms of this Article's analysis, Sweden's significance lies in the
separation it has effected between liquidity and control. Institutional
investors appear to dominate the stock market in Sweden, but they do
not control individual companies. The high rate of takeover activity in
Sweden shows that control can pass to other nonfinancial corporations,
but institutional investors appear to have accepted liquidity in lieu of
control.
The Canadian experience resembles Sweden's. Much like the
United States and Great Britain, Canada has an active stock market and
takeovers are common. But, unlike either country, Canada has exper-
ienced a recent and rapid concentration of stock ownership in the
hands of controlling shareholders. A Royal Commission on Corporate
Concentration reported in 1978 that of Canada's 100 largest non-
financial corporations, 48% were either wholly owned (usually by a for-
eign corporation) or were controlled by a majority stockholder.' 30 This
breakdown appears to have understated the level of control because it
overlooked those firms subject to minority control through a de facto
controlling shareholder.' 3 ' A later 1985 study found that nine Cana-
126. In a summary of cross- and circular ownership among Swedish listed compa-
nies in 1988, the Swedish Parliamentary Commission found 26 cases of cross-ownership
out of fewer than 100 listed firms. See id. at 19. For a description of the Japanese
practice, see supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
127. Skog & Isaksson, supra note 117, at 19.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Even more than in the case ofJapan, Swedish law places strict ownership limits
on the amount of stock that insurance companies, investment funds, and pensions may
own in an individual corporation. A Swedish insurance company may not hold more
than 5% of the voting stock in any single company. Id. at 9. A similar rule applies to
investment funds. Id. at 8. Pension funds are restricted to either 8% or 10%o, depend-
ing on the particular type of fund. Id. at 10. These are the largest classes of institutional
investors in Sweden, where banks do not appear to play an active role in corporate mon-
itoring. See table supra note 120.
130. See Report of The Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration 288-89
(1978).
131. For criticisms of the Royal Commission's Report on this ground, see Wallace
Clement, An Exercise in Legitimation: Ownership and Control in The Report of the
Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration in Perspectives on The Royal Commis-
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dian families held control over 46% of the top 300 companies traded
on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 132 Even more recent data shows that
only 20 of Canada's 400 largest public corporations are widely held,
and some 380 have a single shareholder with at least a 15% holding
(and in 374 of these, a conglomerate or family holds between 25% and
30%o of the stock).' 33 The Canadian experience thus resembles the
Swedish, but with the difference that the vehicle holding control is not
typically another non-financial corporation, but a family dynasty.13 4
E. United Kingdom
The British capital markets match those of the United States in be-
ing extremely active and well-developed.' 35 Institutional ownership is
increasing, and has long been higher in the U.K. than in the U.S.' 36
Thus, the United Kingdom comes closest to an economy that offers in-
vestors both liquidity and control. Still, there are other significant dif-
ferences between the U.K. and the U.S. that militate against the uniting
of liquidity and control in British markets. First, it is estimated that the
major pension funds hold 60% of the equity in U.K. corporations,13 7
whereas the corresponding U.S. figure is only 20.4%.138 Although
British pension funds can be active and substantial shareholders, and
indeed in one recent case have even launched a successful takeover,' 3 9
observers report that they are in general long-term holders who do not
need "the overnight liquidity of the stock market."' 140 This is logical
because, unlike mutual funds, pension funds do not face shareholder
redemptions; nor are they engaged in an active competition for inves-
tors' funds. Moreover, there are structural differences between the typ-
sion on Corporate Concentration 215, 220-21 (Paul K. Gorecki & W.T. Stanbury eds.,
1979).
132. See Deborah A. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, in
Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover 398, 400 (John C.
Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
133. See Diane Francis, Controlling Interest: Who Owns Canada? 4 (1986).
134. See id. By comparison, in the United States only 75 of the companies in the
Standard & Poor's index have a 15% shareholder. See id.
135. SeeJonathan Charkham, The American Corporation and the Institutional In-
vestor: Are There Lessons from Abroad?-Hands Across the Sea, 1988 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 765, 765.
136. British institutional ownership rose from 47% in 1975 to over 63% today. See
Taylor, supra note 41, at 70. British households own less than 20% of British equities.
See id. Currently, institutional investors own approximately 45% of publicly owned cor-
porate equity in the United States. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
137. See Charkham, supra note 135, at 770.
138. See Brancato, Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors, supra note 40, at 18, 20
(presenting data from 1986).
139. See Stephen Clark, Taking a Big Bite, Institutional Investor, Aug. 1990, at 68
(noting successful takeover by British Coal Pension Funds of Globe Investment Trusts).
140. Leonard J. Hollie, Europe Has Appetite for Venture Capital, Pensions & In-
vestments, Apr. 30, 1990, at 22 (quoting Alan Patricof, president of Patricof Associates,
Inc., a New York investment banking and consulting firm).
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ical U.K. pension fund and its U.S. equivalent. U.K. funds typically
invest more heavily in long-term, illiquid assets, including real estate
and foreign stocks. 14 1 British funds also tend to do most of their in-
vesting through "in-house staffs," 142 while the normal U.S. practice is
for the funds to allocate the management of their assets among several
investment advisers, thereby effectively staging a competition among
them. Arguably, the use of internal money managers and the absence
of competition in the U.K. may reduce the pressure for short-term
performance.
Another fact about British institutional investors is more striking:
although unrestricted by legal constraints, individual institutional in-
vestors seldom hold more than one to two percent of the stock of any
corporation. 143 Why not? The most plausible explanation for this self-
imposed limitation is that larger-sized blocks would render them illiq-
uid. Institutional investors often share the same views and thus trade in
a herd-like manner. 144 Because British pension funds make up a dis-
proportionate amount of the British financial markets, a fund that held
a large block of stock might find it necessary to accept a substantial
block discount. In this light, a decision to limit holdings to a low per-
centage of each issuer's outstanding stock reflects the preference of
British institutions for liquidity over control.
Because Britain has long had a level of institutional ownership that
exceeds the current U.S. level, 145 its experience with the growth of in-
stitutional ownership may foreshadow future changes and trends within
the U.S. corporate environment. British institutional investors tend to
act collectively through umbrella institutions when dealing with corpo-
rate managements. Four "Industry Associations"-covering pension
funds, insurance companies, unit trusts, and investment companies, re-
spectively-have developed, in part to share the expenses and political
burden of confronting and opposing individual corporate manage-
ments.146 When an emergency situation arises-such as a takeover de-
141. See Barry B. Burr, British Lead In Investing Abroad, Pensions & Investments,
July 23, 1990, at 14. Some 81.4%o of the assets in the typical British pension fund are
allocated to stocks, as contrasted to 45.1% for the 200 largest U.S. pension funds. See
id.
142. Id.
143. See W. A. Thomas, The Big Bang 18 (1986).
144. Thomas concludes that because institutional investors in Britain tend to hold
an "identity of view" (that is, they tend to trade the same way at the same time) the
liquidity of the British equity market has been diminished. See id. at 18. This could, in
turn, explain why institutions restrict themselves to small stakes of under 2%.
145. In 1975, British institutions owned 45% of all British equities, which is about
equal to the current U.S. level of institutional ownership. Today, British institutions
own over 63%. See supra note 136.
146. See Louis Lowenstein & Ira M. Millstein, The American Corporation and the
Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons from Abroad?-Introduction, 1988 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 739, 748 (quoting Robert Monks, former chief executive of Institutional
Shareholder Services, Inc.).
1310 [Vol. 91:1277
LIQUIDITY VERSUS CONTROL
fense-the four associations will form a "case committee" to deal with
the particular corporate management.1 47 In addition, the Bank of
England plays a behind-the-scenes mediating role when tensions arise
between dissatisfied institutional investors and corporate managements
that appear to have been underperforming. 148 This collective strategy
is in sharp contrast to the classic Wall Street Rule, under which dissatis-
fied institutions dump their shares into the market and move on. Ar-
guably, this pattern shows that (1) institutional investors will exercise
greater "voice" when their ability to "exit" is diminished, and (2) to
exercise "voice," some protective mechanism must evolve that spares
them from head-on, one-to-one confrontations with corporate
managements.
F. An Initial Summary
Three fundamentally different kinds of relationships between insti-
tutional investors and corporate managements can be-posited based on
the foregoing survey. The first is the internal capital market. For the
present at least, the external capital markets that typify the United
States and the United Kingdom remain unique. In other major econo-
mies-most notably Japan and Germany-the allocation of capital to
corporate users is determined principally by internal capital markets.
These internal capital markets maximize the monitoring power of fi-
nancial institutions, but the monitoring process remains relatively con-
sensual, not hostile, and the trip wire for external intervention tends to
be the approach of insolvency, not the failure to maximize stock price.
Moreover, financial institutions undertake external intervention gradu-
ally and generally as a last resort. Even when it occurs, disruption is
carefully minimized, and control eventually returns to internal manage-
ment, after, perhaps, the replacement of the most senior level of the
incumbent management. 149 By contrast, monitoring in external capital
markets often involves hostile contests for corporate control that are
147. See id. Further research is needed on the role played by these industry as-
sociations. They may also serve to dissuade individual members from liquidating their
holdings.
148. See Taylor, supra note 41, at 80.
149. As Professor Aoki observes, within the Japanese firm, bank monitoring follows
a gradual progression from first raising questions to later intervening as a shareholder,
to, finally, removing the senior executives, but even then, typically replacing them from
within the firm:
If the profit of a company starts to decline, the main bank is able to detect
the problem at a rather early stage through information gained from the man-
agement of commercial accounts, short-term credits, long-term personal con-
tacts with top management of the company and its business partners, and so
on, because of its special position. Tacit and explicit pressure for the internal
overhaul of management would be initiated in exchange for various types of
rescue operations as noted before. If bad states continue, the main bank may
decide to take over management through the governance structure of the com-
pany.... Recent experiences indicate, however, that banks do not change the
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triggered simply by a share discount. °50 Typically, such discipline re-
sults in the substitution of an entire external management team for the
incumbent senior management.
The second form of relationship begins with the deterioration of
the first. Reliance on internal capital markets is diminishing with the
growth of a single international capital market. In both Japan and
Germany, there is evidence that corporate managers are gradually es-
caping the control of a single financial monitor by moving to diversify
their credit sources. As this happens, the independence of financial
monitors is increasingly compromised because they must begin to mar-
ket their services to corporate managements against active competition.
In turn, as profits erode, financial monitors may begin to cut back on
those monitoring services for which they feel inadequately compen-
sated. From this perspective, the days of internal capital markets may
be numbered. Unless special means can be found to compensate them
for their monitoring services, financial monitors, such as the German
universal banks, may survive only under circumstances of capital scar-
city-such as post-war Europe and Japan-where they hold control
over access to capital.
The third relationship is less stable: as financial monitors-such as
the German universal banks or the Japanese main banks-face increas-
ing competition, they may begin to strike new alliances.' 5 ' If they can-
not offer their clients lower cost capital than can the international
markets, they can provide management with other services that may
justify special compensation, such as protection from hostile takeovers.
To describe this scenario is also to recognize that financial monitors
need not ally inherently with minority shareholders.
The rise of the institutional investor to a controlling position is by
no means inevitable. Defensive alliances are also possible between cor-
porate managements and other shareholders. As the Canadian and
Swedish experiences show, even in economies with external capital
markets, structural defenses can evolve that insulate managements
from the full impact of capital market discipline. In other major econo-
mies, the level of public ownership remains simply too small to enable
institutional investors to discipline corporate management.' 52
fundamental nature of internal management, but rather hand over top manage-
ment after recuperation to internally promoted employees ....
Aoki, supra note 88, at 15.
150. For a detailed discussion of the view that takeovers are motivated by a margin
(or "share discount") between a firm's liquidation value and its stock market value, see
Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of 'Discounted' Share
Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891 (1988).
151. On the general subject of shifting alliances within the public corporation and
defections among allies unable to reach enforceable agreements, seeJohn C. Coffee,Jr.,
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. LJ. 1495
(1990).
152. The Coopers & Lybrand Report finds that of over 200 listed companies in
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The foregoing survey places us in a position to evaluate the his-
toric passivity of American institutional investors. Although the new
critics attribute this passivity to overregulation, this brief survey casts
substantial doubt on the overregulation thesis. At least five fundamen-
tal objections can be made to the overregulation story as the primary
explanation for shareholder passivity.
First, the claim that American banks were uniquely subject to regu-
lation seems puzzling given that Japanese banks are subject to effec-
tively the same five percent limitation on voting stock ownership. 153
Italy, only seven have over 50% of their shares in public hands. 1 Coopers & Lybrand
Report, supra note 97, at 22. It estimates that in France over half of the 200 largest
companies are "family controlled." Id. In addition, government shareholdings and
cross-shareholdings also minimize the possibility of takeovers and institutional investor
influence in France. Others provide a similar assessment of the thinness of the French
capital markets. See Gareth P. Dyas & Heinz T. Thanheiser, The Emerging European
Enterprise: Strategy and Structure in French and German Industry 169-71 (1976). Ac-
cording to Dyas and Thanheiser, the financial markets in France "are described by all
observers as extremely 'narrow.'" Id. at 170. They conclude that "this is ascribable, in
part, to the preponderance of the state as lender and borrower of available funds." Id.
Only around 460 French corporations trade on the Paris Stock Exchange (out of some
135,000 stock corporations incorporated in France), and the remainder would appear to
be financed largely through internal capital markets. See Hopt, supra note 27, at 4. See
also Franks & Mayer, supra note 113, at 208-09 (noting government involvement as a
shareholder in French corporations as a barrier to takeovers and control changes).
153. The National Bank Act does not authorize banks to own stocks directly. See
12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988). However, until the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, banks could easily
outflank this prohibition by investing through securities affiliates. See Roe, Political
Theory, supra note 3, at 17. While the Glass-Steagall Act precluded commercial banks
from having an affiliation with firms "dealing" in securities, it did not directly prohibit
banks from being owned by a parent company that simply owned securities, either di-
rectly or through an affiliate. See supra note 59. For a variety of reasons, bank holding
companies appeared during the 1950s, and because they were not covered by the Na-
tional Bank Act, they were effectively unregulated. In response, Congress enacted the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which generally precluded a bank holding com-
pany from owning more than 5% of the voting stock of a nonbanking company. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988). Effectively, this means that virtually any major bank
may legally acquire up to 5% of the voting stock of an industrial corporation through a
parent or securities affiliate. See supra note 63. In addition, bank trust departments,
which are not restricted in stock ownership by the prohibition on bank ownership, may
invest up to 10%6 of their funds in the stock of a single corporation. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 9.18(b)(9)(ii) (1991). Alone, this provision would allow a bank with a large trust de-
partment to exercise control over corporations of substantial size (although fiduciary
requirements would necessitate diversification). Finally, the Bank Holding Company
Act permits banks to acquire businesses whose activities are "so closely related to bank-
ing ... as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). Recently,
bank regulators have expanded the category of activities falling within this exception.
See American Land Title Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 892 F.2d
1059 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
One commentator observes that the "most dramatic shift in bank regulation over
the last decade has been the extent to which banks have been permitted to diversify their
activities and investments." Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective
on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 501, 529 (1989). In
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Similar limitations on stock ownership exist in other countries as
well.' 54
Second, in other economies-for example, Germany and Great
Britain-in which substantive limitations on bank ownership of equity
securities have not existed, financial institutions still have not exceeded
this same five percent level. 155 Perhaps the need to diversify invest-
ments limits banks in these countries, or perhaps other factors-such as
the need for liquidity, possible conflicts of interest, or fear of business
or political reprisals-cause them to halt ownership of voting stock at
this low level. Alternatively, banks may just not view equity ownership
as a business at which they have a comparative advantage.
Third, even within the United States, banks generally have not ex-
ploited the statutory powers they do possess to own and hold equity
securities-possibly because they have not found such ownership to be
particularly profitable.156 Although nonbanking activities of bank hold-
ing companies were virtually unregulated until the passage of the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, banks made little use of these pow-
ers. 157 After the Act's passage, real constraints were placed on the abil-
ity of bank holding companies to make acquisitions, but even the
combination, these exceptions to the general prohibition on bank ownership of corpo-
rate stock potentially overwhelm the rule and permit a single bank to exercise a signifi-
cant influence over most corporations. But extra-legal factors seem to prevent this from
happening. See infra note 156.
154. In Sweden, for example, insurance companies may not own more than 5% of
the voting stock of any company. The largest Swedish insurance company owns 2% of
more than 100 listed Swedish companies. See Skog & Isaksson, supra note 117, at 9. In
contrast, American banks have not utilized their legal capacity to buy stocks.
155. German banks today own 3.2% of the voting stock of the 100 largest major
German corporations. See supra notes 99, 112. British banks own even less of the stock
of British industrial companies. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Reforming the U.S. Financial
System: An International Perspective, FRBNY Quarterly Review, Spring, 1990, at 1, 2
(noting that "bank holding of shares of commercial firms is far less common" in Britain
than in Germany). British institutional investors tend to hold in the 1%-2%o range. See
Thomas, supra note 143, at 18.
156. As noted earlier, see supra note 153, although national banks may not directly
own equity securities for their own account, bank holding companies may hold up to 5%
of the voting stock of a non-banking corporation. One explanation for why banks have
failed to exploit this power (and why they did not diversify before 1956 when the Bank
Holding Company Act was passed) is that they have found diversification to be only
marginally profitable. See Garten, supra note 153, at 519, 557. Professor Garten con-
cludes: "mhe evidence suggests that bank holding company management of nonbank-
ing subsidiaries has not been very successful .... Id. at 557. If so, perhaps banks do
not make particularly efficient monitors either.
157. Professor Garten notes that the "relative importance of [bank] holding compa-
nies actually declined between 1936 and 1956." Id. at 519 (footnote omitted). Indeed,
between 1930 and 1939, only 34 nonbank subsidiaries were formed or acquired by bank
holding companies, and between 1950 and 1959 only 290 nonbank subsidiaries were
formed or acquired. Id. at 519 n.85. As Garten notes, a logical explanation for this
reluctance to diversify into nonbanking activities is that bank holding companies found
such acquisitions to be less profitable than their traditional activities. See id. at 519.
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substantial powers that remain are not exploited. Today, Citicorp, the
largest U.S. banking institution with total assets of over $200 billion,
holds only about $1 billion in equities.' 58 Even when U.S. banks do
take equity stakes in U.S. corporations, they do so indirectly, for exam-
ple, through leveraged buyout ("LBO") funds.159 Perhaps the use of a
buyout fund vehicle enables the banks to obtain greater diversification,
and thus reduces the risk of equity ownership, or perhaps, as some ob-
servers have suggested, the motive for the equity investment was not
the investment itself, but the lucrative fees received by the banks for
financing the LBO.160 Whatever the reason, it is difficult to assign a
causal relationship to legal restrictions on ownership when American
financial institutions historically have not used, and today continue not
to use, the considerable discretion that the law gives them.
A fourth problem with the claim that U.S. institutional investors
were regulated into passivity is that this explanation lacks a meaningful
benchmark for comparison. From a comparative perspective, one can
point to countervailing examples in which U.S. law is more protective
of institutional investors' freedom of action. For example, the German
co-determination law gives half the seats on the supervisory board to
labor and employee representatives, thereby effectively precluding
takeovers and limiting shareholder control.' 61 Another example is
ERISA's requirement that pension funds be adequately funded and
structured as free-standing legal entities. t62 In many European coun-
tries, there is no such requirement, and often there is no separate pen-
sion fund, only a legal claim held by the pensioner against the general
158. See, e.g., Black, supra note 12, at 552. Other U.S. banks own considerably
less. See Robert Guenther, Bankers Trust Leads Way for Major Banks in Investment
Banking, Wall St.J., Dec. 5, 1989 at Al, A14. Again, this limited ownership may reflect
the limited profitability of such activities. See supra note 156.
159. See Anise C. Wallace, Banks With Stakes in Borrowers Are in Spotlight, N.Y.
Times,July 4, 1990, at 47 (discussing equity investments by major banks in buyout fund
run by Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts). The key fact about an LBO fund, however, is that
the general partner (such as KKR) and not the bank investor plays the principal monitor-
ing role.
160. See id. (estimating that banks have collected $350 million in fees for financing
buyouts arranged by Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts and $150 million in such fees during
1988 alone). Under this interpretation, the banks invested in buyout funds as a form of
"relationship-building" (as one bank official acknowledged) in order to "win some of the
lucrative lending business generated by" these transactions. Id.
161. For a discussion of the impact of this requirement, see Franks & Mayer, supra
note 113, at 205-07.
162. Section 402(a) of ERISA requires that every employee benefit plan be estab-
lished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
This trust requirement is supplemented by section 403(a) of ERISA, which requires that
all assets of an employee benefit plan be held in trust by one or more trustees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a) (1988). In effect, the corporate sponsor may not hold the assets out of whose
earnings the pension is to be paid. Such a "funded" scheme is in contrast to "pay-as-
you-go" pension systems, which do not require a separate fund. SeeJohn Creedy, State
Pensions in Britain 13-14 (1982).
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assets of the employing corporation.' 6 3 This arrangement effectively
eliminates the pension fund as an entire class of institutional investor and
over the long run necessarily reduces the level of institutional owner-
ship of corporate stock. A third example is the legal rule in Britain and
Canada that may require a person acquiring a controlling position in a
corporation to offer to buy out all the remaining minority sharehold-
ers. 164 Such a rule may chill institutional activism far more than the
basically disclosure-oriented rules imposed on institutional investors
who seek to exercise control in the United States. In short, legal re-
strictions on financial institutions and other institutional investors exist
in most industrial economies that could support the thesis that political
coalitions in those countries had conspired to hobble those institutions.
For overregulation to be meaningful as an explanation of institutional
passivity, it must be shown at a minimum that U.S. institutional inves-
tors suffer from more overregulation than similar institutions else-
where. This showing has not yet been made.
A fifth problem with the overregulation story is historical. A prem-
ise of this story is that the Glass-Steagall Act, and the consequent sepa-
ration of commercial and investment banking, precluded financial
institutions within the United States from evolving into corporate
monitors in a manner that would have paralleled the German universal
banks or the Japanese main banks. However, the historical evidence
suggests that well before the Glass-Steagall Act, the largest, most pow-
erful American financial institutions had already begun to retreat from
an active monitoring role. In his monumental history of the Morgan
Bank, Ron Chernow reports on developments within the Morgan Bank
during the 1920s:
Gradually, if imperceptibly, the banker was becoming less a
corporate partner and more a professional, a disinterested in-
termediary .... In [Pierpont Morgan's] day, weak companies
needed to lean on strong bankers. But by the 1920s, a Stan-
dard Oil of NewJersey or a U.S. Steel had a stability compara-
163. Indeed, in most European countries, private pension plans are a rarity, with
"the vast majority of an individual's pension [coming] through the social security sys-
tem." Eric Short, First Steps on a Very Long Journey Towards a Single Market, Fin.
Times, May 3, 1990, Pension Fund Investment Section, at 5. While separate pension
funds are common in the United Kingdom, both Germany and France currently rely on
alternative systems that do not give rise to pension funds as institutional investors. See
Margaret Price, EC Funds Get Ready: New Rules to Liberalize Pension Investing, Pen-
sions & Investments, Aug. 20, 1990, at 1, 38.
164. British takeover law discourages partial bids and under some circumstances
requires a corporation that has assembled a substantial (but still a minority) percentage
of a firm's stock to make a mandatory bid for all the remaining shares. Such a
mandatory bid requirement obviously increases the costs of acquiring control. See
DeMott, supra note 132, at 408-09 (City Takeover Code requires persons acting in
concert who assemble 30% or more of voting securities to make mandatory buyout bid
for remaining shares at highest price paid by them within last twelve months).
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ble to that of the House of Morgan itself.16 5
As Chernow observes, the bankers' power was at its zenith "when capi-
tal markets were limited, with few financial intermediaries to tap
them."16 6 Yet, as capital markets developed and became "globally in-
tegrated," competition reduced the power of the Wall Street banker. 167
Much this same process-of gradual "emancipation" of industrial cor-
porations from bank influence-seems to be occurring in Germany and
Japan today. 168 Their slower development may be the product of the
longer survival of internal capital markets in those countries or the re-
sult of the instability and chaos following World War II, which may
have made association with a bank more important to financially
strained corporations in a war-ravaged economy The irony here is
that, rather than Germany and Japan serving as a model for future in-
dustrial development in the United States, the reverse may be gradually
happening, as international capital markets gradually supersede inter-
nal capital markets. Predictions are speculative, but the international-
ization of the capital markets does seem to weaken banker control.1 69
II. THE EXTRA-LEGAL CAUSES OF SHAREHOLDER PASSIVITY
Without denying that the overregulation of institutional investors
may partially account for shareholder passivity, this Article suggests
that extra-legal causes contribute more to an explanation of why insti-
165. Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the
Rise of Modem Finance 258 (1990).
166. Id. at 486. It is far from clear that even during this era Morgan bankers were
monitoring the corporations on whose boards they sat to assure that management maxi-
mized value for shareholders. Rather, because the basic business of the Morgan Bank
was bond sales, its own rational incentives were to protect its creditor clients by encour-
aging the retention of free cash flow within the corporation. Also, a seat on the client's
board is an obvious way for an investment bank to protect its business from the competi-
tive efforts of rival investment banking firms and to market its own services.
167. Id. ("Gradually Wall Street bankers would lose their unique place in world
finance.").
168. See supra notes 92-95, 108-116 and accompanying text.
169. One last possibility should be noted. Arguably, the impact of the legal differ-
ences to which institutional investors in different countries are subject can be overem-
phasized. Thus, an alternative standard might be to compare the percentages of listed
companies in different countries that have majority or controlling shareholders. Such a
comparison clearly suggests that the U.S. economy has comparatively fewer such share-
holders who might make effective monitors. Of the 5240 firms on national stock ex-
changes in the United States in 1984, 663 (or 12.7%) had majority shareholders. See,
e.g., Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in
Publicly Held Corporations, 20J. Fin. Econ. 317, 321 (1988). In contrast, over 48% of
Canadian firms had majority shareholders. See DeMott, supra note 132, at 425 n.12;
supra note 130 and accompanying text. A comparable level of Swedish firms had such
shareholders. See Skog & Isaksson, supra note 117, at 14. But what does this compari-
son ultimately show? Does it imply that U.S. investors were somehow deterred by legal
or other forces from acquiring control or simply that they preferred liquidity to control?
This is the basic chicken-or-egg question that confounds the overregulation thesis.
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tutional investors have not yet exerted a greater "voice" in corporate
governance. 170 From this perspective, institutional investors cannot be
characterized as a Gulliver tied down by Lilliputian bureaucrats; if any-
thing, they more resemble spectators at the Roman Colosseum, content
with bread and circuses and unwilling to organize for political reform
as long as the game continues.
Neither metaphor, however, captures adequately the nature of the
extra-legal barriers to institutional activism. These barriers are diverse
and have little in common, except that they would remain even if dereg-
ulation reduced the legal barriers to collective shareholder action.
A. Liquidity and Thin Equity
Some institutions need liquidity more than others. For institutions
requiring liquidity, taking a large control position is unacceptable if
such a stake would be illiquid. Mutual funds, banks, and insurance
companies fall into this class of institutions, chiefly because their share-
holders, depositors, or policyholders can withdraw their funds on short
notice. 171 Not surprisingly, the latter two have been characterized as
the institutions most unlikely to oppose corporate managements.' 72
This problem is most acute in the case of "open end" mutual funds,
which must stand ready to redeem on a daily basis the shares of cus-
tomers who wish to sell. Thus, most mutual funds are active traders
and would hesitate to make any investment the liquidation of which
would require a significant block discount. In addition, because mutual
funds compete for customers' funds based on their asserted ability to
170. The term "extra-legal" requires a word of definition. This Article uses it to
refer to practices, norms, or conventions that have not historically been considered un-
lawful (even though potentially such practices could be made unlawful). Thus, if institu-
tional money managers wish to avoid acquiring a reputation as "activist" shareholders
for fear that it will cost them future pension fund accounts, this factor would be consid-
ered an extra-legal one (even if a visionary might imagine a legal regime under which
such reputations could not be considered).
171. Traditionally, insurance companies have not been grouped with mutual funds,
because their payout to customers is actuarially predictable. However, they are also sub-
ject to panic surges in policyholder redemptions and withdrawals. Recently, three insur-
ance companies-Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., Monarch Life Insurance Company,
and First Capital Life Insurance Company-were taken over by state regulators in the
wake of policyholder panics about their firm's solvency. See Eric N. Berg, Rater to Add
Policyholder Panic Factor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1991, at Dl. Hence, the need to assure
p'olicyholders of their solvency may inhibit insurance companies as well from investing
in illiquid investments.
172. This is the view of professional proxy solicitors. See Could Girard Have Won
the Proxy Fight?, Corp. Control Alert, Sept. 1990, at 11 (Joseph Morrow of proxy solici-
tor Morrow & Co. describing insurers and bank affiliated positions as "the two groups
most likely to support management").
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outperform their competitors, 173 they need to be able to report the cur-
rent market value of their investments. The resulting focus on short-
term performance is inconsistent with holding a collection of illiquid
blocks. As a result, so long as mutual funds face a market in which
investors will continually, and with little notice, shift their funds from
one fund to another or will withdraw their funds to purchase other non-
capital market investments, preservation of maximum liquidity must re-
main a high priority for the rational mutual fund manager.
Banks and, to a lesser extent, insurance companies face a more im-
portant obstacle: Structurally, they have very thin equity compared
with that of industrial corporations. For example, among the largest
commercial banks, the proportion of equity capital to total assets has
steadily fallen from 60% during the early nineteenth century, to 20% at
the turn of this century, to below 10% since the early 1950s, and to
under 5%o since the mid-1970s. 174 The significance of this point comes
into clearer focus when we consider the balance sheet of a hypothetical
bank with $1 billion in assets and equity of under $50 million. If it held
even 20% of its assets (or $200 million) in the form of equity securities
and the stock market declined by 25%o over a period of, say, two
months, the bank's equity would be wiped out, and the bank would be,
at least technically, insolvent. In short, highly leveraged but regulated
entities, such as banks or insurance companies, lack the capacity to hold
173. Whether in fact they can outperform the market or their competitors is an
entirely different question. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
The foregoing analysis does not consider the "indexed" mutual fund, which is not
an active trader and which is discussed at infra notes 236-244 and accompanying text.
174. See Yair E. Orgler & Benjamin Wolkowitz, Bank Capital 3 (1976). For all na-
tional banks as a group, the ratio of shareholders' equity to total assets was 5.8% in
1983. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Operating Statistics: 1983, Ta-
ble 1, at 2. This definition of equity includes both undistributed earned surplus and
reserves for contingencies and other capital reserves.
For the ten largest banks in the United States in 1988, the ratios of total equity
capital to total assets were as follows:
Total Total Equity
Bank Assets Capi Percentage
(In Millions)
Citibank 150,241.0 8,168.0 5.4
Bank of America 82,912.0 3,611.0 4.4
Chase Manhattan 77,542.5 4,372.9 5.6
Morgan Guaranty 71,227.8 4,020.1 5.6
Bankers Trust Co. 55,349.9 2,889.1 5.2
Manufacturer's Hanover 54,210.0 2,546.0 4.7
Chemical Bank 50,933.0 2,488.0 4.9
Security Pacific National
Bank 48,920.5 2,216.6 4.5
Wells Fargo Bank 43,732.1 2,576.5 5.9
First National Bank of
Chicago 35,172.7 1,302.2 3.7
This table was derived from data on total assets and equity capital obtained from
Sheshunoff Information Services Inc., 1000 Largest U.S. Banks: 1989, at 11.1 (1989).
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volatile investments, such as equity securities, as a significant portion of
their investment portfolios. While this volatility problem may explain
why bank holding companies appear not to hold equity securities up to
the ceiling now permitted by the Bank Holding Company Act,17 5 it also
undermines the claim that regulatory constraints are the decisive factor
in the passivity of these financial institutions. Further complicating the
volatility problem is the prevailing practice among financial regulators
to write down the value of marketable securities in determining a regu-
lated firm's legal capital.' 7 6 Thus, if banks could directly own equity
securities, regulators would predictably apply more or less the same
"haircuts" to these investments as they now apply to the securities
portfolios of broker-dealers.' 77
The need for liquidity is based on more than simply the necessity
of assuring customers that their investments can be repaid or redeemed
on request. In fact, some institutions do not promise their customers
ready liquidity, and thus they potentially could hold more illiquid eq-
uity stakes. But these firms- closed-end mutual funds, holding compa-
nies, and natural resource companies-typically trade at significant
discounts below their asset liquidation value.' 78 Thus, for some institu-
tions, the real risk in holding illiquid assets for the long-term is that
they thereby incur a substantial discount in their share value, which
could in turn invite a hostile takeover by those investors seeking to ar-
bitrage the difference between the firm's market value and its underly-
175. See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
176. Brokers and dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
subject to the "net capital" rule. See Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1991) ("Net
Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers"). This rule requires "securities haircuts"
under which all securities must be reduced in value by a specified percentage for pur-
poses of calculating a firm's capital. See Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi) ("Securities Haircuts").
The haircut for common stock is 30% plus an additional 15% in some circumstances.
See Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(J). Although national banks may not currently own equity se-
curities, see 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988), they are subject to similar regulation by the Comp-
troller of the Currency, which restricts the "investment securities" that they may hold.
See 12 C.F.R. § 1.7 (1991). In addition, the Comptroller requires that specified ratios
be maintained between "risk-weighted assets" and total capital. See 12 C.F.R. Part 3,
App. A, § 4(a)(1) (1991). It seems likely, then, that if equity securities could be owned
by national banks, financial regulators would require write-downs at least as severe as
now mandated by the SEC for broker-dealers.
177. Investment banks own relatively little stock in comparison to other institu-
tional investors, see Black, supra note 12, at 603, in part for this reason. Other com-
mentators do not even consider investment banks in their tabulation of institutional
ownership of equity assets. See, e.g., Brancato, Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors,
supra note 40, at 13-17.
178. See Kraakman, supra note 150 at 901-08. Professor Kraakman notes that
"discounts on seasoned funds of 20% or more, persisting for five years or longer, have
been common .... Id. at 903. This tendency, he suggests, may explain the phenome-
non of "bust-up" takeovers. For earlier observations to a similar effect, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich.
L. Rev. 1 (1986).
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ing asset value. Obviously, this danger poses no threat to pension
funds (which have a uniquely low need for liquidity), but it would pres-
ent a substantial barrier for other institutions, such as merchant banks,
if deregulation were to permit commercial and investment banking ac-
tivities to be combined.
B. Conflicts of Interest
Because conflicts of interest have been fully and ably discussed by
others, 179 they will only be briefly treated here. Generally, commenta-
tors report that banks and insurance companies are the institutions
least willing to oppose corporate managements.180 Usually, the reason
given for their reluctance is fear that their firm will lose business-
either of the specific firm whose management they have opposed or of
the corporate community generally if the investor is perceived as an
"activist." Private pension funds are subject to a related form of pres-
sure in that corporate managements can, and do, instruct the profes-
sional investment management firms, to which voting and investment
discretion usually are delegated, as to how to vote in a proxy contest. 181
Moreover, trustees of private pension funds often are corporate em-
ployees or agents who report to senior management and predictably
share their attitudes toward institutional activism.' 8 2
Even if regulations adopted under ERISA prohibited such influ-
ence, their efficacy is doubtful for two reasons. First, corporate man-
agements have the legal power to reclaim voting discretion over the
portfolio's assets. To some extent, this power is now being exer-
cised;' 83 and, once reclaimed, corporate managements predictably will
179. The leading works are James E. Heard & Howard D. Sherman, Conflicts of
Interest in The Proxy Voting System (IRRC 1987) and John Brooks, Corporate Pension
Fund Asset Management, in Abuse on Wall Street: Conflicts of Interest in the Securities
Markets 224 (Twentieth Century Fund ed., 1980). See also Black, supra note 12, at
595-608 (arguing that conflicts of interest may prevent significant monitoring by insti-
tutional investors); Rock, supra note 9, at 469-72 (same).
180. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; infra notes 181-191 and accompa-
nying text.
181. A 1987 survey by the magazine Institutional Investor found that half of all
corporate pension officers considered it "appropriate" to advise pension money manag-
ers how to vote and that money managers almost uniformly followed any such advice
that was given; only 6.8%o of them claimed to have resisted. See Pensionforum: Taking
the Offensive, Institutional Investor, Dec. 1987, at 101. More recently, the Department
of Labor has begun to question such pressure, but low visibility practices are extremely
hard to detect or discourage. See Black, supra note 12, at 553-56.
182. See Nell Minow, One Man's Pension Trustee is Another's CEO, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 23, 1987, § 1, at 32. More generally, seeJohn H. Langbein & Daniel Fischel, ER-
ISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105,
1126-28 (1988) (discussing the perils of the nonneutral fiduciary).
183. Professor Black reports that as the Labor Department has begun to scrutinize
corporate pressure on professional pension money managers, more companies are
choosing to retain (or reclaim) voting discretion, while delegating to the professional
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support each other in the expectation that a Golden Rule of Deference
may someday benefit them. Only public pension funds and mutual
funds are relatively free from such pressure and, not surprisingly, they
are the most likely to oppose management's proposals. Second, even if
active retaliation were forbidden so that corporate managements could
not terminate or withdraw voting discretion from an institutional
money manager who supported dissidents, there would remain the
problem of reputation. Money managers are in active competition for
new pension accounts. If a reputation as an "activist" inhibits one's
ability to obtain new accounts, then money managers will predictably
shun behavior that could give them that reputation-even if reprisals
by existing pension accounts could somehow be strictly forbidden. 184
Real as the problem of conflicts of interest is, its magnitude can be
debated. For institutional investors that are substantial shareholders in
a company, the gains to be made from improved corporate perform-
ance seem likely to exceed the potential losses from business that
moves elsewhere. Thus, as the scale of institutional holdings grows,
the expected gains from activism should increasingly outweigh the
losses. Still, "exit" remains a rational strategy to the extent that
reputational damage could follow from active involvement in a proxy
fight or similar contest. It may be difficult ex ante, to estimate the likeli-
hood or severity of the reputational injury that a specific corporate con-
test could threaten. Moreover, even if the gains from improved
corporate governance were large, these gains should be available at
many firms, while specific conflicts are likely to exist only with respect
to a few firms for any individual investor. Hence, it may make sense for
an institutional investor to flee proxy or other control fights when the
corporation can credibly threaten retaliation. So long as the "exit" op-
tion is available, the rational institutional investor can make its decision
on an ex post basis-in effect, casting its vote with the dissidents only
after it has first evaluated the potential downside in terms of the threats
management can make. In turn, this gives corporate managements a
greater incentive to use threats of business retaliation. Once again,
however, the bottom line is that the "exit" option weakens institutional
"cvoice."
C. Political Retaliation
Institutional activism may trigger political repercussions. The
manager, only investment discretion over the portfolio's assets. See Black, supra note
12, at 598 ("Often, the conscious purpose is to ensure promanager votes.").
184. Based on a series of interviews with pension fund managers, two anthropolo-
gists working with Columbia University's Institutional Investor Project report that fund
managers "are reluctant to do anything which attracts any sort of attention." See John
M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital: An Anthropological Investiga-
tion of Institutional Investment 31 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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1989 report of the New York State Task Force on Pension Fund Invest-
ment, which recommended restrictive legislation barring pension fund
involvement in takeovers, was one ominous signal.18 5 The recent at-
tempt by California Governor Pete Wilson to oust the CalPERS board
and take direct control over that particularly active pension fund may
be a similar signal, or it may just reflect the covetous desire with which
public officials battling deficits eye cash-rich pension funds.' 8 6 At a
minimum, however, it suggests that the traditional independence and
insularity of pension funds is not inevitable.
Probably the clearest example of legislative pressure aimed at insti-
tutional investors is the recent Pennsylvania antigreenmail statute.' 8 7
This statute requires institutions to disgorge any profits if they acquire,
either individually or as a group, a twenty percent stake in a
Pennsylvania-chartered company and sell their shares at a profit within
eighteen months thereafter.' 8 8 Even more chilling to institutional ac-
tivism, the Pennsylvania statute apparently also would be triggered if
investors formed a "control" group to elect directors. Although such
statutes are clearly "legal" restraints, the extra-legal threat is that con-
tinued activism could bring additional restrictions. For institutions, the
real object lesson is supplied by the success of corporate managements
in securing the passage of antitakeover legislation in over forty-two
states during the 1980s.18 9 Whether corporate managements would be
as successful in challenging pension funds as corporate raiders is debat-
able, but the risk may be substantial enough to discourage some institu-
tional investors.
D. Soft Information
Institutional investors who oppose management risk cutting them-
selves off from the flow of soft information that management provides
to "friendly" securities analysts and institutions.190 The magnitude of
this problem is difficult to assess, but there is anecdotal evidence that
securities analysts who issue negative reports about a company may be
185. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
186. See RobertJ. McCartney & Kathleen Day, California Governor Seeks Control
of Pension Fund; Plan Would Cut Benefits of State's Retirees, Wash. Post, June 18,
1991, at Cl, C3. Although Governor Wilson partially backed down in the face of an
outcry from pensioners who did not want to subsidize the state's deficit, other governors
and legislatures have recently hinted at similar plans. See Michelle Osborn, Politicians
Coveting Pension Funds, USA Today, July 3, 1991, at 4B.
187. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2573-2575 (Purdun Supp. 1991).
188. The disgorgement rule does not apply to shares bought more than two years
prior to the acquisition of a 20% stake. See id. § 2575(2).
189. See 42 States Currently Have Antitakeover Laws, ABA Group Told, 22 Sec.
Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 1216 (Aug. 17, 1990).
190. This threat has been acknowledged by many commentators. See, e.g., Black,
supra note 12, at 602. Mutual funds are thought to be the most susceptible to it because
they are very active traders.
1991] 1323
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
denied further information.' 91
In terms of this Article's framework, the trade-off between "exit"
and "voice" is once again posed here. Soft information is desired by
institutions that trade actively in order to outperform the market-in
effect by dumping shares if the information provided to it suggests a
downturn in earnings that the market has not yet anticipated. To be
sure, the ability of institutions to outperform the market is questiona-
ble-although those in possession of truly material, nonpublic informa-
tion have certainly been able to profit even in an efficient market.' 9 2 In
any event, institutions in a highly competitive market; such as mutual
funds, fear less that they will underpeform the market than that by
passing up such information they may underperform the other institu-
tions with whom they are in direct competition. In contrast, for long-
term holders, such as indexed funds and some pension funds, the value
of soft information is minimal because it benefits only active traders,
not those who effectively hold the market in their portfolios. For these
larger holders, the probable block discounts they might suffer on the
disposition of their substantial holdings are likely to be greater than the
gains or losses from active trading.
E. "Short-Termism"
The benefits of improved corporate governance do not immedi-
ately translate into enhanced share value. The election of a few in-
dependent directors or the granting of greater "voice" to institutional
investors iwill seldom, if ever, make an unprofitable company profitable
in the short-run.' 93 Indeed, the introduction of dissident directors
191. See Debbie Galant, The Hazards of Negative Research Reports, Institutional
Investor, July, 1990 at 73.
192. Considerable doubt exists that mutual funds can outperform the market (at
the same level of risk). See Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the
Period 1945-1964, 23 J. Fin. 389 (1968) (finding mutual fund returns to be no better
than that of a passive investor holding a market portfolio). More recent research, how-
ever, has found that mutual funds earned significant abnormal returns (although trans-
action costs largely consumed these gains). See Norman E. Mains, Risk, The Pricing of
Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios: Comment, 50 J. Bus. 371,
384 (1977); see alsoJeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 839-41 (1985) (question-
ing the relevance of performance comparisons between mutual funds and the Capital
Asset Pricing Model). It should be emphasized that a finding that mutual funds do out-
perform the market is not inconsistent with the standard "semi-strong" version of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, because mutual funds may have access to nonpublic
information through the medium of securities analysts. See id. at 839 n.209.
193. Some may question whether institutional ownership and monitoring has any
observable impact on share value. Obviously, investors that are skeptical about the fi-
nancial payoff from reforms will not support them, and frankly the available evidence is
scanty. Some studies have found that the market responds positively to the appointment
of outside directors. See Stuart Rosenstein &Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board
of Independence and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1990). Yet, because
management usually selects outside directors, this finding does not imply that mecha-
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onto a board may even result in an interim period of disruption, uncer-
tainty, and decreased profitability. Thus, for the short-term trader who
expects to hold a stock only for a few months, the long-term benefits of
improved governance and increased accountability mean little, while
the costs of financing shareholder opposition remain real.
Reliance on the timing differences between long-term benefits and
short-term costs to account for passivity is incomplete, however, in the
absence of some explanation of why institutional money managers need
to focus on the short-term. The most plausible answer focuses on
agency costs at the institutional level. Many institutional investors are
in head-to-head competition for investor funds, mutual funds being the
most obvious example. If their profitability lags even for a quarter,
some investors may withdraw their funds and move them to a compet-
ing firm.194 Other institutions, such as pension funds, are not subject
to this same pressure, but other internal pressures for performance
may be equally intense. For example, pension funds use a variety of
external money managers and regularly replace those whose market
performance lags behind that of their peers.195 Thus, so long as pro-
nisms for the appointment of outside directors selected by institutional investors, see
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, would have a similar impact. Some inferential evi-
dence is available that firms with a concentrated institutional ownership are less subject
to managerial retention of free cash flow. SeeJohnJ. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Addi-
tional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27J. Fin. Econ. 595 (1990)
(finding that firms with high institutional ownership have a higher Tobin's Q the ratio
of stock market value to the replacement cost of tangible assets). Still, as Professor Rock
has pointed out to me, this relationship may imply that institutional investors invest in
such firms, not that their presence causes the firm to have a higher Tobin's Q. More-
over, no correlation has yet been found between firm profitability (according to reported
accounting profits) and institutional ownership. See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn,
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ.
1155 (1985). In contrast, studies of the correlation between the board of director's own-
ership and firm Tobin's Qhave suggested a positive relationship between board owner-
ship and profitability. See Randall Morck, et al., Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20J. Fin. Econ. 293 (1988). In short, managerial and
individual owner control may matter, but the evidence that institutional control relates
to profitability has not yet been presented. Absent such evidence, some sophisticated
observers may believe that corporate governance issues have little impact on share
value, unless they foreshadow a takeover bid.
194. Numerous commentators have raised the same point that the competition
among money managers leads each to seek "a short-term premium for a portfolio
stock," even though they recognize that stockholders would profit more from a buy and
hold policy. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 207 (citing other authorities);
see also Michael L. Dertouzos et al., Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge
62 (1989) (main criterion for evaluating fund managers is current value of portfolio).
195. A recent survey of pension funds and other money managers found that over
90% reviewed the performance of the outside money managers they employed at least
quarterly. Only 5.6% relied on semiannual review, and only 3% on annual review. See
Pensionforum: Dismay Over Short-termism, Institutional Investor, Mar. 1991, at 139.
Although underperforming managers were not replaced immediately (three years being
the typical period before replacement for below-market performance was likely), the
pressure of such constant reviews is the critical variable.
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fessional money managers are held accountable in terms of their
monthly or quarterly performance and the benefits of improved corpo-
rate governance do not accrue over this same period, they obviously
will be reluctant to expend funds or incur costs that do not affect their
current competitive standing vis-a-vis their peers. Moreover, in any
competition, there are inevitably laggards. For example, if a pension
fund uses four external money managers, the one whose performance
has most lagged can expect replacement unless it catches up. In such
an environment, short-term performance matters greatly for the money
manager, as agent, even if it is a secondary concern for the pension
fund, as principal. In essence, this is a moral hazard problem, because
the laggard manager has an incentive both to gamble and cut costs
recklessly. As a result, agency problems at the institutional level can
frustrate efforts to correct agency cost problems at the corporate level,
even if institutional shareholders own sufficiently large blocks to be
able to resolve their collective action problems.
F. Agent Apathy
Even if institutional investors have an interest in corporate govern-
ance issues, it does not necessarily follow that their agents will share
their concerns. What could explain such a disparity in attitudes? The
short answer is a combination of a lack of incentives for the agent to
monitor plus an inability on the part of the principal to detect such
shirking by the agent. This explanation becomes more plausible when
one learns that the federal securities laws greatly restrict the ability of
an investment adviser to receive incentive compensation based on capi-
tal appreciation in the fund it manages.1 96 If an investment manager is
compensated simply on the basis of an annual fee equal to a declining
percentage of the fund it manages (that is, '/s of 1%o of the first $500
million, 1/4 of 1%o of the next $250 million, etc.), it may have insufficient
incentive to engage in monitoring so long as it bears the monitoring
costs, while the fund's beneficiaries receive the benefit. Yet, exactly this
structure prevails in mutual funds 197 and, to a lesser extent, in pension
funds. 198 Of course, successful monitoring may attract new clients and
196. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205(l), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(l) (1988).
See infra notes 336-347 and accompanying text for a fuller explanation of these limita-
tions and the SEC rules implementing them.
197. Typically, the investment adviser bears the fund's administrative costs and
charges an annual fee based on the fund's assets under its management to compensate
it. For examples of such a fee structure, see Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, 875 F.2d
404, 407 (2d Cir. 1989); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, 694 F.2d 923,
926 (2d Cir. 1982); Galfand v. Chestnut Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 810 (2d Cir. 1976). Obvi-
ously, such a fee structure gives the investment manager a strong incentive to economize
on the administrative and operating costs that it bears.
198. The largest indexed money manager charges its clients, including many pen-
sion funds, an annual service charge of two basis points a year. See infra note 244 and
accompanying text. Clearly, this will not cover much monitoring.
[Vol. 91:12771326
LIQUIDITY VERSUS CONTROL
increased assets into the fund, thus partially solving the problem. But
this depends on whether the difference between real versus merely for-
malistic monitoring by the agent is immediately observable by the prin-
cipal. If it is not, even successful monitoring will not necessarily attract
new business in the form of increased funds for the agent to manage.
The bottom line is that, in the absence of incentive compensation,
agents may be rationally indifferent about monitoring and will thus do
only the minimum required of them by the law.
G. Managerial Manipulation of Agenda
Management's most effective tactic in securing shareholder ap-
proval of an antitakeover proposal has been its ability to link a disfa-
vored proposal to a "sweetener," such as a recapitalization with a large
dividend or a stock buyback. 199 For those investors who are focused on
the short-term, the gain from the "sweetener" exceeds the loss on the
other linked transaction, and so they vote in favor of both. Although
the "sweetener" may leave the shareholder better off than if no induce-
ment for its acquiescence were paid, this tactic still reduces the ex-
pected payoff from shareholder activism. It thus aggravates the
traditional collective action problem.200
Obviously, agenda manipulation ig a problem that only regulation,
and not deregulation, can address.20 1 Still, this tactic of "bundling"
issues again implicates the trade-off between "exit" and "voice."
Shareholders who rely on the "exit" option seem more likely to vote
approval in such a case, expecting to receive the sweetener and then
sell their shares. However, for longer-term investors, who effectively
hold the market in their portfolios, such linkages are distasteful because
in effect management is "bribing" shareholders into passivity with cor-
porate funds that already belong to the shareholders. Thus, if share-
199. For a fuller discussion of this theme, see Black, supra note 12, at 592-94.
Black gives as an example the 1987 proxy statement of Holiday Corporation, which
asked shareholders to vote on a single proposal to (i) declare a massive special dividend,
(ii) grant very large stock options to management, and (iii) adopt a "capped voting"
antitakeover charter amendment that prevented new shareholders from voting more
than 10% of the corporation's stock. Id. at 593. On the general theory of agenda ma-
nipulation, see Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implica-
tions, 63 Va. L. Rev. 561 (1977).
200. See supra note 23. The inevitable existence of free riders (i.e., shareholders
who will not contribute to the costs of collective coordination and resistance) implies
that the expected payoff from the proposed course of action must exceed its aggregate
costs by a corresponding margin. The more the payoff is reduced, the less likely it be-
comes that large shareholders will fund the costs of coordination (such as by financing a
proxy solicitation).
201. SEC Rule 14a-4(a) does contain a potential limitation on linking unrelated
matters by seemingly requiring a separate vote on "each matter or group of related
matters." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a) (1991). CalPERS has proposed tightening this
vague limitation to prevent some forms of agenda manipulation. See CalPERS Letter,
supra note 56, at 11. The feasibility of these proposals is beyond this Article's scope.
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holders perceive themselves as long-term holders who are locked into
the market, the rational course of action may more often be to reject
the bribe and seek eventually to secure the distribution of the excess
corporate funds, or "free cash flow," by exercising "voice."
H. Summary
Some institutional investors need liquidity. Whether this need de-
rives from "thin equity," the need to meet potential redemptions, a fear
of their own stock being discounted, or other factors, it seems to be the
common denominator that also explains why even unregulated British
and German banks actually acquire only modest to intermediate stakes
in their clients. 202
If we also assume that for the foreseeable future some institutions
will remain active traders with a high turnover in their portfolios, these
two factors-the inability to take large positions and an active trading
style-explain why they will show only a limited interest in corporate
governance issues, except possibly those related to takeovers. Put sim-
ply, money managers are rationally apathetic because the expected
gains from most such governance issues are small, deferred, and re-
ceived by investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate,
and borne by money managers. This problem is compounded because
the competitive pressures on institutional money managers give them
little reason to focus on the long-term. To address this imbalance one
must either induce institutional investors to hold larger stakes or to
hold even modest stakes for a longer term, over which the expected
gains from improved governance would materialize. Additionally, the
compensation formulas used to reward money managers ought to cre-
ate incentives for monitoring. In the absence of these conditions, how-
ever, the reasons for shareholder passivity would remain, even if the
current legal obstacles to the exercise of shareholder "voice" were
greatly reduced.
Where does this analysis lead? It is by no means intended to justify
existing legal rules that chill shareholder "voice," but to take us back to
the essential trade-off between liquidity and control. The more signifi-
cant these legal and extra-legal obstacles are judged to be, the more
likely it becomes that institutional investors will stand and fight only if
their "exit" option is made less available or less attractive.
III. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF UNITING LIQUIDrrY AND CONTROL
To this point, this Article has argued only that a trade-off between
liquidity and control characterizes most major industrial economies.
Thus, the famous generalization of Berle and Means that the modem
202. As noted earlier, German banks own less than 57 of the top one hundred
German corporations and British institutional investors seldom exceed 2%o ownership in
any individual corporation. See supra notes 99, 143 and accompanying text.
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public corporation produced the separation of ownership and control
can be translated into the deeper and more accurate statement that
public shareholders in the modem corporation purchased liquidity at
the cost of control.20 3 Still, the state of the world described by Berle
and Means may already be in flux. With institutional ownership of cor-
porate equity nearing the fifty percent level and some of the largest
U.S. corporations already having over three quarters of their stock
owned by institutions, it is easily imaginable that, absent legal restric-
tions, a dozen or so institutional investors could form a group over-
night that would hold effective control of a giant U.S. corporation.
To be sure, today there are substantial legal obstacles to the forma-
tion of such a control group, and commentators have begun to debate
the scope and purpose of existing regulations.20 4 However, such a de-
bate cannot sensibly begin with the regulations themselves; rather, it
should start by identifying the potential harms that regulation should
address. This Part will assess five potential problems with relying on
institutional monitoring to end the separation of ownership and con-
trol. In each case, it will suggest that the problem lies less in institu-
tional monitoring itself than in its combination with easy liquidity.
A. The Exiting Monitor
The first and most obvious problem with institutions as monitors is
that they are watchdogs whose every incentive is to flee at the first sign
of trouble. This is where the liquidity/control trade-off is the most
acute. A traditional controlling shareholder, owning perhaps thirty
percent or more of a corporation's voting stock, necessarily realizes
that its investment is illiquid, even though a deep and active market
exists. Any attempt by it to dispose of a substantial portion of its stock
in the market is likely to be perceived by the market as a bail-out and to
be greeted by a collapse in the stock price, as sophisticated market pro-
fessionals infer from this disposition that the controlling shareholder
has received nonpublic, but material, adverse information.205
The same is not necessarily true for a loose association of institu-
tional investors, numbering perhaps between ten and twenty, who
203. For a similar observation, see Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of
its Future, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1611, 1662-63 (1981). Martin Lipton has more recently
argued that stockholders "view the corporation more as the holder of a betting slip
views a racehorse." See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 194 (citation omitted).
204. For a partial review of these obstacles, see infra notes 246-287 and accompa-
nying text. Some commentators have expressed doubt that these obstacles are substan-
tial enough to deter institutional monitoring. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at
894-905. This Article does not directly analyze that debate, although it does suggest
that extra-legal forces may be more important to some institutional investors.
205. For the finding that the market does distinguish between block sales by insid-
ers and block sales by institutional investors and penalizes the former more heavily, see
Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the
Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45J. Bus. 179 (1972).
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might collectively own a controlling block. Because they own smaller
blocks on an individual basis-say, one to three percent each-and be-
cause they have lesser visibility, they may be able to liquidate their posi-
tions on learning of adverse developments, without alerting the market.
For such investors, the choice is between seeking to reverse the com-
pany's decline in fortune and seeking to beat the market's recognition
of that decline. Of course, this use of material, nonpublic information
by a controlling investor may violate the insider trading laws. Yet,
while this may be formally true, institutional investors are in a margin-
ally safer position under these laws than the traditional controlling
shareholder. Typically, they will have no employee on the board; nor
will they necessarily be in direct contact with corporate officers. Confi-
dential information will reach them through indirect leakages, usually
through security analysts. Moreover, the information on which they act
typically will be soft information; not hard, specific data, but looser
general impressions and a premonitory feel for future trends. In short,
bail-outs seem both relatively more feasible and marginally less vulner-
able as a legal matter when institutional investors constitute the control
group.
Even if institutional investors cannot exit before the market's per-
ception of the problem, there are other reasons why they might prefer
to flee than fight. Conflicts of interest or fear of reputational loss
(either at the institutional level or, more likely, at the level of their
money manager agents) could motivate such a decision. Put simply,
while the ten percent stakeholder can be expected to fight, the one per-
cent holder is apt to be a "sunshine patriot" unwilling to remain on
duty during the corporation's winter of discontent.
B. The Market-Dominated Monitor
In all likelihood, the principal impact of institutional investors as
large shareholders will be to make corporate management more sensi-
tive to the market's judgment. This development will yield greater effi-
ciency only to the extent that the market can make a better informed or
less biased judgment than can the corporation's own management.
Often, the market can. Yet, because management inherently has access
to nonpublic information that the market lacks, it is impossible to con-
clude that the market's judgment will always be superior. Even in an
efficient market, those possessing "inside" information are capable of
outperforming the market. 20 6 Thus, institutional investors may tend to
206. Under the standard "semi-strong" version of the Efficient Capital Markets Hy-
pothesis, one assumes only that the market has incorporated all publicly available infor-
mation into the share price, not that nonpublic information is reflected. Thus, those in
possession of such information, as management typically is, can make a better judgment
of the firm's value than can the market. For a fuller explanation of efficient market the-
ory, see RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 554-92 (1984).
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follow the herd, enforcing the generic judgments and conventional wis-
dom of the market, but thereby chilling entrepreneurial managers who
believe they perceive opportunities that the market has missed.2 07
One answer to this claim is that if a management team truly knows
more than the market, it has every incentive to explain and defend its
judgment by persuading the consensus of securities analysts on whom
the market, and institutional investors, rely. Still, there is a problem
with this answer: Such an explanation may release confidential, propri-
etary information. Suppose, for example, that at a time when the mar-
ket believes that American companies should cease to produce a
particular technology because they cannot outcompete Japanese firms
that seemingly have a comparative advantage, one lone American firm
bucks the market's judgment and seeks to expand its activities in this
area. If this firm is heavily owned by institutions, this deviant behavior
likely will encounter institutional resistance.
What happens next? Possibly, the corporation's management can
explain to the market why its new technology can outperform all ex-
isting products made by the competition. But to be credible, this claim
must be corroborated. At this point, if the corporation reveals to its
institutional investors, or to the market generally, its basis for believing
its new technology to be superior, it may effectively release-directly or
indirectly-proprietary information, thereby benefitting its competi-
tors. Conversely, if it just asserts the superiority of its new technology,
its position may not be credible to market-sensitive institutional inves-
tors. The paradox is a familiar one: it is often difficult to value proprie-
tary information without revealing it and thereby sacrificing its
proprietary value.
Although corporate management has long faced the prospect that
an unsympathetic market would discount its share price if it bucked the
conventional wisdom, management could withstand this pressure in the
past, either because public shareholders were too disorganized to
mount effective opposition or because the controlling shareholders,
such as a family group, would have participated in the decision, or at
least could have it explained and justified to them in confidence.
Again, the difference between a traditional controlling shareholder and
a loose association of institutional investors is significant here. It is one
thing to disclose confidential plans and data to a single majority share-
holder or a close-knit family group, and quite another to explain the
same information to the community of securities analysts on whom in-
stitutional investors rely. In the latter case, information leakage is
likely.
This problem is not insurmountable. Institutional investors could
207. For the hypothesis that institutional shareholders are susceptible to herd be-
havior, see David S. Scharfstein &Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, Am.
Econ. Rev., June 1990, at 465.
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rely on professional directors selected by them to evaluate manage-
ment's plans and projections, without proprietary information leaking
to the public.208 Yet, this course would require institutional investors
to accept some market penalty during the period when the market was
skeptical ofmanagement's plans. Many institutional investors might be
willing to pay this price, but others would not because of their need for
liquidity. For this latter group, the ideal position is to be a low-profile
member of a loose investors' association that has access to nonpublic
information and projections, and to choose "exit" when that informa-
tion suggests a future market decline in the firm's stock price. In short,
such actively trading investors make poor monitors because they are
unwilling to pursue long-run policies that may elicit a short-run market
discount.
C. The Risk-Preferring Monitor
Standard finance theory recognizes that the shareholder in a highly
leveraged firm will prefer a higher-risk course of action than would the
same shareholder in a less leveraged firm.20 9 Because in such a firm
most of the loss will be borne by creditors, while most of the gain will
go to the shareholders, shareholders might rationally prefer a high-risk
investment with a low probability of success to another investment with
a projected lower return but a much higher probability of success-
even though these shareholders would have the opposite preference if
they were the suppliers of all the capital for the project. Based on this
analysis, some commentators have contended that the Japanese/Ger-
man model, under which the same banking institution provides both
debt and equity capital to the firm, has significant efficiency advan-
tages. 210 Monitors who hold both debt and equity need not be "exces-
sively risk-prone" because their attitude will reflect their weighted
average position as both creditors and shareholders. 211 Stephen
208. Such an institutional arrangement has been carefully spelled out by other re-
cent commentators. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13. They assume (as do I) that
institutional investors must delegate to outside professionals the actual responsibility for
monitoring.
209. This has been a central insight of standard finance theory. See Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 334 (1976) (noting that managers in a
leveraged firm will have an incentive to accept projects having a high payoff but low risk
of success because the shareholders capture the gain and creditors suffer the loss).
While Jensen and Meckling ignore that managers may have firm-specific human capital
at risk that may dissuade them from accepting such risks, their analysis works well for
institutional investors.
Of course, this problem is mitigated if institutional investors also hold the debt
securities of the firms in whose equity securities they invest. See Prowse, supra note 66,
at 46-48 (discussing Japanese pattern). Still, no reason is apparent why U.S. institu-
tions would undertake on their own to diversify on such a matched basis.
210. See Prowse, supra note 66, at 51-52.
211. See Aoki, supra note 88, at 16 (citing Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An
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Prowse has reasoned that allowing financial institutions to serve as both
creditors and shareholders should minimize agency costs. 2 12
The immediate point, however, is that the legal restrictions in the
United States that inhibit banks and insurance companies from owning
stock should logically produce monitoring by other institutional inves-
tors of a very different character than prevails in Japan or Germany.
Rather than being neutral monitors, American institutional investors
have a logical incentive, at least in the case of leveraged companies, to
prefer risky strategies that may transfer wealth from debtholders to
shareholders. To be sure, managers may have the opposing tendency
to be excessively risk averse because they have undiversifiable human
capital and other wealth locked into the firm.2 13 Ultimately, it is hard to
determine how this tension between risk-averse managers and poten-
tially risk-preferring institutions will be resolved. However, it stands in
sharp contrast to an earlier era when the incentives of the controlling
shareholders tended to match those of management because the bulk
of their wealth was typically invested in the firm so that they could not
be risk neutral.
D. The Disruptive Monitor
A substantial economic literature has described contracting within
the firm as based on "implicit contracts." 214 Because managers and
other employees should be risk averse, while diversified shareholders
should be risk neutral, this literature argues that the two sides maxi-
mize their respective interests by entering into employment contracts
under which employees trade off some portion of the wages they could
demand in return for employment stability. One aspect of this system
of implicit contracting is that it defers a considerable portion of the
managers' expected aggregate compensation until the end of their ca-
reers. 215 But, such implicit contracts are vulnerable if there is a hostile
change of control because the new owners can in effect renege on this
implicit agreement and withhold the deferred compensation. 2 16
"Incomplete Contract" Approach to Bankruptcy and the Financial Structure of the Firm
(M.I.T. Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 484, 1988)).
212. See Prowse, supra note 66.
213. See Coffee, supra note 178 at 17-19.
214. For a general review of this literature, see Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts:
A Survey, 23 J. Econ. Literature 1144 (1985); see also Costas Azariadis & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria, 98 QJ. Econ. 1 (Supp. 1983) (ap-
praising current state of theory of implicit contracts).
215. Deferred compensation is a protection against both shirking and managerial
departures. This theory assumes that the manager's value to the firm is often difficult to
estimate until a subsequent period; thus, deferred compensation acts as a bonding de-
vice to reduce the need for costly monitoring.
216. For a fuller statement of this theme as a rationale for hostile takeovers, see
Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers,
Am. Econ. Rev., Mar. 1986, at 155, 159-61.
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This same point can be made in more overtly political terms. Pro-
fessor William Simon has argued that a tradition of "economic republi-
canism" in the United States has long been hostile to "speculators and
intermediaries" because "they introduce a community-threatening liq-
uidity to investments. ' 217 Fear of such destabilizing changes may well
explain the recent wildfire-like passage of antitakeover statutes in the
majority of states. 218
From either an implicit contract standpoint or this community-
oriented perspective, liquidity is disquieting because it implies instabil-
ity. Thus, the future power of institutional investors presents many of
the same issues as did the hostile takeover. Potentially, pools of institu-
tional investors could form and re-form. Particularly because they ar-
rive on the scene at an interim point in the corporation's existence, they
are unlikely to feel bound by prior implicit wage and employment ar-
rangements between the corporation and its employees and managers.
Thus, they may disrupt the implicit contract by pressuring senior man-
agement to reduce employment and compensation levels. Some empir-
ical support exists for this proposition, with one study finding the level
of deferred compensation to be higher in firms with low shareholder
concentration. 21 9 Arguably, managers may be less willing to rely on
implicit contracts as institutional ownership increases.
E. The Opportunistic Monitor
Institutional investors should not be mistaken for financial saints.
Their representatives on a board will not automatically represent all
shareholders; to the extent that conflicts among shareholders exist,
board members who are institutional employees or agents may favor
the interests of their employers. 220 For example, because mutual funds
are often affiliated with investment banking firms, it is not unimagin-
able that mutual fund representatives on boards might pursue the in-
terests of their investment banking firm sponsors, favoring transactions
that generated fees for them. Pension funds have less obvious conflicts,
but to the extent that they are dominated by their own corporate man-
agements, they could logically pursue a policy of reciprocal deference
to their host management. Individuals may also act opportunistically,
using their influence to obtain corporate office or perquisites. Indeed,
217. See William H. Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation Doctrine, in
The Politics of Law 387, 397 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
218. See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.
219. See Gerald Garvey & Noel Gaston, Delegation, the Role of Managerial Discre-
tion As a Bonding Device, and the Enforcement of Implicit Contracts, 9 Advances in
Econometrics (forthcoming 1991) (manuscript at 2, 20, 25, on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
220. I am here referring to directors who are directly affiliated with institutional
investors and not to the professional director proposal advocated by others. See Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 13, at 885-88.
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although public pension funds probably have the fewest potential con-
flicts, their own employees are also probably the least monitored, giv-
ing them a vast range for discretionary decision-making.
Finally, there is the overriding danger of market manipulation.
Unlike risk averse corporate managers, who tend to favor steady earn-
ings and stock price growth, institutional investors who possess de facto
control can benefit from volatile swings in stock price and could manip-
ulate corporate affairs to create profitable trading opportunities. 2 21
The enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was motivated
to a considerable degree by Congressional dissatisfaction with the be-
havior of "notorious market pools, ' '222 which were essentially trading
syndicates formed by large investors to manipulate stock prices. Ab-
sent restrictions on liquidity, the growth of institutional ownership cre-
ates the preconditions under which such pools could reappear.2 23
F. The Unaccountable Monitor
Public pension funds have been the most active of institutional in-
vestors, but they may also be the least accountable to their own benefi-
ciaries. A state or municipal pension fund covers an enormous number
of employees, and therefore substantial collective action problems
would be obvious, even if the beneficiary had some recourse other than
litigation. But unlike the corporate pension fund, there is no corporate
sponsor looking over the public pension fund trustee's shoulder and
seeking to economize on its own contribution. Instead, the public pen-
sion fund offers an attractive vehicle by which political leaders, or
would-be candidates, can present themselves to the public. The more
prominent the role of public pension funds becomes, the greater will be
the political allure of such office. The result is a special agency prob-
lem: political leaders as pension fund trustees are subject to strong
constituency pressures that can conflict with their obligation to maxi-
mize value for their beneficiaries. In fairness, this problem has not yet
materialized in the United States, 224 but its eventual appearance seems
221. See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of
Publicly Held Companies, 42 Hastings LJ. 391, 399 (1991) (arguing that the Congres-
sional purpose underlying § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was not to
prevent insider trading, but to eliminate the incentive for the manipulation of corporate
affairs to produce stock price fluctuations).
222. Id. at 439-40.
223. Recently adopted rules under § 16(b) may reduce this danger, but do not
eliminate it. See infra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
224. Others have already warned of this danger. See Leo Herzel, Are Institutional
Investors A Likely Substitute for the Takeover Market?, in Institutional Investing: The
Challenges and Responsibilities of the 21st Century 128, 134 (Arnold W. Sansetz ed.,
1991); DeborahJ. Martin, Ihie Public Piggy Bank Goes To Market: Public Pension Fund
Investment In Common Stock and Fund Trustees' Social Agenda (1991) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review). Mr. Herzel points to an English case
in which the Bishop of Oxford sued the Church Commissioners of the Church of Eng-
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certain.
G. Summary
This Article does not contend that institutional monitoring is un-
desirable. To the contrary, the benefits seem likely to outweigh the
costs by a substantial margin. The point here, however, is that moni-
toring is not a neutral phenomenon; all monitors have characteristic
biases. The substitution of institutional investors for previous
monitors, such as family groups, carries with it the risks that new
agency costs will be substituted for old ones. Chief among these risks
are the following: (1) the new monitors will be more prone to bail out
when crises loom; (2) a volatile market will interfere with long-term
planning; (3) under some circumstances, the new monitors will have a
higher tolerance for risk than society as a whole deems desirable; and
(4) implicit contracts will be disrupted. These risks are simply that:
Risks, not certainties. Part IV will next discuss how they can be miti-
gated and, in that light, how the "unleashing" of the institutional inves-
tor should proceed.
IV. SHAPING THE INSTITUTIONAL MONITOR: THE ROLE OF
REGULATION
If one sought to define the optimal corporate monitor, what crite-
ria would one select? Three factors seem to stand out: (1) the institu-
tional monitor should be reasonably free from conflicts of interest so
that its evaluation of corporate management will not be biased by the
opportunity to earn fees or income not equally available to other share-
holders; (2) its stake in the corporation should be large enough to jus-
tify the expenditure of significant monitoring costs; and (3) its
preferred investment horizon should be sufficiently long so that it has
an interest in improved corporate governance, even when no immedi-
ate value-maximizing transaction, such as a takeover or LBO, is in the
offing. Based on these three criteria-the absence of conflicts of inter-
est, a substantial stake, and a long-term horizon-the relative superior-
ity of the pension fund over other institutional investors seems clear.
First, unlike banks or insurance companies, the pension fund has no
other opportunities to earn fees or income from the corporation. 22 5
land to compel them to invest the Church's portfolio in greater accordance with the
Church's religious and moral beliefs. Herzel, supra, at 137 n.9. Similarly, public pen-
sion funds face a tension between social investing and shareholder returns. See Martin,
supra, at 1-2. Arguably, there could be "collusive" arrangements in some cases by
which corporate managements agreed to pursue social goals in return for the fund's
agreement to vote to maintain them in office. For the present, however, these remain
speculative possibilities.
225. For a recent instance in which fee income may have driven decisions by banks
to invest in corporate equity, see Wallace, supra note 159 (discussing fee income re-
ceived by banks from LBO lending and its influence on their decision to invest in
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Second, it is increasingly likely to hold a substantial stake in the corpo-
rations in which it invests; but because it cannot make a takeover bid,
there is less prospect for a conflict arising between its interests and
those of smaller shareholders. 226 Third, it characteristically has a lower
turnover rate on its stock portfolio than most other institutional inves-
tors and so has a relatively longer investment horizon. 227
Because pension funds represent the largest, and still growing, cat-
egory of institutional investor, their relative superiority to other institu-
tions in terms of these criteria may seem fortunate. However, pension
funds are hardly immune from pressure,228 and some commentators
believe there is an unresolvable fundamental tension between the legal
responsibilities of pension managers to their beneficiaries and their ac-
tual subservience to senior corporate officials. 229 At a minimum, most
commentators recognize that senior corporate management wants its
pension managers to vote for management and against insurgent share-
holders.23 0 While overt pressure on pension managers may no longer
be permissible, 23 1 only obtuse money managers will fail to detect their
client's or superior's sympathies and the corresponding impact on their
self-interest.
Although the conflict of interest problem has been duly noted by a
number of commentators, two more serious obstacles to active institu-
tional monitoring have received less attention. First, many institu-
tions-pension funds in particular-are so widely diversified, holding
literally a thousand or more stocks, that it is simply beyond their realis-
Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts buyout fund). In contrast, ERISA requires that pension
managers make all decisions "for the exclusive purpose of [] providing benefits to par-
ticipants and their beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(A)(i) (1988). But see in-
fra notes 228-233 and accompanying text (discussing other conflicting interests that
affect pension managers).
226. No U.S. pension fund has ever made a takeover bid, and such a substantial
investment would probably run afoul of ERISA's diversification requirement. See 29
G.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1990). See also Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1982) (in a takeover bid, trustees who are also corporate officers have a duty to resign
when their positions as trustees conflict with their positions as corporate officers).
227. One recent study of turnover rates found the annual turnover rate for pension
funds to be 61%, while it was 76%o for mutual funds and 51% for college and university
endowments. See Stephen A. Berkowitz & Dennis E. Logue, The Portfolio Turnover
Explosion Explained, J. of Portfolio Mgmt., Spring 1987, at 38, 40.
228. For examples of such pressure, see Joe Kolman, The Proxy Pressure on Pen-
sion Managers, Institutional Investor, July 1985, at 145-47; Minow, supra note 172, at
32. Black, supra note 12, at 596-98; Rock, supra note 9, at 469-71.
229. See Daniel Fischel &John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1126-28 (1988).
230. See Black, supra note 12, at 596-97; Rock, supra note 9, at 469-70.
231. Beginning in 1988, the U.S. Labor Department has campaigned to reform
pension voting practices and has issued a series of interpretations requiring plan fiducia-
ries to vote shares held by the plan or supervise those with voting discretion. See Black,
supra note 12, at 597 (noting that subtler pressures still remain possible); Rock, supra
note 9, at 476-78.
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tic monitoring capacity to make any meaningful evaluation of the com-
petence of the management at individual firms or of the likely impact of
proposals raised by other shareholders of those firms.2 3 2 Second, insti-
tutional money managers are typically compensated based on formulas
that leave them rationally indifferent to shareholder voting
decisions.233
It is debatable whether these problems can be overcome, and the
trend toward global diversification suggests that both will be aggra-
vated. Without expressing either optimism or pessimism, this Part will
chart the structural changes that would be necessary to achieve effective
monitoring through institutional investors.
Three basic proposals will be considered: (1) an unbundling strat-
egy which would shift proxy voting decisions from institutional money
managers to specialized proxy advisers, who would be encouraged to
develop and sell their expertise to institutional investors; pension fidu-
ciaries would be required either to use these services or to demonstrate
a sufficient in-house capacity to internalize voting decisions; (2) a re-
stricted diversification strategy which would discourage institutional inves-
tors from diversifying beyond the limits of their monitoring capacity;
and (3) an incentive compensation strategy which would reward money
managers for voting decisions that increased their portfolio's value.
The first strategy addresses the informational overload on the institu-
tion, while the second and third increase the expected payoff from
monitoring to the institution and its agents, respectively. As discussed
below, these strategies can also be linked.
Such a combined strategy would require some deregulation, but
not a broad "unleashing" of institutional investors that freed them
from all existing constraints under the federal securities laws. Rather,
because "voice" and "exit" are competing options for the investor, re-
forms that increase the availability of "exit" by enhancing the liquidity
of institutional investors could chill "voice," namely, their willingness
to participate in corporate governance. Thus, relaxation of "exit" reg-
ulations should selectively focus on both: (1) whether the investors
thus aided will still have an incentive to exercise an increasingly costly
"voice" in corporate governance,23 4 and (2) whether relaxed "exit" will
232. The problem is most acute with respect to "indexed" funds that follow a pas-
sive investment strategy. See infra notes 236-245 and accompanying text. The prob-
lem is not, however, limited to the indexed funds. For a similar, if more pessimistic,
view, see Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 206.
233. See infra notes 336-347 and accompanying text.
234. By "costly," I mean to cover both financial and nonfinancial costs. Current
estimates place the direct financial cost of a proxy campaign in opposition to manage-
ment at between $2 million and $15 million, depending upon the size of the corporation
and the specific proposal. See Proxy Contests: Oasis for Dissidents-or a Mirage?
Corp. Control Alert, May 1990, at 1, 10 [hereinafter Proxy Contests]. Undoubtedly,
legal reforms can reduce these costs, but any campaign to elect directors or dismantle
antitakeover charter provisions is likely to encounter managerial resistance and entail
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give the wrong investors an incentive to participate in control groups in
order to manipulate corporate affairs to benefit from stock volatility.2 5
A. The Decline of "Exit"
Although commentary about institutional investors customarily
distinguishes among them in terms of their legal status (e.g., pension
funds, mutual funds, or insurance companies), a more important dis-
tinction may lie in their differing investment philosophies. Today, it is
estimated that nearly one-third of all equity investments held by institu-
tional funds are "indexed" 236-that is, they are invested in a portfolio
of securities that is intended to represent an accurate proxy for the
stock market as a whole. Such passive investing seeks not to beat the
market, but to duplicate its movements, and, as a result, such investors
tend to hold for the long-term.23 7 In this Article's terminology, such
indexed investors have essentially abandoned their "exit" option and
have become long-term holders. This decision was motivated by their
perception that an active trading strategy did not enable them to out-
perform the market, but only increased the brokerage and other costs
they bore.238
Demographic forces indicate that pension funds will hold a pro-
gressively larger percentage of all equity securities and may account for
forty percent of the equity ownership of U.S. corporations by the year
considerable costs. Nonfinancial costs, such as business reprisals, are harder to quantify,
but may be more significant.
235. See supra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
236. A survey by Financial Executives Institute of pension plans found 34% of the
equity investments held by the surveyed plans were indexed. See David M. Walker, The
Increasing Role of Pension Plans in the Capital Markets and in Corporate Governance
Matters, in Institutional Investing: The Challenges and Responsibilities of the 2 1st Cen-
tury 34, 36 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991). The New York Stock Exchange has reported
that "analysts estimate that between $200 billion and $300 billion-or about 30 per-
cent-of institutional assets are held in portfolios that replicate or mirror a market in-
dex." NYSE Press Release, Panel Recommends Initiatives Aimed at Reducing Volatility,
Enhancing Investor Confidence, June 12, 1990. Public pension funds are particularly
"indexed." For example, it has been estimated that of the $40 billion in equities held by
the three principal New York pension funds covering state and local employees, "$30
billion are in indexed portfolios." Taylor, supra note 41, at 72.
237. For example, CalPERS has an average holding period of between six and ten
years for each security in its portfolio and an annual turnover iate of approximately
10%. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 863. CalPERS is apparently moving to
the point where it will be 85% indexed during 1991. See Stephen Clark, Why Dale
Hanson Won't Go Away, Institutional Investor, Apr. 1990, at 80. A recent survey by the
Financial Executives Institute found that the average turnover rates for pension funds
are falling. For actively managed equity portfolios, the average turnover rate declined
from 66% in 1987 to 47% in 1989, and for passively managed portfolios, the turnover
rate declined from 24% in 1987 to 13% in 1989. See Walker, supra note 236, at 36.
238. As Professors Gilson and Kraakman accurately observe, these institutional in-
vestors have essentially accepted the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 13, at 865-67.
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2000.239 As both pension funds and mutual funds switch to an indexed
strategy, indexed investing eventually will account for a significant frac-
tion of all equity investment. Necessarily, however, a ceiling will be
reached on the percentage of the total market for which indexed inves-
tors account. If all, or nearly all, institutional investors were to adopt
passive trading strategies, there would simply be no market-or at least
not an efficient one. Economic theory suggests that if indexed invest-
ing were to become the predominant strategy for institutions, other in-
vestors would be enabled to pursue more profitable trading
strategies.240 Thus, there seems considerable reason to believe that in-
stitutional investors will divide along a continuum whose poles are rep-
resented by (1) indexed investors and others who follow basically long-
term trading strategies and (2) active traders who may find that the
growth of indexed trading increases the opportunities available for
profitable short-term trading.
Among fund managers, there is already a wide divergence in trad-
ing styles, as shown by their different turnover rates. 241 Recognition of
this diversity should be the starting point for a sensible public policy
analysis of the institutional investor, because different institutions are
likely to behave very differently as corporate monitors. Having aban-
doned "exit," indexed investors present little risk of bail-outs or the
misuse of inside information. Sharing a long-term perspective, they
have less reason to be interested in obtaining short-term gains by dis-
rupting implicit contracts. In contrast, active traders seem more likely
to exert pressure for management decisions and strategies that will in-
239. For this estimate by the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, see
Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Proxy Project Report, Mar.
2, 1989, at 1.
240. See Sanford J. Grossman &Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Infor-
mationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980) (concluding that there will
be an equilibrium level of disequilibrium because the market cannot stay efficient with-
out some incentive to search for new information).
241. See Walker, supra note 236, at 36 (noting that in 1989 actively managed eq-
uity portfolios of pension plans had an average turnover rate of 47%, while passively
managed portfolios of the same institutions averaged only 13%). Another recent survey
of turnover rates by Institutional Investor reported the following range of rates among
responding fund managers:
Turnover Rate Percentage of Funds
25% or below 26.3%
26 to 50% 41.6%
51 to 75% 21.8%
76 to 100% 8.2%
101 to 150% 1.7%
151 to 200% 0.3%
See Pensionforum: Dismay Over Short-Termism, Institutional Investor, Mar. 1991, at
139. Fifty-six percent of the surveyed funds also reported that their turnover rates were
unchanged as compared to five years ago, but of the 24% that did have a lower turnover
rate, the majority attributed the decline to "a shift in assets into index funds." Id. at
139.
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crease the volatility of the corporation's securities, which, to a degree,
they can anticipate because of their privileged position as quasi-
insiders. Accordingly, as a normative matter, deregulation of the re-
strictions on institutional ownership, and particularly those regulating
"exit," should go further and faster in the case of the indexed investor.
Although indexed investors are typically long-term and substantial
holders, it does not follow from this that they will be active monitors.
The problem is that indexed funds are typically managed by external
money managers who have little incentive to monitor. Rather, having
abandoned any attempt to outperform the market, they compete by re-
ducing their costs in order to be the lowest-cost provider of "indexing"
services.2 42 Obviously, a money manager intent on radical cost econo-
mizing has little interest in undertaking costly monitoring activities.
The extent of this problem is revealed by a question aptly posed by my
colleague, Professor Louis Lowenstein. He reports that Wells Fargo
Institutional Trust, the leading index fund manager, has nearly $60 bil-
lion invested in indexed equity funds for its clients, of which $40 billion
is in its S&P 500 index,245 and that it holds perhaps 5000 different
stocks in these funds. Yet, because of the competitive nature of the
indexing industry, it charges fees as low as two basis points a year.
Thus, he asks: "How much monitoring do we get for two basis
points?" 244
The only logical answer is that one gets very little monitoring for
such a price. But if capital markets are competitive, why do not other
competitors offer more meaningful monitoring services and charge a
higher fee? The most likely answer involves a combination of the cor-
porate manager's desire for an implicit and reciprocal system of self-
protective passivity, under which corporate sponsors dissuade their
money managers from supporting shareholder activism and the fear of
money mangers that if they acquire a reputation for activism they will
be less able to attract additional pension fund accounts. Under this
combination of factors, even if all corporate sponsors do not seek to
chill active monitoring by money managers, the latter still fear acquir-
ing an adverse reputation and so seek a low profile. The result resem-
bles an implicit contract: money managers are free to use their own
discretion in making investment decisions, but not in the case of voting
decisions, because the latter more clearly threaten executive job
stability.
242. This point has been well made by Professor Rock. See Rock, supra note 9, at
474.
243. Lowenstein, supra note 45, at 33-34.
244. Id. at 33. A basis point is 1% of 1%b. Thus, two basis points charged annually
on a $1,000,000 fund would amount to $200 a year. The director of proxy voting at
Wells Fargo described their voting practices to Professor Lowenstein as follows:
"[S]ince we invest by formula, we vote by formula." Id. at 34. In my view, use of such a
formula reflects simply an attempt to minimize costs while achieving minimal compli-
ance with the Department of Labor's guidelines.
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Finally, there is a third factor: Most pension funds have only a
skeleton in-house staff, which then hires several external money manag-
ers. 245 Both investment and voting decisions are then delegated to the
external managers, and the function of the in-house staff is basically to
evaluate the performance of these fund managers. To such an in-house
staff, a manager who expends funds or time on proxy voting may seem
to be overcharging, particularly given the likely delay between voting
and any resulting increase in share value.
What then is the answer? Clearly, a small in-house staff is even less
able to monitor the managements of the 500 firms in the S&P 500 or to
follow other corporations on a world-wide basis as pension funds in-
creasingly diversify their holdings on a global basis. Inevitably, a seri-
ous reform program must consider whether some level of portfolio
diversification is "excessive" because it is inconsistent with a capacity to
monitor even minimally the firms held in the portfolio. Because such a
reform would undoubtedly be controversial, it seems best to consider
first several less drastic measures.
B. The Regulation of "Exit"
What gains could be realized simply by relaxing existing regulatory
barriers to institutional activism? Much of the fedzral securities laws
and many state statutes can be grouped into two categories: (1) legal
rules that regulate "voice," and (2) legal rules that regulate "exit." In
the former category, for example, are those rules that apply to share-
holder communications 246 or that require disclosure of plans and in-
tentions once certain ownership thresholds are crossed.2 47 Much
commentary has recently recommended revision of the federal proxy
rules and state corporate law to reduce the costs of proxy contests to
insurgents. 248 Recently, the SEC has proposed relaxing significantly
the proxy rules as they would apply to shareholder communications
among institutional investors. 249 Highly desirable as the SEC's pro-
posed reforms are, this Article doubts that either they or the reforms
proposed by academic commentators would, if adopted, "unleash" in-
245. See Black, supra note 12, at 596 (describing this relationship as "the most
common pattern").
246. The proxy rules are contained in Rules 14a-1 to 14b-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1
to 14b-2 (1991). For a discussion of their impact on the organization of shareholder
groups seeking to oppose management, see Black, supra note 12, at 536-42. But see
infra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing proposed relaxation of proxy rules).
247. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988);
Rules 13d-1 to 13d-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13d-7 (1991).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14. See also Floyd Norris, A Debate
Grows Over Proxy Rules, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at D8 (reporting the Business
Roundtable's opposition to rule revisions).
249. Regulation of Securityholders Communications, Exchange Act Release No.
29,315, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,987 (June 17, 1991) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240). For a
discussion of this Release, see infra text accompanying notes 290-292.
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stitutional investors. 250 In contrast, "exit" regulation, which focuses
on the disposition of securities by persons holding control, has received
less attention but may be more effective in inducing institutional inves-
tors to join and participate in control groups. Among the legal rules
that fall into this category are the following:
1. The Securities Act of 1933. - An individual or a group that pos-
sesses control of a company is deemed an "affiliate" and is therefore
restricted in its ability to resell any of its shares and may resell only
pursuant to a registration statement or an exemption from registra-
tion.251 As a practical matter, the only feasible means by which an affili-
ate can dispose of shares, in a publicly held company at the market price
is pursuant to Rule 144, which imposes both volume and sometimes
holding period restrictions on affiliates. 252 Thus, the acquisition of
"control" by an institutional investor, or a group of them, implies at
least some restrictions on liquidity before resale is likely to be economi-
cally feasible.
2. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. - Any gain
that an officer, director, or ten percent beneficial holder of any class of
an equity security of a "reporting" company receives on purchases or
sales that occur within six months of any earlier sale or purchase must
be disgorged to the corporation. 255 Although long thought of as a pro-
hibition on insider trading, the better, and original, rationale for this
extraordinarily prophylactic rule against "short-swing" trading profits
is that it is necessary to deter manipulative behavior by corporate insid-
ers. 254 Effectively, this threat of a six-month period of illiquidity deters
most institutional holders from crossing the ten percent threshold.2 55
The potential reach of section 16(b) as it applies to institutional
250. See supra notes 10-14, 153-169 and accompanying text.
251. Under § 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1988), a
person who acquires shares from a "control" person becomes an "underwriter" who
also cannot sell shares in the issuer without registering the shares with the SEC or ob-
taining an exemption from registration. "Control" is defined very broadly in Rule 405
to mean the "possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction
of the management and policies of a person .... " 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1991). Rule
144 does provide a practical exemption from the registration requirement for affiliates,
but under Rule 144(a)(1), an affiliate of an issuer is defined as one who "controls... or
is under common control with, such issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.144(a)(1) (1991). Thus, if
an institutional investor joins a control group, its ability to resell even the shares ac-
quired in the open market is significantly restricted.
252. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1) (1991). A controlling shareholder may also
make a "private sale" to another sophisticated person or institution, but typically such a
sale will be at a significant discount to reflect the fact that the shares remain "restricted."
In the future, Rule 144A may liberalize these restrictions, but at present it does not
apply to publicly traded securities.
253. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
254. See Thel, supra note 221, at 393-401. Professor Thel distinguishes this ra-
tionale from the frequently stated rationale that § 16(b) prevents the misuse of nonpub-
lic information, a function that § 16(b) accomplishes only imperfectly.
255. See Black, supra note 12, at 568.
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investors is uncertain because current law is conspicuously imprecise as
about when members of a loose association of institutional investors
become subject to it. For example, assume such a group seeks to elect
a slate of directors to a corporate board. Potentially, this group either
(1) could be deemed to be "constructive" directors if any candidate on
their slate is elected, under a legal doctrine based on "deputization the-
ory,"' 256 or (2) could have their individual holdings aggregated and
thus be considered a single beneficial ten percent holder for purposes
of section 16(b). To date, the SEC has declined to define when support
of, or solicitation for, a directorial candidate will trigger this "deputiza-
tion theory" under which an institution, or group of institutions, be-
comes a constructive director for section 16(b) purposes.2 5 7 The SEC
has, however, indicated that if investors form a "voting group" that re-
quires disclosure under the Williams Act and if this group collectively
controls ten percent or more of a class of equity securities, then it will
be deemed subject to section 16(a). 25 8 As a result, an institution that
solicits proxies may be deemed the beneficial owner of the shares cor-
responding to the proxies it receives. Alternatively, by participating in
discussions with other institutions, the solicited institutions could be
found to have entered into a voting group. Under either theory, insti-
256. Some decisions suggest that an institution or group that has "deputized" an
agent or employee to serve on a corporate board will be deemed to be a constructive
director for purposes of § 16(b), regardless of whether its holdings exceed 10%. See
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969); Lowry v. Howmet Corp.,
424 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
257. See Ownership Reports and Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 26,333,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,343, at 89,602 (Dec. 2,
1988) ("fact-intensive analysis" necessary to resolve issue).
258. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). As part of its comprehensive revision of the rules
under § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC adopted Rule 16a-I in early 1991. This
Rule defines the term "beneficial owner" for purposes of determining whether a person
or group holds more than 10% of any class of equity securities to "mean any person
who is deemed a beneficial holder pursuant to section 13(d) of the Act and the rules
thereunder." See Rule 16a-l(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(a)(1) (1991). However, Rule
16a-1 then exempts shares held by institutions that are eligible to file beneficial owner-
ship reports on Form 13G that are held for clients in a fiduciary capacity in the ordinary
course of business, "as long as such shares are acquired by such institutions or persons
without the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer .... " Id.
Although this language does discourage institutional investor participation in a voting
group (at least one intent on "influencing control" of the issuer), its overall impact is
not great, because this definition applies only to § 16(a) and not § 16(b). For purposes
of § 16(b), the term "beneficial ownership" is defined by Rule 16a-1(a) (2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-1(a) (2) (1991), which requires that the investor "has or shares a direct or
indirect pecuniary interest in the equity securities." The scope of the term "indirect
pecuniary interest" is uncertain. Does it arise when a group of investors would be able
to command a control premium for their shares that they could not expect to obtain on
an individual basis? For the SEC release explaining the concept of "beneficial owner-
ship" and "indirect pecuniary interest," see Ownership Reports and Trading by Of-
ficers, Directors and Principal Securities Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 28,869
[1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,709 (Feb. 8, 1991).
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tutions may become subject to section 16(a), even though they have
agreed to pad their holdings and each holds well under the ten percent
threshold. The consequence is at least a mild disincentive that may
chill institutions from co-operating in solicitation support for a candi-
date for director.
3. Insider Trading Liability. - An institution with an employee or
agent on a corporate board also becomes potentially liable if it trades
while it is in constructive possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion.25 9 In principle, the mere possession of such information within
the corporate enterprise may be sufficient to create liability, even
though those making the trading decision did not use it or have access
to it.260 As a practical matter, this prospect of vicarious liability for
information possessed by an emlloyee or agent may force the institu-
tion to accept illiquidity if it allows an officer to sit on the corporate
board of an issuer in which it holds an equity stake.261 Thus, to main-
tain liquidity, the institution must delegate its monitoring role to an
outside agent, with whom it must have only limited contacts.
262
C. The Deregulation of "Exit" What Rules Are Desirable?
Life would no doubt be simpler for the institutional investor if the
foregoing rules were relaxed.263 But the cost of such relaxation might
be to tolerate some low-visibility forms of insider trading and stock
market manipulation. No reason is apparent why the antifraud pur-
poses of the federal securities laws should be any less applicable to the
behavior of institutional investors than that of any other group. In this
light, what forms of "exit" deregulation could curb unnecessary over-
259. The institution could be liable for compensatory damages to contemporane-
ous traders and to the SEC for a civil penalty of up to three times its profit. See Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 20(a), 21(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(a), 78u(a) (1988).
260. The SEC's long-standing position has been that mere possession of material
information is sufficient to create liability, and the plaintiff need not show that the infor-
mation was actually used in the investment decision. See Louis Loss &Joel Seligman,
Securities Regulation, at 3503-04 (3d ed. 1991). Where a "Chinese Wall" has been
erected to bar the person making the trading decision from access to the information, a
different result may follow, but the discussion in the text assumes that no such structural
protection has been implemented. Indeed, it is generally infeasible if a senior officer of
the institutional investor were to sit on the corporate board.
261. Again, this statement must be qualified to the extent that a "Chinese Wall"
can be erected to cordon off the officer on the corporate board from investment
decision-making at the institutional investor. However, most institutional investors have
relatively "thin" in-house staffs, and most senior officers are involved in investment de-
cision-making. Hence, the feasibility of this option seems doubtful.
262. In essence, this is the proposal for outside professional directors made by
Gilson and Kraakman. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 884-88.
263. Other commentators believe the overreach of the § 13(d) rules could poten-
tially pose an equally serious problem. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at
896-901. I do not, because § 13(d) requires only disclosure, not illiquidity. Nonethe-
less, I acknowledge that the case they make for defining its scope more precisely is
persuasive.
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reach without imperiling important policies of the federal securities
laws? The following very marginal changes could encourage those in-
vestors that this Article suggests have the greatest potential to become
optimal monitors-namely, indexed investors-to participate in corpo-
rate governance. Collectively, they would encourage such investors to
hold larger stakes and engage in more open discussions among them-
selves about corporate governance issues.
1. A Section 16(b) Safe Harbor. - Today, with the uncertainty that
exists over when a "voting group" will be treated as a single beneficial
owner,26 4 section 16(b) has newly emerged as an obstacle to institu-
tional activism. Although indexed investors are basically passive inves-
tors, they still must engage in constant trading in order to adjust their
portfolios. As a result, section 16(b) unnecessarily inhibits these inves-
tors who have no interest in manipulation or insider trading. Yet, the
SEC has broad authority to create exemptions under section 16(b) and
has regularly utilized this authority.26 5 In principle, a variety of solu-
tions could work: (1) "deputization theory" could be curtailed so that
it would not create liability for institutions where they neither em-
ployed nor paid the director alleged to be their "deputy" (but only
solicited proxies for such person); (2) "deputization theory" could be
clarified so that it would not apply to a campaign to elect only a minor-
ity of the directors; 26 6 (3) trades made by indexed investors simply to
adjust their portfolios in line with a stock index could be exempted
from section 16(b); or (4) the concept of beneficial ownership could be
redefined to exclude investors who have reached an understanding that
amounts to a "voting group" for purposes of electing directors, but do
not otherwise have control over, or an agency relationship with, those
who are to be elected. The few decisions that have addressed what
constitutes a "deputy" sufficient to trigger section 16(b) liability for its
controlling principal have generally involved senior officers or directors
of one corporation who were delegated the task of serving on the board
of another.2 6 7 Thus, a court could still rule, consistent with prior
264. See supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
265. The last sentence of § 16(b) authorizes the Commission to adopt rules and
regulations to exempt transactions "not comprehended within the purpose of this sub-
section." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). See, e.g., Rules 16a-4 to 16a-11, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.16a-4 to 16a-11 (1991) (exempting various classes of transactions).
266. This position has been advanced by Professors Gilson and Kraakman. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 902-03. As discussed in the text, I am not opti-
mistic about its chances of adoption.
267. In Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 264-66 (2d Cir. 1969), the
deputy was the president of one corporation who served on the other's board at the
direction of his own corporation. In Lowey v. Howmet Corp., 424 F. Supp. 461,463-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), Felix Rohatyn, a director of Howmet, was allegedly deputized by
Howmet to represent its interests on the board of Pfizer Incorporated. Finding the issue
to require a detailed factual analysis, the court denied motions made by both sides for
summary judgment. In contrast, institutional investors are unlikely to use either their
own officers or directors as their representatives on the corporate boards of portfolio
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precedents, that merely favoring or even soliciting proxies for a candi-
date does not make such a candidate into one's agent or "deputy."
Rather, some economic or other special relationship with the principal
should be necessary.
In the absence of such a judicial statement, however, the simplest,
narrowest reform would be administratively to exempt from section
16(b) trading transactions that are undertaken simply to maintain an
indexed portfolio. 26 8 At a stroke, this solves the section 16(b) problem
for the indexed investor, who buys for the long-term, but recurrently
needs to adjust its portfolio. 26 9 The rationale for such an exemption is
that the motive for such trading transactions is so clear and innocent
that any presumption of misuse of inside information is rebutted. To
implement such a rule, the indexed investor seeking to rely on it could
be required to file in advance a description of its indexing strategy, and
still would be required to report all trading transactions. Above all,
however, such a rule creates a greater incentive for the long-term
holder to play a monitoring role than it does for the active trader.
In contrast, a policy such as that proposed by Professors Gilson
and Kraakman, which would exempt a transaction from section 16(b)
companies, in part because of the need to maintain a "Chinese Wall" to protect against
insider trading liability. In Exchange Act Release No. 28,869 [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,709 (Feb. 8, 1991), the Commission declined to
adopt a rule expressly codifying or clarifying "deputization theory," but instead indi-
cated that that doctrine's development "will be left to case law." Id. at 81,251 n.27.
268. Such an exemption is far from fanciful. In its newly adopted Rule 16a-1, the
SEC exempts from the definition of "derivative securities" "interests in broad-based
index options, broad-based index futures and broad-based publicly traded market bas-
kets of stocks approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental authority."
See 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-1(c)(4) (1991). See also Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, supra
note 267, at 81,264 (streamlining the compliance requirements under § 16 of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to derivative securities, employee benefit plans,
and trusts administered by insider trustees). This exemption does help the institutional
investors that own shares themselves rather than derivative securities (such as options,
futures, or baskets), but conceptually the rationale that justifies exempting trading in
indexes through derivative securities should also exempt transactions in the underlying
securities. In both cases the underlying justification for the exemption is that transac-
tions by indexed investors create little potential for abuse.
269. Indexed investors may need to trade for a variety of reasons. First, stocks are
continually added to, and subtracted from, the S&P 500 and other indexes. Second,
indexes differ, and under some ("equal weighted" indexes) the user invests equivalent
dollar amounts in each stock in the index. In such a case, if an individual stock appreci-
ates (or declines significantly), it will bear a disproportionate relationship to the portfo-
lio as a whole, and the indexed investor would need to sell some shares (or buy more
shares) to maintain a properly diversified portfolio. Third, investors may often decide to
index only a portion of their portfolio (say, 50%o) and, if they revise this percentage (up
or down), sales or purchases will be necessary. Finally, the assets under the institutional
investor's control may change, necessitating sales or purchases. For example, a mutual
fund may experience a significant number of redemptions during a market downturn.
The key point about all these trading transactions is that the indexed investor is not
making individual, firm-specific trading decisions.
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simply because the investor group seeks to elect only a minority of the
board,270 reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose of section 16(b).
Section 16(b) is concerned not with control, but with the formation of
"pools" and access to inside information. 271 An investor group con-
trolling a minority of the board clearly can amount to such a "pool"
and can possess such access, even if it lacks control.
2. Redefining Control. - An investor or investor group that pos-
sesses "control" faces two problems: (1) it cannot sell its shares, absent
registration or an exemption, 272 and (2) a "controlling" shareholder is
prima facie liable for federal securities law violations committed by the
"controlled" corporation, unless an affirmative defense of non-
negligence can be established. 273 The term "control" is defined very
broadly by SEC rules,274 and under this definition, the power to elect
even a minority of the board could well constitute control. Indeed, the
SEC's staff has taken the position that a ten percent holding creates "a
rebuttable presumption of control, especially if such holdings are com-
bined with.., membership on the board. ' 275 If so, institutional inves-
tors who join a "control" group potentially face the worst of all
possible combinations: illiquidity and liability.
What exemptions from this definition of control make sense for the
institutional investor? First, with respect to the illiquidity problem, it
would sensibly parallel this Article's earlier suggestion that portfolio
adjustments by an indexed investor should not be considered transac-
tions within the scope of section 16(b) to exempt these same portfolio
modifications from the concept of "distribution" under the Securities
Act of 1933.276 The practical significance of this proposal is limited,
270. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 903.
271. See Thel, supra note 221, at 417 ("Section 16(b) was intended to deter affili-
ates from trading except on the basis of long-term (almost permanent) investment deci-
sions."). An exemption for indexed transactions is consistent with this purpose.
272. See supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text. "Private" sales can, of
course, be made to other institutional investors, but these sales are typically made at a
discount and thus force the seller to sacrifice the advantage of liquidity. In addition,
affiliates may resell securities under Rule 144 that are not "restricted securities" without
any holding period, but these sales are subject to a volume restriction. See Rule 144(e).
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1) (1991).
273. See Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988). On the significance of this danger to institu-
tional investors, see Conard, supra note 43, at 159.
274. See Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1991); Exchange Act Rule
12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1991). For the content of Rule 405, see supra note 251.
275. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who's In Control?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. Law. 559, 568
(1966); Raymond A. Enstam & Harry P. Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor,
23 Bus. Law. 289, 315 (1968). More recently, the SEC has acknowledged the "widely
held belief that the ownership of 20% ... voting power in a widely held company in
most instances constitutes control." Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to
Shareholder Approval Policy, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,035, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,490
(July 14, 1989).
276. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1988). The term
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however, because Rule 144 already permits an affiliate to sell up to the
greater of one percent of the class or the average weekly trading vol-
ume of the security every three months. 277 Nonetheless, Rule 144
could, and should, be extended expressly to permit indexed investors
who have a "control" relationship to the corporation to sell, regardless
of volume, provided that their disposition was undertaken as part of a
portfolio modification consistent with an indexed strategy previously
filed with the SEC.278 Thus, the indexed investor would face no signifi-
cant increase in illiquidity, even if it wished to dispose of more than one
percent of the class and was a member of a control group.
"Controlling person" liability presents a more serious problem for
institutional investors who are considering whether to join a collective
effort to influence corporate management. 279 Here, the best answer is
explicit rule-making by the SEC to tighten its overly expansive defini-
tion of "control." Some have argued that a group formed to elect only
a minority of the board should not be considered a "control group. 280
Doctrinally, this argument faces an uphill battle, given a tradition of
SEC interpretation to the contrary.281 Moreover, it is not at all dear
that directors who are representatives of institutional investors will nec-
essarily be in the minority on any given decision. More typically, the
board will act as a group and reach a consensus. Thus, a narrower and
more doctrinally feasible route to the same protective safe harbor
might be for the SEC to promulgate rules that indicate that merely
agreeing on voting decisions without soliciting proxies does not make
"distribution" is never defined by the Securities Act, but it is understood to be the pro-
cess by which securities flow from the company through an underwriter or a controlling
person to the public. One who participates in such a "distribution" is deemed to be a
statutory underwriter, who cannot sell without registration or an available exemption.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(d), (f) (1988). Even an indirect participation in a "distribution" of
securities makes one a statutory underwriter. See SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent
Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1941). Criminal liability for engaging in an unreg-
istered distribution is also possible. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779,
782-83 (2d Cir. 1968).
277. See Securities Act Rule 144(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1991). This 17 vol-
ume limit assumes, however, that the securities are not "restricted securities" that were
acquired in a private placement.
278. This proposal does not extend to "restricted securities," which are issued in a
transaction or series of transactions not involving a public offering. See Rule 144(a)(3),
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1991). "Restricted securities" must be held for a two-year
holding period. See Rule 144(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1991). This Article is
concerned only with the impact of Rule 144 on "free" stock that has been purchased by
a person having "control." Rule 144 subjects such "affiliates" to special volume restric-
tions regardless of their holding period. See Rule 144(e) and (k), 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.144(e), (k) (1991).
279. Professor Conard has argued that this is the principal regulatory barrier to
active institutional participation in corporate governance. See Conard, supra note 43, at
158-59.
280. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 902.
281. See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
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one a "controlling person" where one would otherwise not possess
control.282
Similarly, SEC rules could also specifically extend and apply the
affirmative defense that the federal securities laws provide to a control-
ling person so that it would clearly protect the institutional investor
who lacks actual knowledge but does have a nonemployee representa-
tive on the corporate board. 283 Under the Securities Act of 1933, a
controlling person is not liable for securities law violations committed
by the corporation that it nominally controls if it "had no knowledge of
or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason
of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."' 28 4
The same principle, expressed in slightly different words, is also con-
tained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.285 Yet, some decisions
have held that a controlling person has a duty to supervise.28 6 Such a
duty is simply beyond the monitoring capacity of the typical pension
fund, with its usually small, in-house staff. Thus, a safe harbor exemp-
tive rule could be adopted by the SEC to protect institutional investors
by establishing "bright line" standards for them. For example, such a
rule might appropriately provide that shareholders should not be
deemed to have "knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged" if the investor lacked actual knowledge, had no di-
rect employee or paid agent on the board, and had taken reasonable
precautions by establishing a "Chinese Wall" between itself and any
282. Where the agreement related to the election of directors, such a definition
would need to indicate that there could be no agency relation between the institution
and the director. It could add, however, that support for an unaffiliated candidate did
not make that candidate an agent. Thus, this proposal is not inconsistent with the
Gilson and Kraakman idea that directors should be dependent on institutions. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 880-82.
283. There are several precedents for such a safe harbor defense. Under § 11 (b) of
the Securities Act of 1933, see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1988), Rule 176 sets forth criteria to
guide courts in interpreting the "due diligence" defense. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176
(1991). See also Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1991) (statements on behalf of issuer
not deemed fraudulent if made on a reasonable basis and in good faith).
284. See Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7o (1988).
285. Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that "the con-
trolling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action." See 15 U.S.C § 78t (1988).
286. Compare SEC v. First Sec. Co., 507 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1974) (brokerage
firm liable for fraud committed by its officer on escrow investors) with Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (newspaper liable for "touting" columns written
by one of its columnists). These decisions generally have involved corporations who
were supervising their own employees. Courts have been more lenient with outside di-
rectors. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984) (where director was
not involved in day-to-day operation of corporation, he was not a controlling person). A
fortiori, courts should be even more lenient with an outside investor group holding less
than a majority of the shares and electing less than a majority of the board.
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implicit representative on the controlled corporation's board. 287
There is a trade-off to such a defense; to invoke it, the institutional
investor would have to delegate its monitoring role to a representa-
tive-i.e., the director it sponsored-with whom it could have only lim-
ited contacts. Yet, such a separation is probably made necessary in any
event by the potential for insider trading liability, and thus there is little
marginal cost to this standard.
In sum, what would be the net impact of the foregoing proposed
reforms? It is difficult to predict more than a modest increase in activ-
ism if they were implemented alone. Thus, the real point here is that
any program of deregulation that is consistent with the basic assump-
tions of securities regulation will not have much impact and will cer-
tainly not "unleash" institutional investors. At bottom, institutional
passivity is primarily a product of: (1) a preference for liquidity over
control, and (2) agency problems that leave money managers without
sufficient incentives to be concerned about voting. The foregoing pro-
posals deal only with the former problem, but the next section ad-
dresses the latter.
D. The Reregulation of "Voice"
Many recent commentators have proposed the relaxation of those
SEC rules that limit institutional "voice."' 288 In response to this criti-
cism, and in particular to a series of detailed proposals made by
CalPERS, 28 9 the SEC has proposed a bold, sensible, and far-reaching
program of deregulation in order that its proxy rules not inhibit inter-
shareholder communication. 290 The proposal most relevant to institu-
tional holders would exempt solicitations by any "disinterested"
person who is not seeking to obtain authority to vote proxies. 29 1 Thus,
institutional investors could freely communicate and recommend oppo-
sition to a management proposal (so long as they did not solicit
proxies).
The SEC's proposals would largely remove the chill on share-
holder communications that the current proxy rules create. 292 But,
287. The relevance of such a "Chinese Wall" here is not that it rebuts the posses-
sion of indirect control, but that it demonstrates the absence of "reasonable grounds" to
know of the facts giving rise to the asserted liability.
288. See supra notes 10-14, 48 and accompanying text.
289. See CalPERS Letter, supra note 56.
290. Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No.
29,315, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,987 (June 17, 1991).
291. Release No. 29,315 sets forth a proposed Rule 14a-2(b)(1) that would exempt
a "disinterested" person's communications from the obligation to file a proxy state-
ment. The definition of "disinterested" requires that the person not have as "material
economic interest" in the solicitation (other than as a securityholder) and not seek a
proxy or related authority. No exemption is given from the anti-fraud rules relevant to
proxy solicitations.
292. Under current rules, the term "solicitation" includes any request for, or any
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they respond less adequately to the problem of rational apathy. The
basic dilemma is that most institutional investors, and particularly those
agents that run them, have insufficient interest in exercising "voice."
This is true particularly for the indexed investors that this Article has
argued have an unrecognized potential to serve as corporate monitors.
Although these investors have less need for liquidity and are typically
less affected by conflicts of interest, their interest in "voice" is limited
by two basic constraints: First, investors following an indexed invest-
ment strategy typically hold a highly diversified portfolio in which no
single stock is likely to amount to more than a small percentage of the
portfolio. 29 3 This fact implies both an informational overload problem
and a low expected payoff from involvement with issues at any single
corporation in the portfolio. Second, the competitive strategy of exter-
nal money managers who provide indexing services is to cut costs and
engage in price competition.294 As a result, the real policy challenge is
not how to deregulate but, rather, how to motivate the rational institu-
tional investor and its agents to engage in costly monitoring. The fol-
lowing proposals address this challenge.
1. Making Monitoring Mandatory. - As a starting point, let us as-
sume that indexed investors are disinclined to be active monitors. Af-
ter all, a primary purpose of indexing is to economize on transaction
costs, and participating in proxy fights is certainly costly. Still, because
institutions hold for the long-term, such investors are more likely to
reap the benefits of improved corporate governance than are shorter-
term traders whose portfolios turn over regularly. Also, because in-
dexed investors hold shares in numerous companies, they seem more
able to exploit economies of scale in reaching voting decisions and co-
ordinating to oppose management, a factor that one commentator has
argued should reduce the costs of active monitoring to an acceptable
level.295 Finally, the largest institutional investors may hold a two or
request not to execute a proxy, or any "other communication to security holders under
circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revo-
cation of a proxy." See Rule 14a-l(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(iii) (1991). Rule 14a-
2(b)(1) then exempts "solicitations" often or fewer persons. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
2(b)(1) (1991). Thus, an institutional investor could contact up to ten other institutions
today while staying within this safe harbor. But even in this case, it is not clear whether
persons solicited in turn by the ten or fewer persons originally so solicited would count
against this limit on the theory that it was a "group" conducting the solicitation.
293. See Lowenstein, supra note 45, at 33-34; see also text accompanying supra
note 243 (noting that the largest indexed money manager supervises a portfolio of 5000
stocks for its clients). Also, as institutional investors increasingly diversify on a global
basis, they will invest in multiple indexes (i.e., an S&P index for U.S. investments, and
equivalent indexes for European and Asian investments).
294. See supra notes 243-244 and accompanying text; see also Rock, supra note 9,
at 474 (arguing that since all indexed fund managers hypothetically produce the same
gain or loss, the key to competition is to be the lowest cost producer, which provides
disincentives for engaging in costly corporate governance activities).
295. See Black, supra note 12, at 588-91. Some corporate issues will recur regu-
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three percent stake in the corporations in their index.296 At this level
of investment, any improvement in corporate governance that trans-
lates into improved financial performance can justify the expenditure of
substantial costs. If monitoring is then rational for the institution but
does not occur, the most logical diagnosis is that an agency problem
exists.
If so, one answer might be regulatory initiatives that require the
agent to engage in costly monitoring that it would prefer to avoid. Be-
ginning in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Department of Labor tried this ap-
proach, warning ERISA fiduciaries that participation in corporate
governance is not optional. 297 Basically, the Labor Department has re-
quired that pension plans and their investment managers vote their
shares in proxy contests, rather than abstain, and has mandated that
they establish procedures to ensure that their vote is informed. The
doctrinal basis for this position is the Labor Department's view that vot-
ing rights are a pension plan asset that must be exercised "solely in the
interests of ... and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and beneficiaries." 298 Finally, the Labor Department re-
quires that, in voting, investment managers must act prudently and in
the exclusive interest of plan participants. 299 As a normative statement
of fiduciary responsibilities, the Department of Labor's recent pro-
nouncements on proxy voting by investment managers cannot be
faulted. But the effect upon money managers, particularly money man-
agers handling indexed accounts, may only be to require the creation of
formalized procedures and voting guidelines that are largely window
dressing 00
What other steps could motivate pension plan fiduciaries to take
monitoring more seriously? Put simply, for monitoring to work, some
agent in the process must see monitoring as in its self-interest. One
means to this end would be to create and make mandatory a new pro-
fessional-the proxy adviser. Actually, such a professional already ex-
ists, and the market for its services is growing. 301 Intelligent regulation
larly: poison pills, staggered boards, reincorporation decisions, etc. An investor with a
large portfolio can formulate a general policy on these issues and also will be better able
to evaluate relevant factual distinctions.
296. See Black, supra note 12, at 568.
297. For an overview, see Rock, supra note 9, at 477-78.
298. In 1988, the Labor Department made this ruling in a well-known letter to
Avon Products, Inc. Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor, Alan Lebowitz, to
Helmuth Fandl, Avon Products, Inc., 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 391, 392 n.4 (Feb.
23, 1988) [hereinafter Avon Products Letter]. See also Black, supra note 12, at 554 &
n. 116 (citing Avon Products Letter).
299. See Labor Department Opinion Letter on Proxy Voting, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA),
No. 5, at 244, 244-46 (Jan. 23, 1990) (letter from Alan Lebowitz to Robert Monks,
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.).
300. See Lowenstein, supra note 45, at 34 (comment of largest indexed money
manager that it votes "by formula").
301. Among the groups specializing in providing voting advice are: Investor Re-
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could further increase the demand for such services, both in terms of
providing voting advice and monitoring those investment managers
who hold voting discretion. Today, the Department of Labor's rulings
require the pension plan's trustees to monitor "the activities of the in-
vestment manager" to whom voting discretion is delegated.30 2 Thus,
there is both a duty to vote, which in the typical case of external invest-
ment management will fall on the investment manager to whom discre-
tion over the portfolio is given, and a duty to monitor voting, which
chiefly will fall on the pension plan's trustees. These standards how-
ever, do not adequately answer the important question: What steps
must a pension plan take to ensure that voting decisions will be given
adequate and disinterested attention by professional managers? In ef-
fect, there is a duty of care imposed on the pension plan's trustees to
supervise the voting performance of its investment managers. Yet, not
only is the content of this duty uncertain, but the internal staff of most
pension plans is simply not equipped to undertake a detailed evaluation
of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individual voting decisions. Thus,
professional assistance is required. The simplest way to fulfill this duty
is to rely on a qualified expert-namely, the professional proxy adviser.
2. Creating a Market for Monitoring Services. - The problem with
the foregoing proposal is not in showing that a need for such a profes-
sional exists but in demonstrating that a market for its services can be
created. Three distinct steps seem appropriate:
a. "Unbundling" Prices. - Today, investment managers generally
charge a single price for their services; in the case of index fund manag-
ers, this price is low because the investment management services pro-
vided are minimal.3 03 What then would be the impact of requiring
these managers to unbundle their services and quote separate prices
for investment management and proxy voting advice?30 4 In all likeli-
hood, their charge for proxy voting advice would be low to nominal
because these firms seem to follow simple voting formulas.30 5 Yet, it is
also clear that one gets what one pays for, and a nominal charge thus
reflects only nominal service. If nominal prices are charged, the bur-
sponsibility Research Center (IRRC); Institutional Shareholder Services (founded in
1985 by Robert Monks); and The Analysis Group (started in 1988). See Release No.
29,315, supra note 290, at 28,987; Rock, supra note 9, at 479-81; Black, supra note 12,
at 573. I do not mean to suggest that the pension plan must wholly delegate its voting
discretion to such an organization. It could also hire such a firm in an advisory capacity.
302. See Labor Department Opinion Letter, supra note 299, at 245-46.
303. Professor Lowenstein suggests that the annual fee may be as low as two basis
points. See Lowenstein, supra note 45, at 34.
304. The same investment adviser or investment banking firm could provide both
investment and voting services. The point is not to add a new agent, standing alone, but
to break out and distinguish the separable and entirely distinct task of monitoring from
that of investment advice and stock picking. Of course, where the same firm provides
both voting and investment services, it could not monitor itself, and the trustees of the
fund would have to satisfy this obligation.
305. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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den would then fall on the pension plan's fiduciaries to justify how they
could expect to receive adequate service for a trivial charge. If higher
prices are charged, true competition can develop.
In part, this strategy seeks to embarrass pension fiduciaries by
highlighting the inadequacy of existing advice. Companies that did not
hire such an advisor could be placed under special scrutiny and asked
to justify how their skeletal, in-house staff expected to monitor all the
voting decisions before them. Still, the larger point is that the first step
toward the creation of an actual market for professional services is to
prevent those services from being provided on a tie-in basis. Instead,
ERISA regulations should require that they be specifically contracted
for. This would allow new entrants to quote potentially competitive
rates. The next step would be to specify through regulation what the
minimum content of those services should include: for example, spe-
cific review of the proxy statements, record-keeping, and an articulated
basis for the decision to vote for or against a specific proposal or slate
of candidates. To be sure, such rule-making would be unpopular with
corporate sponsors to the extent that it raises the administrative cost of
the pension fund, but the inescapable fact is that monitoring is costly.
In reality, most firms today are buying only investment advice and not
voting advice.
b. Restricted Diversification. - An even more controversial and
more important step toward implementing a serious system of institu-
tional monitoring would be to restrict portfolio diversification, includ-
ing indexing, to a level consistent with the institution's ability to
monitor. In theory, a diversified portfolio can be assembled with as few
as 15 stocks, 06 and 95% of the value of diversification can be achieved
with a portfolio of only 20 stocks.30 7 Clearly, indexing does not require
the purchase of all of the Standard & Poor's 500, and "excess" diversifi-
cation is thus wasteful because it raises the transaction costs, both in
terms of unnecessary securities transactions and unnecessary monitor-
ing. 08 Although it may be impossible for any investment manager to
monitor 500 stocks, even a medium-sized institution could monitor 25
to 50. The impact of any rule restricting "excess" diversification would
also increase the size of the stake that institutions would typicall hold
in individual companies because, other factors being held constant, the
same total investment would be invested by the same institutions in
fewer companies. Thus, the expected payoff from improved corporate
306. See James H. Lorie et al., The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 85 (2d
ed. 1985).
307. See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance
156 (3d ed. 1988). In addition, 9976 of the value of diversification can be achieved
based on a 100 stock portfolio. Id.
308. One reason for "excess" diversification might be the excess brokerage com-
missions that integrated broker-dealer firms receive when the portfolios they handle di-
versify based on the S&P 500 index.
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governance would be higher, and institutions would rationally spend
more on researching and lobbying corporate governance issues.
Potentially, such a restricted diversification rule would also create
an incentive for institutions to hire professional proxy advisers in order
to help them justify that their monitoring capacity was consistent with
their preference for a larger portfolio. The proposed rule would not
prevent a pension fund from exceeding the 20 or 100 stock levels at
which 95% or 99%, respectively, of the value of diversification can be
achieved. Rather, it would only require such a fund to prove that its
monitoring capacity enabled it to follow a larger portfolio adequately.
In short, this strategy would have two goals: (1) by restricting "excess
diversification," pension funds would be required to hold larger stakes
in fewer companies, and (2) by recognizing the use of proxy advisers as
a basis for demonstrating adequate monitoring capacity, the growth of
a new and necessary industry would be encouraged.
Simple as this proposal sounds, it faces two serious obstacles, one
structural and one legal. First, if one were seriously to insist that insti-
tutions limit their investments to stakes in some small number of com-
panies (for example, 50 or 100), the result would be that large
institutions, such as CalPERS, would be compelled to hold huge blocks,
possibly 30% stakes or more, and only in very large companies, simply
to invest that portion of their portfolios currently invested in the entire
market. Because the net result would be to institutionalize the
equivalent of the German universal banking system overnight, it is
clearly unrealistic to think that such a sweeping change could be im-
posed on the corporate world in the absence of any strong political
consensus for change. Thus, modifications are necessary. One possi-
bility would be to place a safety valve on this proposal: for example, a
3-5% permissive cap could be incorporated, so that institutions would
not be deemed to be "excessively" diversified as long as the stakes they
held in corporations were within this range. The result still creates
large enough holdings to justify close monitoring.
Another alternative would be to apply the restricted diversification
standard in terms of individual fund managers. Thus, a large pension
fund might have five fund managers handling different portfolios, each
of which would be restricted to a maximum number of stocks consistent
with effective monitoring. The net result is to give the individual fund
manager (who might be limited to holding, say, 20 stocks) a strong in-
centive to monitor, because its impact could be far greater on the per-
formance of such a limited portfolio.
The second obstacle is created by ERISA, which mandates a
unique and economically unsophisticated form of diversification.
Under section 1104a of the ERISA statute, a fiduciary must "diversify[]
... so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless .. .it is clearly
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prudent not to do so." °3 0 9 This language focuses the fiduciary's atten-
tion not on the net losses to the portfolio, but on the risk of individual
losses of sizable magnitude.310 As a result, concentrated ownership is
dangerous in terms of the trustee's exposure to liability.31' To be sure,
a 100 stock portfolio, or even a 50 stock portfolio, may actually satisfy
this special diversification standard, but a risk-averse trustee may think
otherwise. Here then, a change in regulatory attitude does seem neces-
sary in order to implement this proposal. Indeed, given the obvious
controversy that mandating a "restricted diversification" policy would
arouse, the most practical first step is to relax this unnecessary rule that
today seems to require excessive diversification.
If investment managers were free to diversify on the basis of a
smaller portfolio, then the final proposal that this Article will make-
namely, that incentive compensation be more generally permitted3 12-
might itself be sufficient to cause investment managers to focus on
monitoring as a means of creating value for their clients and
themselves.
c. Retention of Voting Discretion. - The decision of a pension fund
to delegate investment discretion, while retaining or reclaiming voting
discretion, is inherently questionable, particularly in the case of an in-
dexed investor. If a pension plan delegates investment decision-
making, this decision should estop it from proclaiming itself competent
to make voting decisions over the same portfolio assets that it has dele-
gated to professional management. At a minimum, the Department of
Labor should require special justification of such a step, which suggests
that the corporate sponsor is seeking to gain control of the plan's vot-
ing power.313
Indirectly, such an initiative might also create an increased market
for the services of professional proxy advisers in order to justify the
pension fund's ability to retain or reclaim voting discretion. Although
corporate sponsors might desire to hire "tame" advisers whose advice
would match their promanagement inclinations, one constraint could
limit their ability to obtain cosmetic advice: Namely, professional advis-
ers could be placed under a special obligation to report inconsistent
advice given to different clients on the same issue. At least, this would
309. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1988).
310. Labor Department regulations under ERISA require a "screen or filter pro-
cess" even in the case of an index fund to exclude companies that have suffered "signifi-
cant, adverse financial developments." 44 Fed. Reg. 37,224 n.7, amending 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550,404a-l(b) (1990).
311. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent
Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52, 66-67 (1987); see also Black, supra note 12, at 553-54
for a similar conclusion.
312. See infra notes 336-347 and accompanying text.
313. Some evidence suggests that this practice is becoming more common and that
its "conscious purpose is to ensure promanager votes." Black, supra note 12, at 598.
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inhibit specially tailored advice for each client in keeping with its corpo-
rate sponsor's preexisting views.
3. Deregulating the Proxy Adviser. - The professional proxy adviser
today operates in a legal limbo, because its activities are at the very
edge of those permitted by law. Unlike earlier firms that played only a
clearinghouse function, these new advisers expressly offer voting advice
on proxy matters to their institutional clients. The best known of these
new firms, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., not only gives vot-
ing advice, but is developing a database on outside directors and more
technical issues, such as executive compensation.31 4
Potentially, these organizations could substantially reduce the col-
lective action problem facing institutional investors. Both for financial
and legal reasons, however, no institution will be eager to solicit prox-
ies, particularly when it believes that other institutional investors are
"free riding" on its efforts, and will benefit pro rata with it. As a result,
collective action remains under-funded.315 Yet, because the costs of
their services are equitably prorated among all their institutional users,
proxy advisers provide a means for taxing the institutional free rider
and reducing the costs that an insurgent must bear to conduct an effec-
tive proxy solicitation. Equally important, because the proxy adviser
plays a critical coordinating role, no institutional investor would have
to bear the full political heat of publicly opposing management and co-
ordinating shareholder resistance. Rather, each can remain seemingly
passive, on the surface only paying an annual fee to its proxy adviser,
but in reality subscribing to the costs of collective action.
At present, the problem with this simple scenario is that it may run
afoul of the SEC's proxy rules. The legal issue is whether the provision
of proxy advice amounts to a proxy "solicitation" under SEC Rule 14a-
1.316 Clearly, the definition of solicitation reaches this far, but an ex-
emption can be justified on any of several rationales. First, there is an
existing exemption for the "furnishing of proxy voting advice by any
person (the 'advisor') to any other person with whom the advisor has a
business relationship, if ... the advisor renders financial advice in the
314. Founded in 1985 by Robert Monks, the former administrator of the Depart-
ment of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Institutional Shareholder
Services was the first firm openly to offer voting advice to its clients on corporate gov-
ernance matters. See Peter Riddell, A Crusader Takes on Corporate America, Fin.
Times, June 6, 1990, at 7; see also Marcia Parker, New Tactics in Governance Wars,
Pension & Investment Age, Nov. 12, 1990, at 1 (describing an affiliated company, Insti-
tutional Shareholder Partners, which seeks partners in the form of large individual cor-
porate investors to engage in corporate governance activities).
315. For a discussion of collective action and "free-riding," see supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
316. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1) (1991). This rule defines solicitation to include
any "communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to
result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy." Id. at
§ 240.14a- 1(l)(iii).
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ordinary course of his business. '3 17 On its face, this exemption would
seem to cover the new professional proxy advisor, except for the ambi-
guity in the requirement that the advisor render "financial advice in the
ordinary course of his business." Unfortunately, the SEC has histori-
cally given a narrow interpretation to this exemption, and in 1988 it
refused to grant a "no action" letter exemption to Institutional Share-
holder Services, ruling that only an advisor who provides "separate and
distinct" financial advice could utilize the exemption.3 1 8 More recently
however, the SEC has proposed an even broader exemption for proxy
advice furnished by a "disinterested" person so long as the adviser
does not seek to obtain a proxy.3 19 This proposed exemption would
expressly cover the new proxy advisory firms that have recently entered
this field.3 20 Either approach is adequate, but whether either will be
actually adopted may test the validity of the overregulation thesis.
E. Delegation to Professional Directors
As earlier noted, direct monitoring of corporate managements by
institutional investors quickly encounters a major logistical problem:
Most institutional investors own too many stocks and have too small an
in-house staff to be able to evaluate the quality or performance of the
corporate managements in whose securities they have invested.3 2 1 Del-
egating shareholder voting decisions to professional investment man-
agers is a partial answer to this problem. Still, it is directors, not
shareholders, who hold the real power in corporate governance. Here,
the same overload problems re-appear, but they can potentially be
solved by delegating the task of monitoring to outside directors. Yet,
as most serious proponents of this approach acknowledge, there is con-
siderable reason to doubt that, absent a crisis, outside directors today
317. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (1991).
318. See Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 17, (Jan. 2, 1991). In this no-action letter, the SEC staff advised Institu-
tional Shareholder Services that: "Rule 14a(b)(2) seems to contemplate that the voting
advisor will be rendering voting advice in the context of a relationship in which his role
is primarily that of an advisor on financial matters separate and distinct from that of
proxy voting." As a result, a bank trustee or a registered investment advisor can provide
voting advice, but a specialized firm, such as Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.,
apparently cannot.
319. See Release No. 29,315, supra note 290, at 28,990-92 (proposing Rule 14a-
2(b)(1) to exempt proxy advice from a "disinterested" person).
320. Release No. 29,315 specifically refers to "organizations or associations com-
prised of securityholders or issuers that exchange information with members regarding
such matters of common concern as proxy voting positions or views on corporate gov-
ernance policy. Another category would be providers of shareholder advisory services,
including organizations offering proxy voting information or recommendations . ..."
Id. at 28,991 (footnote omitted). The Release then names the principal existing proxy
advisers and indicates that they would generally be covered by the proposed rule.
321. See supra notes 243-244 and accompanying text.
1991] 1359
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
play an adequate monitoring role in the public corporation.3 22 Critics
point out that the vast majority of outside directors at Fortune 1000
firms are chief executives of other corporations, 3 23 who thus are subject
to severe time constraints and other commitments. Such directors,
they argue, may also share a group loyalty or "club ethos" that assumes
that directors, like house guests, should not question or criticize the
host.324 Finally, outside directors are part time visitors to the corpora-
tion, who lack any permanent staff, depend on management for their
factual information, and on average devote only fourteen days a year to
each board on which they serve.3 25
Beyond these logistical, ideological, and social obstacles to effec-
tive monitoring, the greater problem again involves incentives. Even if
the law could define independence in a meaningful way,3 26 there is no
assurance that an independent director would be an effective director.
The outside director still has few incentives to challenge or criticize the
incumbent management, particularly when the economic payoff from
such conduct to the director will be minimal-and may get the director
removed from office. Thus, for the outside director to be effective, in-
centives must be used to increase the director's willingness to monitor.
Recognizing the need for enhanced incentives to monitor, Profes-
sors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman have recently proposed a
novel and provocative solution: Make the outside director economi-
cally dependent on the institutional investors that the director is ex-
pected to serve.3 27 Under their proposal, institutional investors would
identify a cadre of professional outside directors who would become
specialists in monitoring. Each such director would serve on a full-time
basis as the representative of institutional investors on the boards of a
number of corporations in these institutions' portfolios. They suggest
that a professional director could serve on, hypothetically, six boards
and that, as a class, they would constitute a minority-probably a
third-of the entire board. Through such multiple board member-
ships, the professional director could earn compensation equivalent to
that of a partner in a law or an accounting firm, but, unlike most current
322. See Jay Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of American Corporate
Boards (1989). ProfessorJay Lorsch, a Harvard Business School professor, concluded
that directors play an effective role in times of crisis, but seldom otherwise.
323. Lorsch finds 63% of outside directors at such firms to be other chief execu-
tives. Id. at 18.
324. Lorsch reports that many directors "still feel they are serving at the pleasure
of the CEO-Chairman." Id. at 17. For the view that there is a "club ethos," see Elmer
W. Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Directors, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr.
1990, at 46, 47.
325. See Heidrick & Struggles, The Changing Board 9 (1987).
326. As Professor Brudney has noted, the law cannot assess the social and personal
relationships that may exist between directors and those they are expected to monitor.
See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City of Potemkin Village, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 597, 613 (1982).
327. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 883-92.
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outside directors, they would have no other major time commitments
and would be dependent upon institutional investors for their contin-
ued service in that capacity. In effect, Professors Gilson and Kraakman
discard the models of the outside director as an independent referee in
favor of one under which the director becomes a full-time agent of an
identifiable class of shareholders. 328
In principle, such an idea could work because it solves the logistical
and incentive problems that have long made monitoring by outside di-
rectors more an ideal than a reality. But the real problem is how to get
there from here. From this Article's perspective, the Gilson and
Kraakman proposal for institutional investors to elect a minority slate
of professional directors is not feasible without (a) some deregulation
and (b) enhanced incentives for institutional money managers to moni-
tor. The problem is not with what Professors Gilson and Kraakman
say, but with what they leave out. Their solution works to align the
interests of principal and agent only at the directorial level, not at the
institutional level. At the institutional level, there is considerable rea-
son to believe that professional money managers would remain ration-
ally apathetic about minority directors, because they would incur short-
run costs to benefit free-riding shareholders but would not expect to
share in the long-run benefits. 329
This conclusion does not deny that a variety of legal obstacles
should be reduced by the SEC through the deregulation of rules that
curb the overreach of the proxy rules and reduce the prospect of sec-
tion 16(b) and controlling person liability.3 30 Still, even if these re-
forms were implemented, it remains doubtful that institutional
investors would respond to the "voice" that the Gilson and Kraakman
proposals would give them. The implicit premise to the Gilson and
Kraakman proposals appears to be that if legal restrictions, particularly
those on "exit," are eased, institutional investors will participate ac-
tively in corporate governance. Yet, from this Article's perspective,
easy "exit" may mean diminished "voice"; and deregulation is not a
cure for rational apathy.
To date, there is little evidence that institutional investors who rely
on "exit" will participate in corporate governance, except on a short-
term basis in connection with takeovers. Although sometimes institu-
tional investors have successfully organized themselves to take collec-
tive action in favor of proposals that seek to unblock the market for
corporate control, there are few instances in which they have success-
328. For precisely this reason the Gilson and Kraakman proposal presents the ear-
lier noted legal issues surrounding deputization theory and controlling person liability
in their least favorable light. See supra notes 253-262 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text. For a similar analysis, see
Rock, supra note 9, at 474-75.
330. See supra notes 264-287 and accompanying text.
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fully organized to pursue other goals. 33 ' Only in corporate control bat-
tles have the short-term gains to investors been sufficiently high-
because success may be followed by a lucrative takeover bid-to out-
weigh the uncertain direct and indirect costs of opposing corporate
management. Even in these cases, institutional activism has been on
balance largely unsuccessful. In 1987-88, the Council of Institutional
Investors organized a campaign to adopt shareholder proposals oppos-
ing the poison pill; thirty-two corporations were chosen as candidates
for such proposals because they had particularly high levels of institu-
tional ownership (averaging 56.6%).332 Regardless, the average vote
for the proposals was only 29.4%, implying that institutional investors
only voted a little over half of their stock for the proposal. 333
Holding aside the special case of public pension funds, a pessimis-
tic evaluation thus seems necessary: The costs of opposing manage-
ment are still perceived by many, perhaps most, institutional investors
as too high. Many fear the unknown evil represented by insurgents
more than they fear the known evil of incumbent management. 334 Still,
over the next decade, pension funds will come to own approximately
forty percent of the equity in American corporations. 335 The future of
corporate governance will depend less on what the SEC does about the
overreach of the securities laws and more on what the Department of
Labor does about creating incentives through compensation systems,
diversification restrictions, and the pricing of money management ser-
vices to encourage long-term monitoring.
F. The Case for Incentive Compensation
The hardest problem has been saved for last. Repeatedly, this Ar-
ticle has suggested that even if institutional investors have a rational
331. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, there were twenty-
six proxy contests for full or partial control of the board in 1989, of which only three
were successful. As of mid-1990, there had been twenty actual or threatened proxy con-
tests, of which only one had been successful. See Proxy Contests, supra note 234, at 1,
10. There has also recently been a decline in the number of proxy contests. See supra
note 47.
332. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 868, 893 n.91.
333. Id. By 1988, this average increased to 39.57o. Id. Still, this data suggests that
a substantial portion of institutional investors will not even support a provision that
seeks to unblock the market for corporate control (in which they make very high short-
term returns). Contests over directorial elections are even more controversial and offer
no immediate returns.
334. See Proxy Contests, supra note 234, at 11 (institutional investors have "con-
servative" bias and tend to back only candidates they know). The Gilson and Kraakman
proposals are intended to respond to this problem by seeking to elect only a minorityof
the board. Still, investors may fear that a divided board implies disharmony and conflict.
This fear was always the justification offered by corporations for their opposition to~cu-
mulative voting, and the Gilson and Kraakman proposals may produce an equivalent
end result.
335. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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interest in corporate governance, their investment managers may not.
Why? Both in the mutual fund and pension contexts, investment advis-
ers tend to be compensated under mechanical formulas that pay them a
small annual percentage of the assets under their control.336 Clearly,
such an unsophisticated flat formula does little to align incentives be-
tween the manager and the fund it serves, and incentive compensation
based on capital appreciation would work far better.
Why isn't incentive compensation used? In the mutual fund con-
text, the short answer is a legal one: The Investment Advisers Act of
1940337 prohibits the use of any formula that "provides for compensa-
tion to the investment adviser on the basis of a share of capital gains
upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of
the client."3 38 Although this prohibition has been marginally relaxed
in the case of an investment adviser to a mutual fund, index funds are,
as a practical matter, unable to use the narrow authorization for incen-
tive compensation.33 9 Moreover, even if a broader exemption specifi-
cally tailored to the index fund could be adopted, a further problem
still remains: Directors of mutual funds have little incentive to adopt
336. Usually, such formulas are a declining percentage of the assets under manage-
ment in order to reflect economies of scale (for example, 1/2 of 1%6 of the first $500
million, 1/4 of 1%o of the next $250 million, etc.). The actual formulas used appear in
many of the well-known cases in this field. See cases cited supra note 197. For an over-
view of the factors considered in the fee formula determination, see Robert C. Pozen,
Financial Institutions: Cases, Materials, and Problems on Investment Management
250-96 (1978).
337. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-l-80b-21.
338. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205(a)(1) ("Investment advisory con-
tracts"), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (1988). The policy problem underlying the statute is
that incentive compensation can create an incentive for the fund manager to accept ex-
cessive risk. See 2 Tamar Frankel, The Regulation of Money Managers 285-300 (1978);
Harvey E. Bines, The Law of Investment Management § 5.03[2] (1978). But see infra
notes 346-347 and accompanying text (noting that pension fund managers would never
take on excessive risk in any case).
339. Section 205(b)(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
5(b) (1988), relaxes the prohibition on incentive compensation with respect to a regis-
tered investment company if the contract "provides for compensation based on the asset
value of the company or fund under management averaged over a specified period... in
relation to the investment record of an appropriate index of securities prices or such
other measure of investment performance as the Commission by Rule, regulation, or
order may specify." The SEC has promulgated Rule 205-1 to define "investment per-
formance." See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-1 (1990). However, because index funds by defini-
tion do not exceed the performance of the market (or any other "appropriate index"),
this Rule does not provide them with a relevant exemption. An expanded rule could
seek to define the meaning of superior "investment performance" in the index fund
context, but this is not an easy task. Finally, Rule 16a-I(a)(2)(ii)(C), 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-
'I(a)(2)(ii)(C) (1991), states that a performance-related fee received by any broker, in-
-vestment adviser, or trustee gives such person an "indirect pecuniary interest" in the
securities managed and thus triggers the application of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). This rule, however, applies only when the securities of the is-
suer exceed 107 of the market value of the portfolio. See Rule 16a-l(a)(2)(ii)(C)(2).
13631991]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
novel or potentially excessive fee formulas, because, under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, they are subject to private suit for permit-
ting investment advisers to receive excessive or unreasonable
compensation. 340 Derivative actions regularly raise such claims against
mutual fund directors.34'
In the case of pension plans, there is similar fiduciary liability for
unreasonable compensation, whether the plan is subject to ERISA or
not.3 42 Moreover, incentive compensation contracts are strictly forbid-
den when the adviser is also a registered investment adviser under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.34 3 Possibly some means of circum-
venting these prohibitions can be devised, but pension and mutual fund
trustees have little reason to take risks or to experiment. Rather, both
are likely to follow the herd and avoid original but potentially litigable
compensation arrangements.
How great an impact do these limitations on incentive compensa-
tion actually have? In the case of mutual funds, the answer is debata-
ble, because superior performance by a fund manager will attract new
money into the fund, thus increasing the adviser's compensation even
though it is measured on the basis of a declining percentage of total
assets. In short, the market may still work. In the case of a pension
fund, however, the problem is more complicated. The corporate spon-
sor of a defined benefits plan, which includes most pension plans, does
have an incentive to monitor its investment manager's performance,
because the better the manager does, the less the sponsor has to con-
tribute to the pension fund. Still, this incentive weakens to the extent
that investment managers begin to become involved in proxy contests
or show other indicia of shareholder activism. Here, all the evidence
suggests that corporate managers resist such involvement and may
340. Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)
(1988), creates fiduciary liability and gives a private cause of action to shareholders
against both the fund's directors and the investment adviser for "breach of fiduciary
duty in respect of... compensation or payments paid by such registered investment
company... to such investment adviser."
341. See cases cited supra note 197. For a more recent case, see Kalish v. Franklin
Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
342. Under § 1104(a)(1) of ERISA, a fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with re-
spect to a plan solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries and.., for the exclusive
purpose of ... defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). For a decision imposing civil liability, see Leigh
v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1988). Criminal and civil penalties are also authorized
for breach of this duty. Non-ERISA trustees are subject to virtually identical standards
under the law of trusts. See Black, supra note 12, at 553-56.
343. Many pension advisers in fact are registered investment advisers. Where the
investment adviser represents a pension fund, the exemption in § 205(b)(2) of the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 for an adviser to a mutual fund is made expressly inappli-
cable by § 205(b)(2)(B). 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1988). Thus, incentive compensation
seems to be strictly forbidden in this case.
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withdraw voting discretion.3 44 Put simply, corporate management's
conflict of interest weakens its normal incentive to pressure its fund
managers for performance in this area. Moreover, the investment man-
ager may fear that aggressive monitoring will give it a reputation as an
"activist" that will cost it additional pension fund accounts. In short, in
the absence of incentive compensation that rewards it for successful
monitoring, a pension fund investment manager probably has more
reasons to avoid active monitoring than to engage in it.
So stated, the compensation problem seems to require regulatory
intervention to encourage the use of incentive fee formulas that better
align the investment manager's incentives with those of the fund. But
here the real difficulty of the problem comes into view: In the case of
the indexed fund manager, incentive compensation is difficult to devise
because it is impossible to calculate how an index fund's performance
exceeded that of the market when, by definition, it sought to match the
market. In short, by choosing as its goal the matching of the market's
performance, there is no yardstick for comparison or an obvious basis
for measuring superior performance. Even if its monitoring improved
the firms in its portfolio, a broadly diversified index fund will have
thereby improved the entire market.
One answer to this "Catch-22" is possible and has already been
discussed: Restricted diversification. A diversified portfolio of, say, 50
stocks can outperform a similar market index (i.e., the Standard & Poor
500)-largely to the extent that the firms in the smaller portfolio are
better monitored. Indeed, the margin by which the smaller portfolio
outperforms the larger, similarly selected portfolio is probably an ap-
proximate measure of the success, or failure, of monitoring. Ulti-
mately, then, answers dovetail: a restricted diversification policy
combined with incentive compensation to fund managers can raise the
payoff from monitoring to both the institutional investor and its man-
ager. Indeed, if prudent incentive compensation plans could be
adopted, it might not be necessary to mandate restricted diversification,
but only to relax the current rules that require a special level of diversi-
fication beyond that suggested by economic theory.3 4 5 Money manag-
ers who saw an opportunity to profit would have a rational self-interest
in assembling smaller portfolios based upon their perceptions of the
potential for monitoring gains in these stocks. Finally, the traditional
reason for avoiding incentive compensation-namely, that it will lead
managers to accept excessive risk34 6 -seems inapplicable here. ER-
ISA's diversification requirements would continue to apply,3 4 7 and the
344. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 338.
347. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988); supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text.
While the phrasing of this standard should be revised, the continuation of a diversifica-
tion rule for pension funds is a certainty.
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pension fund's trustees would be under a duty to monitor the fund
manager to ensure that it not accept excessive risk. Put simply, the
pension investment manager's strategy under such a compensation
formula should be to increase portfolio value through active monitor-
ing; and nothing suggests that this requires it to accept additional port-
folio risk.
G. Summary
Investors who rely on "exit" are likely to show little interest in
"voice." As a result, actively trading institutional investors are apt to
make poor corporate monitors. In contrast, indexed investors have
largely abandoned "exit" and might therefore be induced to exercise
"voice." For them, participation in corporate governance can be ra-
tional, because they are locked into the market. Yet, even if it is ra-
tional for the institutional investor to be interested in corporate
governance, it need not be for its agent, the professional money man-
ager. Here, deregulation will have little impact, and the critical steps
are for the Labor Department and the SEC to increase the incentives to
monitor, by restricting diversification and/or by authorizing incentive
compensation formulas that better align the interests of external money
managers with those of the institutions they serve.3 48
Restricting diversification under ERISA to the level at which the
pension fund could show that it was still capable of monitoring its port-
folio would be a sensible means to this end. However, mandating such
a rule may be infeasible. Although it would impose little cost on most
institutions (because efficient diversification is achievable with relatively
few stocks, and market indexes can be constructed using only a fraction
of the Standard & Poor's 500),349 it does encroach on the sacred cow of
the manager's investment discretion. Thus, if such a proposal is
deemed politically infeasible, the second-best substitute would be to
relax ERISA's diversification requirements to a level that is economi-
cally justifiable. Such a deregulatory step, if coupled with the authori-
zation of incentive compensation, would give investment managers
their own incentive to reduce their portfolio size so as to be able to
outperform the market.
Still, if these steps were taken, how optimistic should we be that
corporate governance would improve? It is difficult to make optimistic
predictions, because adaptive responses by corporate managements are
predictable. "Tame" proxy advisers would soon enter the market, and
348. As noted earlier, the Labor Department has begun to assert jurisdiction over
pension voting decisions, but it has not gone much further than ruling that voting is
mandatory. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text. The SEC has similar
jurisdiction over mutual funds, but has taken no steps to date.
349. See supra notes 306-308 and accompanying text. Indeed, the net impact
might be to reduce transaction and brokerage costs for institutions, as each would trade,
monitor and focus on fewer stocks. ,
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would characteristically counsel deference to the incumbent manage-
ment. Assertive corporate managements can always find a variety of
low-visibility means to induce their pension fund trustees to retain
"safe" or "prudent" proxy advisers, if the law mandated their use. This
does not mean that there would be no net gains because the foregoing
proposals would likely activate public pension funds and indexed mu-
tual funds. Still, the gains would be marginal. Only changes in the
compensation formulas used for money managers promise significant
short-term gains.
CONCLUSION
The trade-off between liquidity and control implies that overregu-
lation is only one of the factors inhibiting institutional activism. More
importantly, it also suggests that the reduction of agency costs cannot
be the sole goal of corporate governance reform. Rather, monitors as
well as managers can behave opportunistically. Indeed, the two can
even collude to the disadvantage of minority shareholders (as may
sometimes occur in the financial monitoring systems now in operation
in Japan and Germany).
Once one recognizes the multilateral character of the relationships
within the public corporation, the very concept of financial monitoring
takes on a deeper ambiguity: (1) sometimes, the monitor may work on
behalf of the minority shareholders to reduce agency costs (possibly in
return for some benefit not made available on a pro-rata basis to all
shareholders, such as above-market interest); (2) sometimes, the moni-
tor may rebel against the tendency of minority shareholders to "free
ride" on its efforts and instead align itself with management (again,
possibly in return for some side payment); or (3) sometimes, the moni-
tor may defect from one alliance to another and do so repeatedly. The
result can be unstable and shifting coalitions.3 50
From this perspective, public policy should encourage some insti-
tutional investors more than others to assume a monitoring role. The
profile of the optimal monitor seemingly includes the following ele-
ments: (1) an ability to hold large equity stakes; (2) an inclination to
hold for the longer term over which improved monitoring can pay off;
and (3) the absence of any substantial conflict of interest. On this basis,
pension funds and closed-end mutual funds seem potentially superior
to banks and other creditor-shareholders. Yet, what cannot be safely
concluded is that monitoring will be adequately funded without the in-
stitutional investor occupying some other relationship to the corpora-
tion through which it can be compensated for the "excess" monitoring
it provides the free-riding minority shareholders. Precisely this issue
underlies, and confounds, any attempt to reach a bottom line evalua-
350. I have discussed this theme elsewhere. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Co-
alitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. L.J. 1495 (1990).
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tion of the efficiency of either the Japanese keiretsu or the German uni-
versal bank system of credit or/shareholder monitoring. The
unwillingness of financial monitors to take and hold larger equity stakes
that might justify greater expenditure on their part, even when legally
permitted to do so, suggests that monitoring is costly and that these
institutions do not consider themselves to have a major comparative
advantage as equity investors.
The serious study of comparative corporate governance is still in
its infancy. Yet, at least as a preliminary assessment, the liquidity/con-
trol trade-off seems readily discernible around the globe. Does this
mean that it is unbridgeable? Not necessarily. This Article has focused
on how to improve monitoring by those investors whose demand for
liquidity is already limited. However, the longer term answer may lie in
focusing on how public policy can reduce either the demand for liquid-
ity or the demand for control. Much of the demand for liquidity may
reflect managerial desires, rather than institutional needs.3 51 Similarly,
the demand for control may be moderated to the extent that close sub-
stitutes for control can be developed.35 2
Ultimately, monitoring is not neutral. Different monitors will be-
have differently in terms of their respective needs for liquidity, their
time horizons, or their attitudes toward risk. Society either chooses the
monitors it wants or accepts those that emerge by default. In this
sense, the new political theory of the corporation is correct: Politics
does and will continue to count.
351. The short-term trading of large portfolios, for example, produces brokerage
commissions and justifies research fees, even though the large institutional investor may
already be locked into the market and unable to outperform it.
352. This is essentially what the Gilson and Kraakman proposals would accomplish
by allowing institutions to influence, but not directly control, corporate decision-
making. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 883-905.
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